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vAbstract
Gender Income Gap Over Life-Cycle: Cross-Country Analysis
by Papuna Gogoladze
Despite the vast literature on the gender disparities in the labor market participation
and outcomes, there is a scarce literature on the gender gap in total income. This pa-
per tries to fill the research gap and has threefold contribution to the existing litera-
ture. First, the paper studies the gender gap in aggregate income instead of focusing
only one component – wages. Second, the analysis of the gap in four age categories
reveals how the income gap behaves throughout the “life-cycle”. And three, the gap
is analysed in 25 countries that allows observing the institutional differences that are
not apparent in case of single-country study. In most countries the unexplained me-
dian total income gap is the lowest among the youngest and increases throughout
the life-cycle. However, there are countries, where the gap peaks in the youngest
age group, for example, in Bulgaria. There is a large heterogeneity among countries
in the unexplained gap size. Among the working age people, the unexplained me-
dian income gap is above 70% in Greece, while the lowest gap, approximately 4%, is
reported in Slovenia. The paper suggests that trade union membership reduces and
minimum wages increase the unexplained income gap of low-income individuals
below age 45. More generous maternity leave increases it for low-income individu-
als between age 25-44, while formal child-care has negative impact throughout the
distribution for the oldest. The analysis shows that "one-size-fits-all" policies are




A gender discrimination in numerous fields has laid a solid foundation for develop-
ment of advanced econometric tools, which has enabled researchers to extensively
study differences in the labor market outcomes and participation by gender. Most
studies on gender inequality in labor market participation show strong convergence
of economic status of males and females over time (e.g. see Balleer et al. (2009), Al-
toji and Blank (1999)), However, there still exists substantial gap between earnings
of men and women (e.g. see Boll and Lagemann (2018)). Since wages constitute
the largest component of total earnings, the gender wage gap has become the most
widely studied topic in terms of gender inequality. This process has been acceler-
ated by the availability of the data on employment income. However, the absence of
appropriate statistical data impeded the further examination of gender disparities
in other fields, such as wealth and pensions. For example, until recently, little to
no studies have been done on wealth inequality (see, inter alia, Siemerminska et al.
(2010), Bonnet et al. (2013), D’Alessio (2018), Meriküll et al. (2018)). Most datasets
collected information on wealth components at household level, which made is im-
possible to differentiate the individual possessions.
Due to very similar reasons as for the gender wealth inequality, there is a very
scarce literature on the gender income gap. The study of wage differentials captures
the gap only among wage-earners, which accounts for less than a half of the total
population. Moreover, employment income is only one part of the total income. Em-
ployment income itself may include wage and self-employment income, while the
total income, in addition, includes property and capital income, and transfers. Also,
the role of employment income is different for people from different age groups (less
important for young and old individuals). The aim of the study is to investigate the
gender income gap over age groups in Europe. The contribution of this paper to the
existing literature is threefold. First, instead of focusing on discrepancies solely in
employment income, the study aggregates 17 different income sources and studies
the gender gap in the total income. Furthermore, the gender gaps in three differ-
ent income categories are separately investigated. Second, the gap is analysed for
different age groups that reveals how the income gap behaves throughout the “life-
cycle”. And finally, the paper studies the gap in 25 countries and tries to observe
institutional differences that are not apparent in case of single-country study.
In the study the survey data of European Union Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (2016) is used. The dataset collects information about income at both
personal and household levels along with other demographic and socio-economic
data. The study spans the 23 EU and 2 non-EU countries, including individuals
aged 16 and above. In order to study the impact of the observed characteristics on
the total income throughout the whole distribution, the unconditional quantile re-
gression is used, proposed by Firpo et al. (2009). The key advantage of this method
is its ability to estimate the effects of marginal changes in the explanatory variables
on the unconditional quantiles of the dependent variable. Next, the Oaxaca-Blinder
(1973) decomposition method is applied to investigate the gender income gap and
see what portion of the total gap can be explained by the differences in the observed
characteristics.
It is found that there is a high degree of heterogeneity among the countries. In
14 out of 25 countries, the unexplained median total income gap is the lowest for
2the youngest age-group and gradually increases over the life-cycle. However, there
are countries in which the gap peaks among the youngest individuals, for exam-
ple, in Bulgaria. The study also revealed significant variation within the age groups.
Among the individuals below age 25, in Bulgaria the unexplained median income
gap is the largest and in favour of men (0.726 log points), while in Greece there is
the evidence of the largest unexplained median income favouring women. In the
following age group of 25-44, the largest unexplained median gap is observed in
Greece (0.557 log points), while the lowest gap is reported for Denmark (0.115 log
points). Similar results are reported for the individuals between 45-65: there is the
evidence of the largest and the lowest unexplained median income gaps favouring
men in Greece and Slovenia, respectively. The fact that in Greece there are the largest
gap in these two age groups could be attributed to the shift from public to private
sector. Earlier literature found that in Greece there is a negative relationship between
public sector employment and wage gap (e.g. see Christofides et al. (2013)). Since
the crisis in 2008, the public sector employment has been decreasing at high rates.
Therefore, moving towards private sector could have contributed to the enlargement
of the wage gap and, subsequently, total income gap. In the oldest age group, the
largest unconditional median income gap in favour of men is reported for Austria,
while it is the lowest in Estonia, though statistically insignificant. Since the public
transfers have the lion’s share in the total income for the oldest individuals, these
findings are further strengthened by the gaps in public transfers: in Estonia the un-
explained median gap in public transfers is the lowest, while in Austria it is one of
the largest.
In addition, the paper analyzed the gender gaps in employment income, private
transfers and capital income, and public transfers. The raw and unexplained median
gaps in employment income are always in favour of men. Among the individuals
between age 25-44, the largest unexplained median employment income gaps are
reported in Latvia and Estonia (0.463 and 0.456 log points, respectively), while it
is the lowest in Romania (0.078 log points). In the following age group of 45-65,
there is the evidence of the largest and the lowest unexplained median employment
income gaps in the Netherlands and Slovenia (0.425 and 0.091 log points, respec-
tively). Also, glass ceiling and sticky floor effects are found in Belgium, Czechia,
France, Greece, and Norway for both age groups, indicating a presence of positive
selection (Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)). The analysis for private transfers and cap-
ital income provides evidence that the largest total and unexplained median gaps
are present in France, while they are the lowest in Hungary, among the youngest.
In the age groups of 25-44 and 45-65, the explained part of the total gap systemati-
cally favours women over men. Among the oldest, the largest unexplained median
gap is reported for Serbia, which is also in favour of women. The analysis of the
public transfers showed that the differences in the observed characteristics predom-
inantly favour women for the individuals below age 65. This could be attributed to
the women’s increased participation in the education and higher education-related
allowances compared to men. On the contrary, both explained and unexplained me-
dian gaps in public transfers favour men over age 65.
Finally, the paper studied impact of eight institutional factors on the unexplained
total income gap: union density, employment protection legislation, Kaitz index (ra-
tio of minimum wage to average wage), maternity pay entitlement, formal child
care for children under 3, pensions system design, minimum wage setting, and na-
tional minimum wage. Union density and minimum wage setting are found to have
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significant negative and positive impact, respectively, on the unexplained gap for
low-income individuals. The negative impact of union density on the gap is also
highlighted by other studies (e.g. see Blau and Kahn (1992, 1996)). Moreover, the
analysis showed that minimum wages have negative impact on the unexplained
gap in employment income (e.g. see Bargain et al. (2018)). However, as mentioned
above, it enlarges the unexplained total income gap. Since many low-income indi-
viduals receive public transfers, once minimum wages are set, they may not qualify
for those social benefits anymore, which might be larger than the marginal increase
in employment income. It is found that the maternity pay entitlement (product of
maternity leave length and payment rate) has positive impact on the unexplained
gap for individuals between 25-44: increased burden encourages employers to offer
lower wages to women compared to their male counterparts. Among the oldest indi-
viduals, there is the evidence of the negative relationship between formal child-care
and unexplained total income gap. This could easily be explained by widespread
culture of informal care (for example, grandmothers), especially in Eastern and Cen-
tral European cultures.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 overviews the literature re-
lated, Section 3 explaines the application of the unconditional quantile regression
and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, Section 4 describes the data and its transforma-
tions, Section 5 presents the findings of the paper, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A study of the economics of discrimination is thought to be pioneered by Becker
(1957) in his seminal study. As Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) describe,
availability of microdata allowed labour economists to conduct numerous studies
on gender inequality in the last decades. Most studies on gender inequality depict
strong convergence of economic status of males and females over time. Lion’s share
of this reduction can be attributed to increasing trends in women’s participation
in the labour market and their educational levels. Altoji and Blank (1999) summa-
rized the literature of gender and race inequality and showed dramatic changes in
the labour force participation in the United States – there had been a steady decline
in men’s involvement in the labour force, especially for black men, while, women
showed increased labour force participation. Despite this convergence, there exists
a gap between men’s and women’s earnings. They distinguished two main factors
contributing to the gender earnings gap: human capital accumulation and discrim-
ination. The largest part of the differential was due to the discrimination even af-
ter controlling for individual and job characteristics. Goldin (2006) introduced the
term "quiet revolution" to describe how women changed their views about career
perspectives and their role in the family. On the other side of the labour market,
computerization has had a great impact on relative labour demand for females as
compared to males. Weinberg (2000) estimates that more than half of the increase in
demand for female workers in the United States can be accounted for computeriza-
tion.
Until the second half of the 20th century, it was legal to differentiate employees
by gender and offer them different wages for certain jobs. It was a common practice
to publish job advertisements for each gender separately. However, some countries
started promoting equal pay for both genders. For example, in the United States, the
4Equal Pay Act was enforced that prohibited differentiating wages based on gender.
Australia is also a striking example in terms of promoting equal pay. The Com-
monwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunal took several measures to prevent
discrimination on the gender basis. In 1969 the principle of equal pay was intro-
duced, which aimed to prohibit the differentiation of pay for the same work. This
principle was extended in 1972 and covered work of equal value followed but set-
ting a single minimum wage in 1974. The law prohibiting the gender discrimination
was enforced by Workplace Relations Act in 1996. (Daly et al. (2006)).
Since wages are the largest and most accessible component of income, the gender
wage gap has become the most widely studied topic in terms of gender inequality.
The economics of discrimination equipped labour economists with necessary tools
for studying gender wage gap that has resulted in innumerable research papers try-
ing to quantify variables that contribute to the difference. Starting from the 1970s, a
myriad of studies tried to explain the factors that contribute to the wage differentials
between men and women. To put it simpler, all these studies sought to divide the
gap into two parts: one that could be explained by the differences in the observable
characteristics of men and women, and the other one that could not be explained, so-
called discrimination. The standard gender wage gap decomposition tool emerged
from a seminal study of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). The main idea of this
principle is to write the gap as the sum of two parts: structure (unexplained) and
composition (explained) parts. Over time several modifications and extensions of
this decomposition method have been developed: Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) extended
the method to study changes over time in the unexplained gap; Albrecht et al. (2003)
and Machado and Mata (2005) integrated quantile analysis; Fairlie (2005) extended
the model to treat dichotomous outcomes; Bauer and Sinning (2008) modified the
model for censored outcomes, and Ñopo, (2008, a,b) developed the model for non-
parametric setups. Throughout the time the model framework advanced by includ-
ing other distributional characteristics, even more, some methods of studying the
entire distribution have been developed (e.g. see Chernozhukov et al. (2013), Firpo
et al. (200), Fortin and Lemieux (2000), DiNardo et al. (1996)).
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) conduct a meta-analysis of 263 pub-
lished papers and they showed that the estimated size of the gap largely depends
on the type of the dataset used rather than on the decomposition method. Further-
more, they found approximately 35 percentage points decline in the gender pay gap
from the 1960s to 1990s. The decline was mostly due to equalization of productive
characteristics, so-called explained part of wage differential if we use the language
of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Convergence of gender pay gap is not sur-
prising at all because, as noted above, the convergence of economic status between
men and women is mostly due to increased trends in women’s participation in the
labour market and their education levels.
Blau and Kahn (2006a,b) show that in the majority of OECD countries wage gap
has been narrowed down recently but the rate of convergence is very slow. De-
spite the prohibition of gender discrimination, women still do receive much lower
wages than men. As Ponthieux and Meurs (2015) reported, at the end of 2010 the
average gender wage gap in the OECD countries was approximately 16%, but sig-
nificant variation had been observed across the countries (Table 1, from Ponthieux
and Meurs (2015), p 1010).
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One possible explanation for such variation across countries is provided by Blau
and Kahn (1992, 2013). In the wage distribution, women are observed to be concen-
trated at the lower tail. This unfavourable ranking in the male wage distribution
results in less wage differential if the distribution is more compressed. To show how
this mechanism works, Blau (2012) compares hourly adjusted gender earning ratios,
which are 77.3% and 65.4% in Sweden and the United States, respectively. Women’s
mean ranking in men’s wage distribution is lower for Sweden than for the United
States, resulting in lower gender pay gap in Sweden than in the United States that
is due to more compressed wage distribution1. Important determinants of the wage
distribution compression are wage-setting institutions. Low-paid workers, who are
mostly women, benefit from highly centralized, unionized wage settings because it
reduces wage dispersion (Ponthieux and Meurs(2015), Salverda and Checchi (2014)).
Another possible explanation but at a lesser extent is the gender gap in employ-
ment. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) introduce the effects of selection into employ-
ment, which implies that when the fewer women are employed, they are more likely
to be selected and the higher their relative wage is. This statement could be trans-
lated into a negative correlation between the gender pay gap and the gender gap in
employment. Similar effect is reported by Hunt (2002), who found that after 4 years
of reunification of former East Germany the employment rate for women had fallen
by 6% more than for men, which could be used for explanation the half of the rela-
tive wage gain (10% point drop in gender wage gap) of women.
In addition to differences in the gender pay gap among countries, a lot of inter-
est has been drawn to within-country gender wage gap and its determinants. Pon-
thieux and Meurs (2015) summarize the key findings of Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer’s (2005) study and highlight the fact that basic human capital variables can
explain only a very small portion of the gender pay gap. Similar results are re-
ported by Manning and Swaffield (2008), who studied British Household Panel Sur-
vey data. Becker (1993) and Mincer (1974) proposed the human capital model, which
attempts explaining the gender pay gap in three dimensions: first, since women are
more likely to have interruptions in their careers, it is thought that they will accu-
mulate less work experience than men; second, given the fact that women expect
interruptions in their careers, it may affect their investment in human capital, for
example, education; and third, as Becker (1985) explains after so much time spent
on childcare and housework, women have less time left for job and, therefore, they
choose less demanding and well-paid jobs. In contrast to the human capital model,
Manning and Swaffield (2008) found that human capital hypothesis can explain a
significant portion of the gap in the early stage of a career. However, more than a
half of the gap that exists 10 years after entering the labour market cannot be ex-
plained by this approach. The fact that human capital hypothesis has a significant
impact on early career wages is further strengthened by various studies, conducted
in the United States, trying to quantify the effects of college major on wages (e.g.
see Black et al. (2008), Brown and Corcoran (1997), Loury (1997)). A few women
have been observed to choose science or technology as their majors, which leads to
a higher degree of occupational segregation (also known as horizontal segregation).
1The basic idea of this mechanism is assigning a rank to females according to their wages in the male
wage distribution. Then, the average of females’ rankings gives mean percentile ranking of females in
the male distribution. Had men and women had the same distribution, the average of these ranking
would have been 50. Hence, in the wage hierarchy the lower mean ranking of females implies their
less favourable position.
6This itself brings up a question why women do not choose those career paths if they
promise higher wages? Polacheck (1981) claimed that women tend to choose pro-
fessions that do not require high career interruption costs. However, Ponthieux and
Meurs (2015) argued that this explanation does not work in the modern societies as
nowadays women are more attached to their jobs and their careers are often contin-
uous and pointed to psychological factors, which are discussed below.
The trend of occupational segregation has not been linear over time. Blau and
Hendricks (1979) observed a sluggish decline in the 1960s, which was followed by a
faster decline in 1970s (Bianchi and Rytina (1986)). Since the 1990s the decline slowed
down significantly (Blau et al. (1998); Hegewisch et al., (2010), observed stagnation
during that period). Blau et al. (2013) showed that the occupational segregation
had declined among those with college degrees, however, almost no change had
been observed among school dropouts. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010) proposed
a model that helps to understand occupational segregation. They assumed that each
individual should follow the social norms, which are associated with a certain social
category: either man or woman. Once an individual deviates from these prescribed
behaviours, this deviation results in disutility and also negative externalities for their
coworkers. The disutility is a consequence of the fact that not following the norms
makes coworkers uncomfortable and they may react and not cooperate with them
(Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015).
Bergmann (1974) introduced an overcrowding model, which summarizes the im-
plications of horizontal segregation. Bergmann argued that traditional views on
"roles" of men and women lead to the division of the labour market into males’ and
females’ labour markets. When labour market experiences discrimination, demand
for female workers decreases, resulting in supply surplus. Consequently, due to the
laws of supply and demand, they experience depressed wages for a comparable oc-
cupation. Baker and Fortin (1999) showed that horizontal segregation does not have
the same impact everywhere. They made a cross-country study between the United
States and Canada and claimed that occupational segregation did not have a statis-
tically significant effect on women’s wages in Canada.
Numerous studies tried to explain how the gender pay gap differs across the sec-
tors. It has been observed that the gender wage gap is smaller in the public sector
compared to private (e.g. see Arulampalam et al. (2007), Chatterji et al. (2011)). This
difference can be attributed to more regulated wages in the public sector. Based on
the study of Depalo et al. (2011), Ponthieux and Meurs (2015) propose a stylized
fact that “the public-private sector pay gap is positive, particularly in the lower part
of the wage distribution, but may be insignificant or negative at the top” (p. 1020).
They argue that since women are concentrated in the lower end of the wage distri-
bution, they are better off in the public sector, which contributed to the decline in the
pay gap. However, de Castro et al. (2013) claimed that the budget crises do have a
negative impact on this effect and recedes with high rates of privatization.
An interesting approach has been introduced by Goldin (2014), who argued that
the gender wage gap is mostly due to within rather than between occupation seg-
regation. She showed that for some occupations there is a non-linearity between
worked hours and remuneration, which lead to higher gender gap compared to
the case when earnings are linear with worked hours. There are some occupations,
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where time-adjusted earnings are largely affected by the time spent out of the la-
bor market and number of hours worked. Goldin (2014) provides convincing ev-
idence that such non-linearity exists when employees are not perfect substitutes,
which causes transaction costs to rise. Therefore, employees, who do not have per-
fect substitutes, receive wage penalty form reduced working hours. The elimination
of this asymmetric pay scheme may significantly reduce or even vanish the wage
differential.
Throughout the time there emerged a concept of vertical segregation, which in-
corporates notions of “glass ceiling” and “sticky floor” effects. Vertical segregation
itself describes a set of obstacles women face while climbing up a professional ca-
reer. Along with horizontal segregation, it is thought to contribute to the largest
part of the gender wage gap. The term “glass ceiling” was introduced by Albrecht
et al. (2003) and they referred to the phenomenon when women face limited ca-
reer prospects after the certain point. Using Swedish microdata from 1998, they
showed that the gender pay gap was increasing throughout the wage distribution,
however, the distribution was characterized by a drastic increase in the upper tail.
On the other hand, Booth et al. (2003) studied British Household Panel Survey for
1991-1995 and observed that women are as likely to be promoted as men but after
promotion, they may receive a smaller increase in wages compared to men. This
phenomenon has been labelled as a "sticky floor" effect. Unlike from the “glass ceil-
ing” effect, which is generally observed in the upper tail of wage distribution, the
“sticky floor” effect is evident if the gender wage gap increases at the lower tail of
the wage distribution.
To study how career and outside opportunities are related to each other, Lazear
and Rosen (1990) developed a model, which assumed that the differences in the pro-
motion opportunities at jobs that require specific training can be ultimately blamed
for the gender pay differential. Even though women and men might have the same
labour market ability, women are more likely to stay away from the labour market
due to their higher ability in domestic work. Therefore, employers are not willing to
train and promote women as much as they are in the case of men.
Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972) proposed a concept of statistical discrimination,
which reflects the consequences of imperfect information about productive charac-
teristics of economic agents. The fact that employers are not willing to hire and
promote women because they tend to have higher career interruption rates can be
used as an example of statistical discrimination. However, it is not always that
easy to distinguish statistical discrimination from the human capital model. This
difficulty is easily explained by feedback effects: since women expect fewer career
promotions, which is due to their employer’s misconceptions about labour supply
behaviour, they are less motivated to invest in careers. Goldin (2013) proposed a
complementary model of statistical discrimination, taking into account the working
environment and employees’ preferences on gender composition. The model im-
plies that men will be against women joining male-dominated occupation because
it devaluates the occupation and makes it less prestigious. In addition to discrimi-
natory factors that explain the gap in the promotion, Cannings and Montmarquette
(1990) found that men are more likely to use informal connections for promotion,
while women tend to follow formal framework and therefore they must wait longer
for promotion.
8Given the fact that explanatory power of human capital variables has been di-
minished, this paved a path for labour economists to integrate psychological and
socioeconomic factors into the analysis of the gender pay gap. The recent advance-
ments in psychology and experimental economics literature have had a significant
impact on economic research (Bertrand, 2010). Among many psychological factors,
risk aversion and competitiveness have been most extensively studied. Gneezy et al.
(2003) observed that women are more likely to have poor performance in a competi-
tive environment compared to men, however, non-competitive environments allow
them to have equal performance. They conducted a lab experiment asking students
to solve a maze under two possible compensation schemes: a piece rate and tourna-
ment schemes. The piece rate scheme paid each student on the basis of a number of
mazes solved, while the tournament scheme paid only them who solved the high-
est number of mazes. In the former case, there was observed no gender difference
in performance, however, in the case of the latter, a sharp increase was observed in
men’s performance.
These findings are in line with those of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), who
found that men and women tend to overestimate their performance rank in their
group, but men do it by a greater extent. They studied compensation choices (the
same schemes as in Gneezy et al., 2003) of men and women in a mixed-sex environ-
ment and observed that approximately three-quarters of men choose tournament
compensation scheme, while only one-third of women favoured it. The gender gap
in overconfidence could explain a portion of gender difference in the compensation
scheme, but not all (Bertrand, 2010). On the other hand, Manning and Saidi (2010)
studied British Workplace Employees Relations Survey data and, considering litera-
ture outcomes on the gender differences in risk attitudes and competitiveness, they
tested a hypothesis that fewer women are employed in the establishments, which
use variable pay scheme. Even though the hypothesis could not have been rejected,
the difference was quantitatively very small. Likewise, Lavy (2012) did not find any
significant difference in performance when the compensation was paid according to
the rank in the tournament. Considering these contradictory results, it is legitimate
to ask whether the findings of experimental studies can be extrapolated to on-the-job
discrimination. Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) argue that to date experiments do not
fully explain real-life discrimination, and how expected discrimination might affect
an individual’s choices. Furthermore, while one may conclude that lab experiments
have direct implication for labour market outcomes, these conclusions are based on
incomplete information and require further evidence from the workplace to depict
the gender differences in real markets.
In addition to psychological factors, the unequal share of unpaid work and fam-
ily responsibilities are supposed to contribute to the gender pay gap at larger ex-
tent than differences in risk aversion and competitiveness (Ponthieux and Meurs,
2015). A family composition results in different consequences in the labour market
for men and women, even though they might possess similar productive character-
istics. Family status and parenthood are found to have a significant contribution to
the gender pay gap. However, these factors have strictly opposite effects for men
and women. Men are found to receive marriage wage premium, while there is no
positive change observed for married women. One possible explanation is that since
most of the domestic chores are done by women, men tend to have higher involve-
ment in the labour market. A concept of wage penalty has been introduced to reflect
the fact that married women or mothers receive lower wages compared to their male
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counterparts. This is easily explained by the inelastic supply of labour that puts their
employers into monopsony and gives market power, which allows them to pay be-
low the competitive wages. Similar results are reported by Hirsch et al. (2010) and
Barth and Dale-Olsen (2009), who reported that in Germany and Norway, respec-
tively, labour supply of women is more inelastic than of men’s and linked with wage
discrimination.
During the last decades an interesting trend has been observed: despite the
decline in the gender wage gap, the wage dispersion increased between women
with and without children. This phenomenon was called “motherhood wage gap”.
Cukrowska-Torzewska and Lovasz (2016) studied the effects of having children on
the gender pay gap in Hungary and Poland and named five possible sources of
lower wages of women with children compared to those without children: 1) work-
ing mothers are more likely to spend time out of the labour market due to childbear-
ing, which leads to accumulated less human capital and its depreciation; 2) family
responsibilities limit working mothers to seek for ‘mother-friendly’ jobs, which are
typically less demanding and more convenient, resulting in wage differentials; 3)
unobserved heterogeneity among women with and without children; 4) according
to Becker’s work effort theory, lower wages for mothers are consequence of their re-
duced productivity, which makes employers avoid their promotion; 5) discrimination-
based theories. In the recent study of Viitanen (2014), it is shown that motherhood
has a long lasting but small effect on compensation. On the contrary, using the same
dataset as Viitanen (2014), Waldfogel (1998b) showed that motherhood results in
20% penalty for women aged between 30 and 33. Due to the "motherhood wage
gap," there has recently emerged a hypothesis that women tend to postpone having
children in order to accumulate human capital. Caucutt et al. (2002) showed that
there is a correlation between the increase in earnings and fertility delay. These re-
sults are in line with Miller (2011), who found the positive effect of fertility delay on
wages. In contrast, Smith et al. (2013) argued that those women who have children
at a young age are more likely to be selected as chief executive officers.
Not only women are affected by family status and parenthood, as it was noted
above. While there are no direct effects of having kids on men, they do receive mar-
riage premium. In addition to the increased productivity argument stated above,
another hypothesis contributing to the wage premium is a positive selection. Corn-
well and Rupert (1997) and Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997) argued that those men,
who are more productive in the labour market, are more likely to find a partner and
succeed in the marriage market. However, there is no convincing evidence support-
ing either hypothesis. For example, Nakosteen and Zimmer (1997) and Dougherty
(2006) found the selection effect. On the other hand, Chun and Lee (2001) and Mehay
and Bowman (2005) observed a positive effect of specialization.
Until recently, little to no studies have been done on wealth inequality. Most
likely, the explanation is a lack of appropriate statistical data. Generally, data in-
cludes household level assets that are shared among the members and almost al-
ways it is impossible to differentiate who owns what in the household. However,
some approaches have been developed over time to partially overcome the data lim-
itations, though all of them are far from being consistent. For example, one of the
most widespread methodologies is to impute wealth on the individual level from the
household level. This can include per capital wealth, an equal share of wealth to each
partner in the couple households, etc. As it is easily noted, the assumption that all
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household assets are owned jointly and shared equally has different consequences
for different types of households, which depends on partners’ marital status and
marriage agreement. However, the emerged approaches are still better than nothing
and provide some interesting insights despite the bias. Sierminska et al. (2010) and
Bonnet et al. (2013) used German and French data and found a significant differ-
ence in wealth accumulation: in Germany there was observed almost 45% gap in net
worth, favouring men, and in France, the gap was 16%, again in favour of men. The
results differ not because there is less inequality in France but because Bonnet et al.
(2013) did not include business assets in their study, whereas in Germany the biggest
wealth gap was observed in business wealth. These results are in line with D’Alessio
(2018), who found 18% gender wealth gap in Italy, and Meriküll et al. (2018), who
estimated approximately 45% gender wealth gap in Estonia, the country with the
largest gender wage gap in EU. Furthermore, Meriküll, et al. (2018) showed that the
gender wealth gap is the largest in self-employment business wealth.
Furthermore, the gender gap in pensions was neglected till the second half of the
20th century, when male breadwinner model was no longer consistent with the real-
ity. Before that time, it was considered that since pensions could be considered as an
outcome of wage, the wage differential would automatically result in less pensions
for women than for men. In addition, the assumption of a women being married
implied that the pensions were pooled and they could share their partner’s pension
(Ponthieux and Meurs (2015)). Recent decreasing trends in marriage and increased
rate of divorce and cohabitation changed the patterns of the gender pension gap.
3 Methodology
In the paper I analyze factors contributing to the gender income gap, apply regres-
sion analysis, and decompose the difference by Oaxaca-Blinder method. If the pri-
mary interest of the paper were to study the impact of the explanatory variables on
the average income, then the simple OLS method could have been a candidate. The
reason why the simple OLS method is popular in economic studies can easily be
seen from the law of iterated expectations (L.I.E.). According to the L.I.E., the mean
of dependent variable, conditional on explanatory variables, averages up to the un-
conditional mean: E (E(Y/X)) = E(Y), where Y could be the dependent variable
and X could be a vector of explanatory variables. Due to this property, the OLS re-
gression provides consistent estimates of the effect of an independent variable on the
unconditional mean of the dependent variable. Since the goal of this study is to ex-
amine the whole distribution of the income, methods other than simple OLS should
be employed. A computation of quantiles is considered to be a convenient way to
characterize the distribution of the outcome variable. This helped conditional quan-
tile regression models gain popularity (e.g. see Koenker and Basser (1978), Koenker
(2005)). However, the estimates of the impact of the explanatory variables on the
outcome variable, derived by quantile regression, cannot be used to study their im-
pact on the corresponding unconditional quantiles. This is due to the fact that the
expectation of the conditional quantiles does not equal to the expectation of the un-
conditional quantiles, which was the case for the conditional mean. To overcome
this problem, Firpo et al. (2009) proposed the unconditional quantile regression.
The rationale behind using the unconditional quantile regression is that it allows
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estimation of effects of marginal changes in the explanatory variables on the uncon-
ditional quantiles of the dependent variable.
Borah and Basu (2013) studied the conditional and unconditional quantile re-
gressions and distinguished three differences favouring the latter: (1) if the data
generating process is influenced by only one covariate then both conditional and un-
conditional regressions would estimate the same effect of this covariate on a specific
quantile; (2) if the data generating process is influenced by several covariates, then
conditional quantile regression would estimate the effect of a variable on a specific
quantile of the dependent variable, conditional on mean values of other covariates.
On the contarary, in case of unconditional quantile regression, the estimated effect of
a covariate is generalized over the distribution of other covariates and its interpre-
tation is directed to the whole population instead of a specific quantile; (3) in case
of exogenous covariates, the inclusion of different sets of explanatory variables have
no impact on the estimate of a covariate in case of unconditional quantile regression
as a specific quantile of the distribution is not conditioned on the mean values of
other covariates.
The unconditional quantile regression is built on influence function, however, a
slightly modified one. As Hampel (1974) described, the influence function of func-
tional statistic shows how much influence each observation has on the distribution
of this functional. Firpo et al. (2009) proposed a concept of recentered influence
function (RIF), which is derived by adding the statistic to the influence function. For
the sake of clarity, if the influence function is:
IF(Y; qτ) =
τ − 1{Y ≤ qτ}
fy(qτ)
(3.1)
then the recentered influence function can be written in the following way:
RIF(Y; qτ) = qτ + IF(Y; qτ) (3.2)
where 1{Y ≤ qτ} is an indicator function, Y is a continuous random variable, qτ
is τth quantile of the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable, Y, and
fy(qτ) is the density of the marginal distribution of Y. In general terms, instead of
qτ, there could have been any functional statistic of our interest.
Modelling the expectation of the RIF, conditional of explanatory variables, is
called RIF regression model. In case of quantiles, it can be considered as uncondi-
tional quantile regression:
E [RIF(Y; qτ)|X] = mτ(X) (3.3)
It is easily observed that when mean is considered as a functional statistic, the
OLS estimates of explanatory variables, X, on the dependent variable, Y, are equiv-
alent to the coefficient estimates derived by regression of RIF(Y, µ) (Firpo et al.
(2009)). In case of mean, the influence function is the demeaned value of the depen-
dent variable. Therefore, recalling the fact that RIF is sum of IF and the functional
statistic, RIF would equal to Y:
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IF(Y; µ) = Y− µ (3.4)
RIF(Y; µ) = IF(Y, µ) + µ (3.5)
By plugging equation (3.4) into equation (3.5), RIF(Y, µ) = Y− µ+ µ = Y. This
property implies validity of OLS estimates of the impact of explanatory variables on
the unconditional mean of the dependent variable, Y. However, Firpo et al. (2009)
show that this property can be extended to any other distributional statistic.
The central idea of the unconditional quantile regression is that any functional of
the distribution can be written as a mathematical expectation. The definition of the
unconditional distribution of Y implies that
FY(y) =
∫
FY|X(y|X = x)dFX(x) (3.6)
Firpo et al. (2009) provide the proof for the fact that the recentered influence function
integrates up to the functional:∫
RIF(y; ν)dF(y) =
∫
ν(F) + IF(y; ν)dF(y) = ν(F) (3.7)
By substituting the equation (3.6) into the equation (3.7) and considering the fact
that:
E [RIF(Y; ν)|X = x] =
∫
y
RIF(y; ν)dFY|X(y|X = x) (3.8)





E [RIF(Y; ν)|X = x] dFX(x) (3.9)
By comparing the equation (3.6) to the equation (3.9), it is easily seen that to de-
rive the unconditional distribution of Y, it is necessary to integrate over the whole
distribution in (3.6), however, when a specific distributional statistic is of an interest,
integration over E [RIF(Y; ν)|X] by regression methods is sufficient.
The primary goal of the unconditional quantile regression is to estimate how
a small increase, t, in the explanatory variable impacts unconditional quantile of
the dependent variable. This is achieved by unconditional quantile partial effect
(UQPE). If Y is a function of observed X covariates and unobservable e, in a form
of some unknown mapping h (Y = h(X, e)), then the impact on the unconditional
distribution of Y, caused by an infinitesimal change in a continuous variable X on
the τth quantile, is given by:
β(τ) = lim
t→0
Qτ [h(X + t, e)]−Qτ [Y]
t
(3.10)
where Qτ [Y] is the τth quantile of the unconditional distribution of Y. This de-
picts the case when X is univariate, however, it can be extended for the case when X
is multivariate:
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More formally, if a continuous variable X is increased by an infinitesimal change
t, from X to X + t, the change will result in counterfactual distribution F∗Y,t(y). If ν
is any distributional statistic then the impact of the change in X on the distributional






∫ dE [RIF(Y; ν)|X = x]
dx
dF(x) (3.12)
This can be extended to the case, when X is a binary random variable. Let us
assume that X can be either 1 or 0, i.e. X ∈ 0, 1. If probability of X = 1 is Px
then the infinitesimal change in this probability would result in the counterfactual






= E [RIF(Y; ν, F)|X = 1]−E [RIF(Y; ν, F)|X = 0] (3.13)
To apply the unconditional quantile regression to this study, first, I define the
recentered influence function specification for income:






i,τ + ei,τ (3.14)
where RIF(yi; qτ) is the recentered influence function of income yi at quantile qτ;
xj (j=1,...,J) are explanatory variables; β0,τ and β j,τ are coefficients of the explanatory
variables on the τth quantile of income; and ei,τ is an error term.
Firpo et al. (2011) distinguish several advantages of the recentered influence
function regression due to its linearity. The most important advantage of this method
is that one does not have to worry about monotonicity. This fact emerges from in-
version of proportion of the interest, performed locally, which relaxes a need of eval-
uating the global impact at all points of the distribution. The simplicity of regression
makes it easy to interpret and the decomposition is path independent.
To study the gender income gap, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is employed
(Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)). First, considering the fact that income is strongly
skewed right, the sample mean is not necessarily the most informative. When the
distribution is skewed right, a sample mean tends to be biased towards the right
tail and the difference between mean and median increases as distribution becomes
more skewed. Therefore, a great emphasis should not be placed on the sample mean,
because those individuals earning high incomes would be a false representation of
2The proof is provided by Firpo et al. (2009)
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the typical income. This might be an especially relevant issue in a country such as Es-
tonia (Rõõm and Anspal (2010)), where income dispersion is high. Due to this reason
unconditional quantile regression is applied. Second, the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition is applied to the estimates derived from RIF-regression. The decomposition
method allows writing the difference between income estimates of men and women
in the following way:





+ β̂M,τ(XM − XF)
= ∆̂τS + ∆̂
τ
X (3.15)
where ∆̂τM−F refers to the income difference between men and women at τ
th
quantile of the income distribution, XM and XF are sample averages of the explana-
tory variables, β̂M,τ and β̂F,τ are respective coefficients of the explanatory variables,
derived from RIF-regression for men and women separately.
The first term of the right-hand-side of the equation (3.15) (∆̂τS) is called a struc-
ture effect, while the second term is referred to as composition effect (∆̂τX). Structure
and composition effects are also referred to as unexplained and explained parts of
the differential, respectively. Since a reported gender status is considered as a group
membership indicator, either male or female, its immutable nature implies that un-
explained part of the differential can be attributed to the discrimination. However,
in case of income, unlike the case of wages, the unexplained part is not necessarily
discrimination. This unexplained part is related to the institutions to some extent,
for example, how generous public transfers are towards those raising children at
home. The composition effect, or the explained part of the differential, captures the
gap that is due to the difference in the observed characteristics between men and
women. Such characteristics could be education, field of occupation, employment
status, etc.
Gardaezabal and Ugidos (2004) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) argue that choice
of base group has a large impact on the contribution of each explanatory variable to
the structure effect. In this paper, men are considered as a base group. The compo-
sition effect can be interpreted how income would differ between men and women,
had they had different observable characteristics but same returns (i.e. returns of
men) on these characteristics. On the contrary, the structure effect shows how in-
come would differ between men and women, had they had the same characteristics
(i.e. characteristics of women) but different returns. The rationale behind using men
as a base group is the author’s expectation of the discrimination in favor of men,
which makes interpretation of the structure effect of the gap straightforward.
Ponthieux and Meurs (2015) highlight one classic difficulty associated with de-
composition methods that "the measurement error of some key variables may be
more marked for women than for men" (p. 1014). The striking example of this
problem is the labour market experience, which very often is proxied as a difference
of current age and school-leaving age (potential experience). Given the fact that
women are more likely to have interruptions in the career, their experience is over-
estimated, leading to downward bias of returns to experience and therefore upward
bias of the unexplained part of the wage gap. Neumark and Korenman (1992) point
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to the difficulty of choosing wage equation (simply, omitted variable bias).
Ponthieux and Meurs (2015) argue that apart from the observed characteristics,
there are some unobserved ones that determine the employment status of an indi-
vidual, and they might be correlated with the productivity and the wage. Neuman
and Oaxaca (1998) propose treatment for selection bias, which is arisen due to the
fact that workers are not a random sample of the working-age population, by the
inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman, 1976, 1979) in the wage equation. The
inverse Mills ratio, which is sometimes called as a correction term, is derived from
the probit model of the probability of being employed. Theoretically, this proposal
seems to work rather well, however, it has practical limitations (Vella, 1998).
The analysis is conducted in Stata 14.2. For the RIF-regression command rifreg3
was used, and for Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition the command oaxaca84.
4 Data
The methodology, described in Section 3, is applied to the dataset of European Union
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, hereafter) provided by Euro-
stat. The dataset collects information at both personal and household levels for the
year 2016. The EU-SILC data has two important features that distinguish it from the
other datasets. First, it collects data on income for personal and household levels,
which makes it more desirable for income analysis compared to strictly personal or
household level datasets. Secondly, it contains information on 25 countries (23 EU
and 2 Non-EU countries) for individuals aged 16 and above. Such rich dataset al-
lows researchers to study income distribution patterns over age groups and make
cross-country analysis, which itself reveals institutional effects to some extent. The
dataset includes 420,520 observations over 25 countries. The sample size of females
within each country is systematically larger than the sample of males. The only ex-
ceptions are Finland, where the males’ sample exceeds females’ sample size, and
Sweden, where the sample sizes are almost equal. In addition, there is a variation in
males’ and females’ sample sizes within each-country’s each age group: despite the
fact that females’ sample is larger than males’ within a country, this does not imply
that number of females systematically exceeds number of males in an age-group (the
detailed information regarding the sample size of each country is given in appendix,
Table A.1). However, the difference is rather small for each country. In addition, I
applied survey weights so that the results are the representative of the whole distri-
bution.
The income of an individual is computed as a sum of household level income
per household member and personal level income. To compute the household level
income per its member, aggregate household income has been divided by the num-
ber of its members. In other words, it is assumed a priori that the household pools
and equally distributes income among its members. This approach can be criticized
as it precludes intrahousehold inequality. However, to the author’s best knowl-
edge, there is no other consistent way of redistributing household income among
its members. As for the personal level income, the dataset allows inclusion of other
3Nicole M. Fortin based on Firpo et al. (2009) - ri f reg
4Jann (2005, revised in 2008) - oaxaca8
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TABLE 1: Countries in the study
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Denmark, Estonia,
Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia,
Slovakia, UK1.
Non-EU: Norway, Serbia.
1 At the time the paper was written, the United Kingdom was in EU.
sources of income than just employment income. Moreover, the EU-SILC data col-
lect information on income during the previous 12 months. In the data, the income
components were initially given in local currencies. To make cross-country results
comparable, all components have been converted into Euros5. The Table 2 shows
the income sources included at both, household and personal levels.
Similar to wages, the distribution of income is positively skewed. However, un-
like the wages, to rescale income, it is impossible to apply the logarithmic trans-
formation. The reason lies in different income sources that may be positive as well
as negative, which is not the case for wages. For instance, gross cash losses from
self-employment (Table 2) may outweigh income from other sources and result in
negative total income. To deal with such problems, Johnson (1949) proposed inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS, hereafter) transformation. The importance of IHS transforma-
tion has been highlighted by Pence (2006) (also see e.g. Poterba et al. (1995)). The
IHS of income is written in the following manner:









where θ6is a scaling parameter and Y is total income. The main advantage of
the IHS transformation is its linearity around the origin. This feature is especially
important for very low income. The logarithmic transformation would treat 100%
change at the lower and upper tails of the distribution in the same way (Pence, 2006).
The fact that the IHS transformation approximates logarithm in the right tail of the
distribution can be considered as another advantage.
Table A.2 presents the average share of each income component in the total
income. It is observed that apart from employment income, which constitutes a
substantial portion of the total income (on average 49.25% for men and 42.22% for
women), there are other sources that contribute to the composition of the total in-
come. The high share of unemployment income is not surprising. For some time,
an individual could have been unemployed, thus receiving unemployment income,
and after that time they could become employed and started receiving employment
income. Also, Table A.2 shows that employment income has a bigger share of men’s
income compared to women’s. On the contrary, a share of household income is
5Average annual exchange rate of 2015 is used for conversion.
6In this study the scaling parameter is set to θ = 1 as it made the distribution closer to normal,









TABLE 2: Income components
Level Components
Personal: (1) Gross employee cash or near cash income;
(2) Company car;
(3) Gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment1;







Household: (11) Income from rental of a property or land;
(12) Family/children related allowances;
(13) Social exclusion not elsewhere classified;
(14) Housing allowances;
(15) Regular inter-household cash transfers received;
(16) Interests, dividends, profit from capital investments; 3
(17) Income received by people aged under 16.
1 Includes royalties.
2 Includes only those sources that are not classified in European System of in-
tegrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS).
3 Investments in unincorporated business.
Note: Income components are assigned to either personal or household level
by the survey.
always higher for women. The assumption of the absence of intrahousehold in-
equality, implies that the variation in individual household level income is primar-
ily driven by single-headed households. Moreover, in all countries (excluding Swe-
den), the share of profits and losses from self-employment is higher for men. Since
many income components are reported on the annual basis (for example, profits
and losses from self-employment and interests, dividends, and profits from capital
investments), in this paper, I study the gap in the annual income rather than monthly.
The set of explanatory variables includes age, education, employment status, oc-
cupation, marital status, citizenship status, and children under 3 or 15 years. A more
tentative classification of the explanatory variables is displayed in Table 3.
Individuals are grouped into 4 age categories: 1) <25; 2) 26-45; 3) 46-65; and 4)
>65. From the study, I excluded individuals who are below 24, living with their
parents and reported their occupation as student, i.e. I dropped economically de-
pendent household members from the study data. As for the education, the vari-
able provided in the EU-SILC data initially had several categories, which later have
been grouped into the following 3 broader categories. Primary education includes
individuals with less than primary or primary, and those with lower secondary ed-
ucation. Secondary education group consists of individuals with either, upper sec-
ondary, or post-secondary (non-tertiary) education. And individuals with short cy-
cle tertiary, bachelor, master, or doctorate degrees are grouped in tertiary education
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group7.
TABLE 3: Classification of the explanatory variables
Variable Components
Age Individuals aged 16 - 81
Education Primary, secondary, tertiary.
Employment Status Full- and part-time worker, unemployed, inactive.
Occupation Managers; professionals;
technicians and associate professionals;
clerical support workers; services and sales workers;
skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers;
craft and related trades workers; elementary occupations;
plant and machine operators and assemblers.
Marital status Single, married, cohabitants.
Citizenship status Citizen, non-citizen.
Children younger than 3 Whether there are children below 3 in the household
Children younger than 15 Whether there are children below 15 in the household
Another group of explanatory variables that have been grouped into broader cat-
egories is self-defined economic status. Those individuals, who reported that they
were working full-time (either employed or self-employed) have been assigned to
full-time workers, while those working part-time (either employed or self-employed)
have been assigned to part-time workers. The group of unemployed individuals in-
cludes those, who reported their current economic status as unemployed. Pupils,
students, trainees, interns, permanently disabled or unfit to work, compulsory mil-
itary and community service workers, also those fulfilling domestic tasks and care
responsibilities were assigned to inactive group.
The data on occupation is collected in accordance to ISCO-088 classification. Indi-
viduals who participated in the EU-SILC survey were asked to report the occupation
of most recent main job. If an individual was unemployed, occupation for the last
main job was reported. Most individuals reported detailed codes for their occupa-
tion (either for sub-major, or sub-minor), however, some part of the total population
reported more generalized occupational fields. Generalizing more specified cate-
gories seems to be more reasonable rather than specifying generalized categories
into narrower ones without any knowledge of the real occupation of the individ-
ual. Therefore, to achieve one format across the countries’ samples, detailed occupa-
tions have been grouped into broader groups. The armed forces occupations were
grouped together with technicians.
Marital status includes three categories: single, married, and cohabitants. Sin-
gle individuals include those who have never been married, as well as separated,
divorced, and widowed individuals. Those who reported their marital status as
married have been assigned to the group of married people, and group of cohabit-
ing individuals includes those living in a consensual union without a legal basis.
7This approach follows ISCED 2011 methodology, implemented by Eurostat.
8 ISCO-08 Structure, index correspondence with ISCO-88 is available at https://www.ilo.org/
public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco08/index.htm
4. Data 19
The low response rate to the questions regarding the industry, firm size, and
health conditions, does not allow their inclusion in the regression model. The in-
clusion of these variables would result in losing the substantial portion of the total
observations (approx. 54% in case of industry, approx. 55% in case of firm size, and
more than 15% in case of health conditions).
For robustness, total income is divided into three groups: employment income,
private transfers and capital income, and public transfers. Employment income in-
corporates all income sources of either employee or self-employed ((1), (2), and (3)
components from Table 2). The private transfers and capital income include: private
pensions, received from individual plans; rent income; inter-household transfers;
interests and profits from capital investments, and income of individuals below 16
((4), (11), (15), (16) and (17) from Table 2). And lastly, public transfers include the
rest of both, personal and household income components ((5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10),
(12), (13), and (14) from Table 2)).
Figure 1 shows average share of each these income group in total income for all
countries across age groups. The share of employment income peaks for age group
25-44 almost for all countries. In Sweden, it increases gradually for all age groups
and then drops for people over 65, as in every country.





































































































































































































































































































<25 25−44 45−65 >65
UK
Employment income Private transfers and capital income Public transfers
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
In all countries public transfers constitute the largest share of total income for
individuals above 65. Unlike from employment income and public transfers, there
is a heterogeneity in income from private transfers and capital. Interesting trends
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emerge for Greece and Denmark. In Greece, the share of this income group for in-
dividuals below 25 is the largest over all countries. On the other hand, this income
component has negative share in total income for Danes older than 65.
In the next section, first, I analyze aggregate income gap in all countries over
the given age groups. Next, the gap in each above-mentioned income component
is analyzed in the similar manner. It allows to determine which income component
could have the largest contribution to the total gap. Employment income gap is
analyzed only for those between age 25-44 and between age 45-65. This is due to
the fact that there are very few employed9 individuals in the other two age groups.
On average only 2.5% and 1% of the total sample receive employment income in age
groups of below 25 and over 65, respectively. The approach to leave out individuals
below age 25 and over age 65 from the employment income gap analysis is in line
with Christofides et al. (2013), who analyzed the gender wage gap, using EU-SILC
data for year 2007.
5 Results
In this section, I present results derived from EU-SILC data by applying uncondi-
tional quantile regression and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, discussed in Section
3. Before analyzing the gap over the different age groups, first, decomposition re-
sults for pooled age groups are presented10. Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 show detailed
decomposition results of total income gap for the 20th, median, and 90th percentiles,
respectively.
For the low-income individuals, unexplained income gap is mostly due to mar-
riage status: being married or cohabiting with partner widens unexplained income
gap. The gender income gap at 20th percentile can be explained by managerial occu-
pations, as well as training in craft and trade and plant and machinery occupations,
and economic status of being inactive. Likewise, as for the gaps at median income,
being married has a major contribution to the unexplained portion, while inactive
economic status can account for the largest portion of the explained gap. In addi-
tion, part-time working can explain significant part of the explained gap for some
countries. Similar to the previous two income percentiles, for the high-income indi-
viduals, marriage accounts for the largest part of the unexplained gap, while being
inactive and having training in managerial, clerical and administrative, and service
and sales occupations have positive contribution to the explained income gap.
The detailed decomposition of gender employment income gap (the largest part
of the total income for individuals below age 65) are reported in Tables A.6, A.7,
and A.8 for 20th, 50th, and 90th percentiles, respectively. For the low-income indi-
viduals in most of the countries, part-time employment and secondary education
contribute positively to the explained gap. Furthermore, training in crafts and re-
lated trade could account for significant portion of the explained gap. Similar to
the total income gap, the unexplained gap of the employment income is mainly due
to marriage status (however, it is not statistically significant for some countries).
Likewise, in case of median employment income gap, part-time employment has
9Please note that the term "employed" includes full- and part-time (self-) employed individuals.
10Please note that throughout the section terms "unconditional" and "raw"’ (or "total") are used as
synonyms. Also, terms "unexplained" and "conditional" gaps are used interchangeably.
5. Results 21
significant contribution to the explained gap, while marriage accounts for large part
of the unexplained gap. And finally, among high-income individuals, economic sta-
tus of being a part-time worker or inactive have major contribution to the explained
gap for most of the countries. Moreover, training in clerical and service occupations
has significant positive effect on the explained gap. As in all other cases, marriage
constitutes large part of the employment income gap at the upper end of the dis-
tribution. Across the distribution tertiary education tends to lower the explained
gap: more women enroll in universities and choose degrees that are primarily male-
dominated, also female graduates outnumber their male counterparts. This can be
considered as a consequence of the women’s strategy to attain more education to
reduce the disparity. However, despite these changes, the concentration at lowest-
earning occupations (e.g. teachers) still remains the problem for women. The reason
why secondary education does not impact the gap for median and high-income in-
dividuals could be explained in a following manner: people at median and upper
end of the income distribution are expected to have higher education than those at
the lower end, therefore, for them the differences in lower levels of education are not
likely to have significant impact on the gap.
The findings of marriage having large impact on unexplained gap of either total
income or employment income are line with earlier literature, known as “marriage
premium” for men (e.g. see Dougherty (2006) for selection effects). Given the fact
that women are underpaid compared to their male counterparts, for maximizing the
household income the married couple would rather focus on male partner’s labor
market activities and allocate female partner’s time to household chores.
5.1 Results for the gap in total income
The results are reported for different age groups that allow observing the behaviour
of the income gap over different age categories. Tables A.9, A.10, A.11, and A.12
show results of the unconditional quantile regression decomposition obtained for
9 quantiles (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90%) for the individu-
als below age 25, between 25-44 and 45-65, and over age 65, respectively. The upper
parts of these tables show how much of the total income gap can be explained, while
lower parts report the portion that cannot be explained by differences in observed
characteristics. There is a variation in the statistical significance of the gaps, either
raw, explained, or unexplained for all age groups. Figure 2 reports the median in-
come gap for all age groups across the countries. Detailed decomposition of the total
income gap is provided in appendix, Figure B.1.
The results shown in Figure 2 are interpreted by age groups. First, I analyze the
youngest age group, which is followed by individuals between 25-44 and 45-65, and,
lastly, the oldest age group of the sample is analyzed.
According to the Figure 2, for individuals below age 25, the unconditional me-
dian income gap systematically favours men in all countries, except in Finland,
Greece, Portugal, and Sweden, where the gap is in favour of women. On the con-
trary, the conditional median income gap favours women only in Estonia, Greece,
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. As observed, in Greece and Sweden both
unconditional and conditional gaps favour women (i.e., the gaps are negative), how-
ever, unconditional gap is lower than the conditional one. This fact implies that
the explained part of the total income gap is negative as well, i.e. had men and
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women had the same returns, the differences in observed characteristics would ben-
efit women more than men. Likewise, in Finland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, the
conditional income gap exceeds median raw gap, again implying that the explained
part of the total gap is in favour of women. The largest median raw income gap
in favour of men is reported to be in Bulgaria (0.695 log points), while the largest
median gap favouring women is observed in Greece (-0.807 log points). In Bulgaria
the unexplained part of the total gap is also the largest among all studied countries
and accounts for 0.726 log points of the total median gap. According to the report
on world population prospects by United Nations11, Bulgaria is the fastest shrink-
ing country in Europe, which is mostly due to brain drain among young population.
Also, the share of female emigrants with tertiary education in total emigration is ap-
proximately 4 percentage points higher than men’s12. This could be the reason why
Bulgaria has the largest median total income gap among the youngest. However, sta-
tistical significance of either raw or unexplained gaps varies across countries, which
can be attributed to the small sample size in some countries (Table A.1).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































<25 25−44 45−65 >65
Age group
UK
Raw gap Unexplained gap
Note: confidence intervals are shown for 90% confidence level.
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
Next, results for individuals between 25-44 are summarized. Unlike the previ-
ously analyzed age group, the total median gap favours men in all countries. In
112017 Revision of World Population Prospects is available at United Nations’ website.
12Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries: DIOC. OECD, 2011.
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Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania unexplained part of the total gap is larger than the
total gap itself. This implies that in these countries differences in observed character-
istics benefit women rather than men. However, in other countries both explained
and unexplained parts of the total gap favour men. The largest total median gap
is reported for Greece and only 0.176 out of 0.733 log points can be explained by
the control variables. In the age group of 25-44, Greece is also observed to have the
largest unexplained median gap, which accounts for 0.557 log points. On the other
hand, Denmark is shown to have the lowest unconditional and conditional median
gaps (0.124 and 0.115 log points, respectively). The observed characteristics can ac-
count for 201 out of 0.594 and 0.339 log points in the UK and Austria, respectively,
which is the largest portion among all other countries (Table A.10). In contrast to
the previous age group, the results reported for the individuals between 25-44 are
statistically significant in all countries.
In the following age group of 45-65, similar to age group of 25-44, the uncon-
ditional median income gap is always in favour of men. In Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania the portion of the total income gap that is due to the differences in ob-
served characteristics is in favour of women. In other countries both explained and
unexplained gaps benefit men more than women. The largest total median gap is
again observed in Greece, where only 0.109 out of 0.849 log points can be explained
by the control variables, making Greece the country with the largest unexplained
part of the raw gap (Table A.11). Christofides et al. (2013) found that in Greece
public sector employment is associated with a reduced gender wage gap. Accord-
ing to the labor force survey, conducted by International Labour Organization13, the
share of public sector employment decreased drastically following the 2008 crisis.
Assuming that most of these people moved to private sector, that could have laid a
solid foundation to the enlargement of the employment income and, therefore, total
income gaps (e.g. see de Castro et al. (2013)). Greece is followed by the Nether-
lands, Spain, and Germany, where the unconditional median total income gaps are
estimated to be 0.666, 0.646, and 0.644, respectively. The lowest total median income
gap is reported in Lithuania (0.112 log points). However, more interesting indicator
is unexplained part of the total income gap, which is the lowest in Slovenia (0.039 log
points). As it is shown in Section 5.2, Slovenia is the country with the lowest median
employment income gap among people between 45-65, which could be lowering
the total median income gap to some extent. In addition, both unconditional and
conditional median gaps are statistically significant in all countries for the given age
group.
And finally, for individuals over age 65, the unconditional median total income
gap always favours men over women. The differences in observed characteristics
are in favour of women in Denmark and Slovakia (-0.071 and -0.020 log points, re-
spectively). In all other countries, both unconditional and conditional gaps are ob-
served to be in favour of men. The largest unconditional and conditional median
gaps are reported for Austria (0.651 and 0.547 log points, respectively), while the
13Informaton on public employment by sectors and sub-sectors of national accounts is available at
International Labour Organization’s website.
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lowest unconditional and conditional gaps are observed in Estonia14. These find-
ings can mostly be attributed to the gap in public transfers as it is shown below, in
Section 5.4, where it is reported that in Austria and Estonia there are the largest and
the lowest median gaps in public transfers, respectively.
Since the prime interest of this study is to examine the portion of the gap that
cannot be explained by the differences in observed characteristics, next, the condi-
tional median gap is analyzed over the age groups. In each country the conditional
median gap demonstrates several patterns over these age categories. In Bulgaria and
France, the unexplained median gap has U-shaped pattern (unexplained part of the
total gap is high at the lower and upper tails of the distribution). In particular, the
unexplained median gaps for age groups 25-44 and 45-65 are lower compared to the
other two groups. However, the conditional median gap has predominantly inverse
U-shaped form (unexplained part of the total gap is lower at the low and upper
tails of the distribution) in some countries. Namely, in Belgium, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia,
and Spain, where the unexplained gaps peak at age groups 25-44 or 45-65. From
these countries, in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Ser-
bia the gap is the largest for individuals between 25-44, while in Belgium, Greece,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain the gap is largest in age group 45-65. In other
countries, the gap demonstrates either increasing or decreasing, or much more com-
plex form. For example, in Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK the
unexplained gap peaks for the oldest age group. On the other hand, in Croatia,
Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia the gap decreases over age groups. In Romania and
Slovenia, the unexplained median gap has relatively complex form.
In addition to the the median income gap, there is a significant variation within
each of these age groups. This within-group variation is easily observed in Figure
B.1. Similar to median income gap, the unexplained gap behaviour within groups is
also analyzed from the youngest to the oldest age groups across the countries.
In Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Lithuania, and Spain the unexplained gap
in favour of men is systematically lower for people with high income (upper end
of the distribution) in the youngest age category. On the contrary, in Estonia, Fin-
land, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, and Slovenia, the unex-
plained gap in favour of men is the largest for high-income individuals15. In France,
Latvia, Poland and Slovakia, the unexplained gap is the largest in the middle of the
distribution (i.e., inverse U-shaped pattern). The gap is the lowest around median in
Portugal and the UK (i.e., U-shaped pattern). Belgium, Romania, Serbia and Sweden
have rather complex pattern of the unexplained gap across the distribution of total
income among the individuals below age 25.
14Please note that in Estonia both unconditional and conditional gaps (0.024 and 0.007, respectively)
are the lowest among all countries for the given age group, and they are both statistically insignificant.
Also, Estonia is the only country in the age group of >65, where results are statistically insignificant at
all confidence levels (Table A.12).
15Please note that in these countries, excluding Germany and Hungary, the unexplained part of the
total income gap favours women rather than men at the lower end of the distribution. However, this
effect gradually decreases or totally fades away at the higher end of the distribution. The decrease in
the unexplained gap in favour of women could be interpreted as an increase in the unexplained gap,
which favours men.
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In the age group of 25-44, the size of the conditional gap is predominantly in-
creasing. Specifically, in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary,
Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden the unexplained gap is the largest among people
with high income. In Austria and Germany, the unexplained gap is lower for the
low-income individuals but is relatively flat from median upwards. Unlike from
these countries, in Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain the gap is larger
for low-income individuals (in Spain the gap first decreases and then is relatively flat
for upper end of the distribution). Also, in Poland, the gap is largest for the lower
end of the distribution, becoming flat starting from median. The gap is observed to
be relatively low around median in Bulgaria, Czechia, Portugal and the UK. Some-
what similar U-shaped pattern is reported for the Netherlands and Portugal, where
the lowest unexplained gap is at the lower end of the distribution. In this age group
Slovenia and Serbia are the only countries with inverse U-shaped form of the unex-
plained gap.
Next, results for age group 45-65 are summarized. In Austria, Croatia, Greece,
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain the largest unexplained gap is present
at the lower end of the income distribution. On the other hand, in Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Sweden the largest unexplained
gap is observed at the upper end of the distribution. In Bulgaria, France, Norway,
and the UK the lowest gap is reported around median income. In Germany and
Serbia, the unexplained gap demonstrates inverse U-shaped pattern, however, the
gap is observed to be the lowest not around median but at the lower percentiles of
the distribution. In Belgium, Portugal, and Slovenia the gap shows rather complex
pattern.
In the oldest age group, the unexplained gap has rather complex shape over the
whole distribution in Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia. In Romania and Hungary the lowest unexplained gap is reported at 20th
and 30th percentiles, respectively. Likewise, in Croatia and Denmark, the lowest
gap is observed at 40th percentile. On the contrary to these countries, in Slovakia
the lowest gap is at 80th percentile, while in Czechia and Greece at 90th percentile. In
Austria, Belgium, and Norway the unexplained gap is systematically lower for high-
income individuals. Somewhat similar pattern is observed in France, Germany, and
the UK, where the gap decreases throughout the distribution and increases for the
individuals with the highest income in the given age group. In Spain, the lowest gap
is reported around median, however, for upper income percentiles the gap increases
and becomes relatively flat. In Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia, and Sweden the gap is systematically larger at the upper end of the distri-
bution. In Serbia, for the individuals with the lowest income the gap is the largest.
However, for the 20th percentile it is in favour of women and starts to benefit men
more from 30th percentile onwards.
5.2 Results for the gap in employment income
The following part of the paper examines the gap in greater details. First, as de-
scribed in Section 4, the gap in the employment income is analyzed. The set of
explanatory variables includes the same controls as for the total income. The gap
is analyzed for the age groups of 25-44 and 45-65. Detailed results are reported in
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Appendix A, Table A.13 and Table A.14
The upper panel of Figure 3 reports unconditional and conditional employment
income gaps in all 25 countries. In the age group of 25-44, the unconditional and
conditional median employment gaps are always in favour of men. The largest un-
explained gaps are observed in Latvia and Estonia, where they amount to 0.463 and
0.456 log points, respectively. The fact that Estonia has one of the largest employ-
ment income gap in Europe has also been highlighted by earlier studies (see, inter
alia, Christofides et al. (2013), Rõõm and Anspal (2010)). In this age group the un-
explained employment gap is the lowest in Romania (0.087 log points). The recent
study by Boll and Lagemann (2018) also provides evidence that in Romania there
is lowest unconditional and conditional employment income gaps. In 15 out of 25
countries, the explained part of the total gap is in favour of women (there countries
are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.). In the rest of the
countries, both explained and unexplained gaps are in favour of men.



























































































Raw gap Unexplained gap
Note: confidence intervals are shown for 90% confidence level.
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
In the age group of 45-65 the results are somewhat different from the previous
age group (lower panel of Figure 3). The largest unconditional median gap is re-
ported for the Netherlands (0.66 log points), where the unexplained part is also the
largest among all other countries (0.425 log points). The unconditional median em-
ployment income gap in the Netherlands is almost equal to the median total income
gap for the same age group, shown in the previous subsection. In the given age
group the only country, where the unconditional median gap is in favour of women,
is Romania (however, statistically insignificant). The lowest unconditional median
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gap, which is in favour of men, is reported for Slovenia (0.061 log points). This is
also in line with the findings of Boll and Lagemann (2018). In Latvia and Estonia,
the unconditional and conditional median gaps are lower compared to the previ-
ous age group, where these indicators were the largest. Moreover, the number of
countries, where the explained part of the gap was in favour of women, has also de-
creased from 15 to 8. These countries are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovenia.
In order to check how an unobserved segregation among industries and firm
sizes could have influenced the analysis, the robustness check has been done for 5
countries (Czechia, Estonia, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK) for the median
employment income gap. The detailed results are reported in Table 4. It is observed
that compared to the employment income specification, when industry and firm
size controls are included, the current study underestimates the explained part of
the employment income gap, while the unexplained part is overestimated in most
of the cases. This leads to the overestimation of the total employment income gap in
all cases apart from Estonia (age group 45-65). Hence, it must be noted that exclu-
sion of these controls is a clear limitation of the study.
The analysis revealed the significant heterogeneity across the countries not only
for median employment income gap but for the whole distribution. The gap reveals
interesting behaviour across the distribution, which is shown in Table A.13 and Ta-
ble A.14. These results allow to examine “glass ceiling” and “sticky floors” effects.
TABLE 4: Robustness check for industry and firm size covariates.
Country
Explained Unexplained Total
Study Robust Diff. Study Robust Diff. Study Robust Diff.
Age group 25-44
Czechia -0.028 0.012 -0.040 0.340 0.294 0.046 0.312 0.306 0.006
Estonia -0.030 0.004 -0.034 0.456 0.377 0.079 0.426 0.381 0.045
Netherlands 0.125 0.114 0.011 0.224 0.177 0.047 0.349 0.291 0.058
Norway 0.030 0.069 -0.039 0.263 0.183 0.080 0.293 0.252 0.041
UK 0.111 0.137 -0.026 0.182 0.155 0.027 0.293 0.292 0.001
Age group 45-65
Czechia 0.017 0.020 -0.003 0.260 0.253 0.007 0.277 0.273 0.004
Estonia -0.039 -0.002 -0.037 0.255 0.253 0.002 0.216 0.251 -0.035
Netherlands 0.235 0.236 -0.001 0.425 0.289 0.136 0.660 0.525 0.135
Norway 0.101 0.129 -0.028 0.195 0.097 0.098 0.296 0.226 0.070
UK 0.159 0.187 -0.028 0.261 0.231 0.030 0.420 0.418 0.002
Note: Statistical significance is not shown for convenience purposes.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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As proposed by Christofides et al. (2013), there exists glass ceiling effect if gap
at 90th percentile is at least 2 percentage points larger than the gap for a reference
percentile. Likewise, sticky floor effect is present when the gap at 10th percentile
is 2 percentage points larger than the reference percentile gap size. Due to the fact
that IHS transformed income is linear around its origin, the gap for very low in-
comes should be interpreted in monetary values, while gaps for larger incomes can
be interpreted, roughly speaking, in percentages (to be more precise, as in case of
logarithmic transformation). The former is mostly observed at 10th percentile of the
distribution. For this reason, to show existence of sticky floor effects, instead of 10th
percentile, as described by Christofides et al. (2013), 20th percentile will be compared
to reference gap. For the reference, median employment income gap is taken.
These effects can be easily seen from the shape of the unconditional employment
income gap on Figure B.2. U-shaped raw gap implies that both effects could be
present in a country, then this country can be further examined whether it satisfies
the suggested definition of the effects. On the contrary, inverse U-shaped raw gap
shows that neither of these effects are present in a country. The increasing and de-
creasing graphs can be a good indication of the presence of glass ceiling and sticky
floor effects, respectively. However, there are countries, where the unconditional
gap has complex shape and no prior assumption can be made.
Table 5 shows whether there is the evidence of either sticky floor or glass ceiling
effects. It can be observed that in Belgium, Czechia, France, Greece, and Norway
both effects are present in both age groups. The presence of these effects in Greece
is in line with the findings of Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), who showed that labor
market is mostly populated by highly skilled female workers (positive selection).
However, the results partially conform with the findings of Christofides et al. (2013),
who showed that neither of these effects is present in Greece and Spain. In Finland
and the UK sticky floor and glass ceiling effects are present in the age group of 25-44,
while only the latter is observed in the older age group. On the contrary, in Slovakia
and Sweden both effects are reported for the age group 45-65, while only sticky floor
is observed in the younger age group. In Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands
only sticky floor effect is observed in both age groups. In contrast, only glass ceiling
effect is present in Bulgaria and Lithuania for both age categories. In Croatia there is
the evidence of only sticky floors effect in age group 25-44. Similarly, in Estonia only
glass ceiling is observed in the age group 45-65. On the contrary, in Poland, Portu-
gal, Romania, and Serbia only glass ceiling is reported for the age group of 25-44.
In Denmark, glass ceiling effect is observed in the younger age group, whereas the
evidence of both effects is reported for the older age group. The data provides the
evidence of sticky floor and glass ceiling effects in the age group of 25-44 and 45-65,
respectively, in Latvia and Slovenia. The evidence of sticky floor effect is found in
Spain for the age group 45-65. Hungary is the only country, where both sticky floor
and glass ceiling effects are observed in the age group 25-44, while only sticky floor
evidence is provided for the age group 45-65.
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TABLE 5: Sticky floor and glass ceiling effects over age groups.
Age Group
25− 44 45− 65
Sticky floor Glass ceiling Sticky floor Glass ceiling
Austria Yes Yes
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bulgaria Yes Yes
Croatia Yes
Czechia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Denmark Yes Yes Yes
Estonia Yes
Finland Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes
Greece Yes Yes Yes Yes









Slovakia Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia Yes Yes
Spain Yes
Sweden Yes Yes Yes
UK Yes Yes Yes
Note: Sticky floors effect is present if the total gap at the 20th percentile is at least 2 percentage points
larger than the gap at 50th percentile.
Note: Glass ceiling effect is present if the total gap at the 90th percentile is at least 2 percentage points
larger than the gap at 50th percentile.
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
5.3 Results for the gap in private transfers and capital income
In this subsection, principal findings of the gender gap in private transfers and cap-
ital income are presented. As shown in Figure 1, the private transfers and capital
income constitute significant portion of the total income in some countries (for ex-
ample, France, Greece, Spain, the UK), while its share is relatively low in other coun-
tries (for example, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia). In the post-communist countries, the
relatively short time to accumulate wealth could possibly explain why this income
category has relatively low share (Meriküll et al. (2018)). The gender gap in this
income category is analyzed in the similar manner as for the total income: first each
30
age group is analyzed across these countries, and then its development over the life-
cycle is investigated.
Figure 4 reports results for all countries, except Romania, which has been ex-
cluded due to data limitations. For the youngest age group, it can be observed that
most of the estimates are statistically insignificant. Among those, which are signif-
icant at the given confidence level, France has the largest unconditional (0.838 log
points) and conditional (0.986 log poins) gaps in favour of men. However, the dif-
ferences in observed characteristics benefit women more than men. On the contrary,
in Hungary, both unconditional and conditional gaps are in favour of women (1.116
and 0.882 log points, respectively16). What is even more striking is that the observed
characteristics benefit women more as well17.























































































































































































































































































































































































<25 25−44 45−65 >65
Age group
UK
Raw gap Unexplained gap
Note: confidence intervals are shown for 90% confidence level.
Note: Romania is excluded due to data limitations.
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
16Please, note that gaps are reported as positive values, since they are in favour of women.
17In the Figure 4, Lithuania has also somewhat large median gap benefiting women, however, as
described in the previous subsection, such large gap is an indicator that the differential is given in
absolute values. Thus, it is difficult to say decisively that in Lithuania there is a larger gap favouring
women than in Hungary.
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In the following age group of 25-44, the unconditional median gap in private
transfers and capital income is systematically in favour of women and, occasionally,
in favour of men (e.g., Denmark, France, and Lithuania), however, rarely statistically
significant. The differences in the observed characteristics always favour women,
except in Serbia. As for the next age group of 45-65, the gap predominantly favours
women. In France, Norway, and Portugal the observed characteristics benefit men
more than women. The largest unconditional median gap is reported for Denmark,
however, it is statistically insignificant. In Croatia there is the largest statistically sig-
nificant unconditional median gap in favour of women (0.668 log points).
Among the people over age 65, the number of countries, where the unconditional
median gap favours men, increases: in 11 out of 24 countries the median raw gap
is positive. However, out of these 11 countries the median gap is statistically signif-
icant only in Austria, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and the UK. The largest median
gap, which favours men, is reported for Belgium (0.84 log points), followed by the
UK (0.773 log points). On the contrary, in Slovakia there is the largest gap in favour
of women (0.554 log points).
There are countries, where the median gap peaks for the youngest and the old-
est individuals. For example, in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden,
the gap has U-shaped pattern and favours men for individuals below age 25 and
over age 65. On the contrary, there are countries, where the same pattern occurs,
however, in favour of women. For example, in Greece, Lithuania, Serbia, and Slo-
vakia, in the youngest and oldest age groups there is the largest median gap, which
favour women. In Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, and Spain the unexplained
median gap is favour of men in the youngest age group, then gradually decreases
and favours women for the eldest individuals.
5.4 Results for the gap in public transfers
The final income category that is analyzed in this paper is public transfers. The de-
tailed decomposition of the gap is provided in Tables A.19, A.20, A.21 and A.22 for
each age group, respectively. The information regarding the median gap in public
transfers is shown in Figure 5.
In the youngest age group, the unconditional median gap is observed to be pre-
dominantly in favour of women, and occasionally in favor of men. In the countries,
where the raw gap favours men (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Latvia, Poland,
and Serbia) the gap is not statistically significant. On the other hand, in 9 out of 18
countries (Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Sweden, and the UK), the gap, favouring women, is statistically significant. The
largest gap is reported in the Netherlands, where the gap is mostly unexplained
by the differences in the observed characteristics (-0.672 out of -0.832 log points).
However, in Denmark, the country with the second largest median gap in favour
of women, only a little portion of the raw gap is unexplained (0.144 out of 0.82 log
points). In the majority of countries, where the unconditional median gap in pub-
lic transfers favours women, both explained and unexplained gaps are in favour of
women as well. In Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Spain the observed character-
istics benefit men more.
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In the following age group of individuals between 25-44, somewhat similar re-
sults are observed: in most of the countries, the gap is in favour of women. The
largest unconditional median gap, favouring men, is reported for Greece (0.309 log
points), while in Norway there is an evidence of the largest gap in favour of women
(0.395 log points). As for the age group of 45-65, the largest raw gap that favours
men is observed in Portugal (0.415 log points). Moreover, there is a large number
of countries where the unconditional gap benefits women more than men: Austria,
Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Norway, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































<25 25−44 45−65 >65
Age group
UK
Raw gap Unexplained gap
Note: confidence intervals are shown for 90% confidence level.
Source: author’s calculation from EU-SILC 2016.
Unlike from the results for all previous age groups, among the oldest, both un-
conditional and conditional medium gaps in public transfers are in favour of men.
The only exception is Denmark, where the unconditional gap favours women (0.044
log points). Moreover, all estimates are statistically significant. The largest uncondi-
tional gap is observed in Austria, where the differences in observed characteristics
can account for 0.116 out of 0.573 log points. In Estonia there is an evidence of the
smallest gap in favour of men (0.023 log points). In the vast majority of countries
both explained and unexplained part of the total gap are in favour of men (the ex-
plained gap favours women only in Denmark, Slovakia, and the UK).
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Figure 5 shows that for most of the countries the unconditional median gap
favouring men peaks at the oldest age group. One possible explanation for this
observation could be high rate of tobacco and alcohol consumption among men
(EHIS (2015)18, Mäkelä et al. (2006)) throughout their life that may result in in-
creased sickness and disability benefits at older ages. On the contrary, the short
life-expectancy of males can explain why women have “advantage” at early years,
which contributes to increased survivor’s benefits that is granted to people under
retirement age, when a spouse or partner dies. Also, given the fact of increased
women’s participation in education, this can contribute to higher educational al-
lowances compared to men.
5.5 Impact of the institutional factors on the unexplained total income
gap.
The paper also studies the effects of institutional factors on the unexplained gap
at different quantiles of the distribution. In total, eight institutional factors are an-
alyzed: (1) union density, (2) strictness of employment protection legislation, (3)
Kaitz index19, (4) maternity pay entitlement, (5) formal child care for children under
3, (6) pensions system design, (7) minimum wage setting, and (8) national minimum
wage. The data on these factors has been collected from several sources20. The infor-
mation on union density is collected from administrative data for year 201521. The
employment protection indicator is collected for 2013, however, 2014 data is used for
Slovenia and Lithuania, due to its absence for 2013. Kaitz index is also calculated for
wages in 2013. As suggest by Christofides et al. (2013), maternity pay entitlement
has been calculated as a product of maternity leave length (weeks) and pay rate (%).
Information on formal child care is based on EU-SILC 2016 data and depicts average
weekly hours spent at pre-school and day care centers. Pension design is ordinal
variable with three levels: public, combined, and private. Likewise, national mini-
mum wage and minimum wage setting variables are ordinal variables with 3 and 6
levels, respectively22.
Table 6 reports Spearman correlation coefficients between the institutional fac-
tors and unconditional total income gaps at the 20th, 50th, and 90th quantiles across
all age groups. As observed, union density has significant negative impact on the
unexplained gap for individuals below age 25 and between 25-44. Blau and Kahn
(1992, 1996) provide the evidence of reducing wage dispersion as unionization rates
increase in a country. Given the fact the employment income is a large part of the
total income for the individuals in the above-mentioned age groups, it is logical to
expect the higher unionization rates to reduce the unexplained and, therefore, raw
18European health interview survey (EHIS), 2015.
19Kaitz index is defined as the ratio of nominal minimum wage to average wage.
20Data on (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) factors have been collected from OECD databases, while infor-
mation on (7) and (8) variables are provided by the ICTWSS (Database on Institutional Characteristics
of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 51 countries between 1960 and
2014).
21Estonia is the only country for which survey data has been used. Due to data limitations, 2014 and
2013 data have been used for Poland and Greece, respectively.
22National minimum wage levels are no statutory minimum wage, statutory minimum wage in
some sectors, and statutory national minimum wage. Levels for minimum wage setting range from
between agents collective agreement to the minimum wage set by government without a fixed rule.
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total income gap. Another interesting finding is that the union density has no sig-
nificant impact on high-income individuals. This is rather intuitive because high-
income individuals are less likely to join trade unions and if so, bargaining power of
trade unions in the negotiations for pay increase is expected to be low.






















20 0.197 0.121 -0.054 -0.344 -0.292 -0.014 -0.030 -0.378
< 25 50 -0.390* 0.139 0.285 0.062 0.103 0.507** 0.304 -0.416*
90 -0.211 -0.233 0.175 -0.013 0.114 0.061 0.232 0.069
20 -0.546** 0.012 0.498** 0.419* 0.064 0.815*** 0.616*** -0.295
25− 44 50 -0.493** -0.007 -0.032 0.746*** -0.108 0.390* 0.168 -0.240
90 -0.358 -0.100 -0.296 0.150 0.043 -0.066 -0.146 0.026
20 -0.040 0.230 0.612** 0.144 -0.153 0.421* 0.378 -0.359
45− 65 50 -0.191 0.204 0.233 0.387 -0.459** 0.276 0.309 -0.304
90 -0.118 -0.263 -0.129 -0.254 0.166 -0.170 -0.058 0.587***
20 0.274 0.291 0.075 -0.221 -0.398* -0.164 -0.017 -0.255
> 65 50 0.233 0.237 0.064 -0.100 -0.508** -0.150 -0.085 -0.328
90 0.065 0.085 0.099 -0.143 -0.440* -0.101 -0.047 -0.232
1 Minimum wage divided by average wage.
2 Product of maternity leave length (weeks) and pay rate (%).
3 Average usual weekly hours for children using early childhood education and care services.
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: author’s calculations.
The employment protection is found to have no significant impact on the unex-
plained total income gap. Also, the impact of pension design among the youngest
individuals remains puzzling. However, Kaitz index, minimum wage setting, and
national minimum wage have significant positive impact on the unexplained gap
for individuals between 25-44 and 45-65. On the contrary, the minimum wage set-
ting and national minimum wage have negative impact on the employment income
gap for low income individuals (not reported in the paper). This result is in line
with earlier literature, where it is shown that the introduction of minimum wage
reduces the gender wage gap (e.g. see Bargain et al. (2018)). This could partially
explain why the setting of minimum wage increases the unexplained total income
gap: once minimum wages are set, those individuals who might be receiving some
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public transfers due to low income, they do not qualify for those benefits anymore,
which might have been larger than the marginal increase in the employment income.
Maternity pay entitlement is found to have significant negative impact on the
unconditional total income gap for individuals between 25-44. Given the fact that
women are most fertile in their twenties and early thirties, when the maternity leave
and its pay rate are regulated by state laws, the increase of either of these indicators
would put more burden on employer. Therefore, employers are more likely to offer
lower wages to women. Also, Farré (2016) highlighted that more generous mater-
nity leave increases women’s labor force participation in low paying jobs and their
absence in high-profile occupations.
The formal child-care has negative impact on the unexplained total income gap
for the oldest individuals. It turns out to have significant impact not only on low-
income but, also, on high-income individuals. In many countries informal child-
care still dominates over formal care, especially for Eastern and Central European
countries (Mills et al. (2013)). The burden of informal child-care, which is typically
not paid, is usually put on grandmothers. The increase of formal child-care allows
grandmothers to dedicate their time to paid tasks, which would otherwise be spent
on free child-care for their grandchildren.
6 Conclusions
The paper studies the gender income gap across 25 countries over 4 age groups. For
the analysis survey data of European Union Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions (2016) is used, which, in addition to other demographic and socio-economic
information, collects data on personal and household level income. To examine the
gender income gap, 17 different income sources are aggregated: 10 personal level
and 7 household level. For extending the scope of the paper, these income sources
have further been grouped into 3 categories: employment income, private transfers
and capital income, and public transfers. To study the factors contributing to the
gap, unconditional quantile regression is applied for both genders, and then the dif-
ference is estimated by Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method.
The analysis showed that the gender income gap is still inarguable problem in
EU. However, even though the gap is mostly in favour of men, this is not always the
case. The reported results unveiled the the high level of heterogeneity among coun-
tries. In addition, there is a large degree of variation observed within each country’s
age group. In each country the conditional median gap demonstrates several pat-
terns over these age categories. In Bulgaria and France, the unexplained median gap
has U-shaped pattern In particular, the unexplained median gaps for age groups 25-
44 and 45-65 are lower compared to the other two groups. However, the conditional
median gap has predominantly inverse U-shaped form in Belgium, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia,
and Spain, where the unexplained gaps peak at age groups 25-44 or 45-65.
Among the individuals below age 25, the largest unconditional median income
gap in favour of men is reported for Bulgaria, while the largest unconditional me-
dian income gap favouring women is observed in Greece. The intuition behind the
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largest gap in Bulgaria could be the enormous rate of brain drain among the young
individuals. In the given age group, the unexplained part of the total gap in favour of
men is systematically lower for people with high income in Austria, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czechia, Lithuania, and Spain. However, the unexplained gap favouring men
is large for the high-income individuals in Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, and the Netherlands. In the following age group of 25-44, the largest uncondi-
tional median income gap favouring men is observed in Greece, while the lowest gap
is reported for Denmark. The dramatic decrease in the public sector employment,
which is found to have negative impact on the employment income gap, could have
contributed to the increased total income gap (through employment income gap) as
people moved towards the private sectors. The unexplained gap is predominantly
increasing in this age group. There are countries, where the unexplained gap is lower
at the bottom of the distribution (for example, Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovakia),
while in some countries the gap is the largest among individuals with high-income
(for example, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Sweden). Similar to
the previous age group, among individuals between 45-65 the largest unconditional
median gap is observed in Greece, while the lowest is reported in Lithuania (both
in favour of men). In this age category the largest unexplained gap is present at the
lower end of the distribution in Austria, Croatia, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland,
Romania and Spain, while the largest gap is observed at the upper end of the dis-
tribution in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and
Sweden. As for the oldest age group the largest unconditional median gap in favour
of men is reported in Austria, while it is the lowest in Estonia. Since the public
transfers constitute the largest part of the total income among these individuals, it
is rather expected that the gap could be caused by the gap in public transfers, as it
has been shown in the study. On the other hand, in Denmark there is the largest gap
in favour of women. The unexplained gap is systematically larger for low-income
individuals in Austria, Belgium, and Norway, while it is the lowest for high-income
individuals in Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and
Sweden.
Next, the paper also studies the gender gap in employment income for two age
groups: 25-44 and 45-65. In the latter, the largest unconditional median gaps are
found in Latvia and Estonia, and the lowest – in Romania. In the former age group,
there is the evidence of the largest and the lowest unconditional median gaps in the
Netherlands and Slovenia, respectively. Furthermore, the glass ceiling and sticky
floor effects are investigated for these age groups. The analysis showed that both
of these effects are present in Belgium, Czechia, France, Greece, and Norway. The
presence of these effects provide the strong evidence of positive selection in the la-
bor market.
Furthermore, the paper studies the factors contributing to the explained and un-
explained parts of the total and employment income for pooled age groups. In case
of total income, marriage status has the largest impact on the unexplained gap in
favour of man across most of the countries, providing evidence of "marriage pre-
mium"’ for men. On the other hand, managerial occupations accounts for signifi-
cant part of the explained gap at 20th and 90th percentiles, while inactive economic
contributes large part of the explained gap at median income. Similar to the total
income, marriage accounts for the largest portion of the unexplained gap in the em-
ployment income. The main factors that contribute to the significant portion of the
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explained gap is found to be part-time employment. Furthermore, the tertiary edu-
cation is found to lower the gap, which could be attributed to women participation
in male-dominated degrees. However, the concentration at the lowest earning occu-
pations still remains the problem for women. The secondary education is found to
have no significant impact on high-income individuals, which could be due to the
fact that high earners are expected to have higher education than those at the lower
end of the income distribution. Therefore, for them the differences in lower level of
education are not likely to have significant impact on the gap.
The paper also investigates the gender gap in private transfers and capital in-
come. For the individuals below age 25, the largest statistically significant uncondi-
tional and conditional median gaps are reported for France, while there is the evi-
dence of the largest unconditional and conditional median gaps in favour of women
in Hungary. In the age group of 25-44, the differences in the observed characteristics
always favour women for median income, except in Serbia. In the subsequent age
group, the largest unconditional median gap favouring women is observed in Den-
mark, though not statistically significant. Among the oldest, the largest statistically
significant unconditional median gap is reported for Belgium, while the lowest is
observed in Slovakia.
And finally, the gender gap in public transfers is examined. In the youngest
age group, the unconditional median gap is predominantly in favour of women.
The largest statistically significant gap favouring women has been reported for the
Netherlands. In the following age group of 25-44, the largest unconditional median
gap favouring men is observed in Greece, while the evidence of the largest gap in
favour of women is found in Norway. Increased trend of enrolling in higher educa-
tion institutions and receiving more education-related allowances could be a reason
why the gap favours women at young ages. Also, due to high mortality rates of men,
women are more likely to receive survivor’s benefits. Unlike from these age groups,
for individuals above age 65, both unconditional and conditional median gaps are
in favour of men in all countries but Denmark, where the gap benefits women more.
The largest and the lowest unconditional median gaps are found in Austria and Es-
tonia, respectively. Moreover, in vast majority of countries, the gap peaked for the
oldest age group.
The analysis of the institutional factors showed that the membership of trade
unions and minimum wage setting have no significant impact on the unexplained
total income gap among the high-income individuals. Furthermore, more generous
maternity leave enlarges the unexplained gap for the individuals between 25-44,
while the formal child-care is negatively related to the unexplained gap for the old-
est individuals, as they can allocate the time, which would otherwise be spent on
informal child-care, to paid tasks.
Nowadays most of the policies, which aim to achieve gender income equality,
are based on "one-size-fits-all" philosophy. However, these policies fail to take into
account the differences that exist within a country’s age groups for different income
sources. Focusing only the gap in particular part of the aggregate income, whether
in favour of men or women, could have detrimental effects on the gap in another
income source. To tackle the problem of gender income inequality, current policies
must be updated and be more versatile so that they would cover various sources of
income for different age groups.
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TABLE A.1: Distribution of males and females across countries.
Country
Age Group
< 25 25− 44 45− 65 > 65 Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Austria 395 286 1,488 1,630 1,936 2,130 1,173 1,387 10,425
Belgium 235 180 1,672 1,767 1,879 2,004 1,124 1,291 10,152
Bulgaria 307 272 2,014 1,897 2,731 2,880 1,873 2,889 14,863
Croatia 389 290 2,118 2,070 3,126 3,319 1,892 2,661 15,865
Czechia 265 250 2,290 2,289 2,625 2,913 1,962 2,691 15,285
Denmark 297 299 1,198 1,268 2,269 2,474 1,623 1,587 11,015
Estonia 380 285 1,787 1,745 2,134 2,357 1,151 1,810 11,649
Finland 709 540 2,690 2,766 4,239 4,198 2,104 2,089 19,335
France 572 459 2,708 2,909 3,843 4,097 2,320 2,907 19,815
Germany 447 383 2,187 2,534 4,478 5,207 3,376 3,562 22,174
Greece 733 616 4,991 4,999 6,517 7,123 5,130 5,948 36,057
Hungary 378 302 2,054 2,142 2,659 3,230 1,520 2,585 14,870
Latvia 242 219 1,558 1,607 1,816 2,299 1,034 2,307 11,082
Lithuania 190 137 910 965 1,806 2,158 1,023 1,743 8,932
Netherlands 599 543 2,678 2,955 4,939 5,412 2,407 2,655 22,188
Norway 568 452 1,885 1,942 2,472 2,635 1,250 1,195 12,399
Poland 886 670 4,016 4,050 4,677 5,309 2,423 3,666 25,697
Portugal 455 390 2,929 3,186 3,847 4,375 2,573 3,445 21,200
Romania 309 235 2,020 2,068 2,781 3,032 1,949 2,505 14,899
Serbia 398 319 2,293 2,202 2,704 2,768 1,443 1,998 14,125
Slovakia 330 267 2,257 2,261 2,220 2,721 1,073 1,737 12,866
Slovenia 402 222 3,310 3,094 4,022 4,239 1,981 2,396 19,666
Spain 538 432 4,225 4,332 5,630 5,997 3,276 4,265 28,695
Sweden 390 318 1,435 1,488 1,929 1,987 1,455 1,440 10,442
UK 485 516 2,453 2,935 2,901 3,155 2,086 2,293 16,824
Total 420,520
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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Empl1. Comp. Car2 Profit/Loss 3 Pens4. Unempl5. Old-age6 Suvivor7 Sickness8 Disabled9 Ed. allowance10 HH inc11.
Austria 50.59 0.00 8.17 0.60 3.30 24.91 0.46 0.59 2.87 0.32 8.18
Belgium 47.16 0.28 7.45 0.04 6.62 24.59 0.03 0.50 4.05 0.06 9.23
Bulgaria 48.67 0.08 7.37 0.03 0.94 29.18 0.47 0.60 3.85 0.05 8.76
Croatia 41.77 0.10 10.03 0.01 0.83 26.48 0.45 0.40 11.31 0.19 8.43
Czechia 50.19 0.31 10.37 0.10 0.72 29.01 0.55 0.45 3.63 0.11 4.58
Denmark 65.56 0.36 4.32 0.00 4.79 30.76 0.07 0.36 3.19 2.10 -11.53
Estonia 56.88 1.16 3.07 0.05 1.24 22.49 0.14 0.73 6.16 0.40 7.69
Finland 45.15 0.39 11.43 1.25 5.87 21.15 0.14 0.69 3.71 1.49 8.73
France 48.52 0.00 4.16 0.04 3.90 27.89 0.12 0.18 1.09 0.12 13.98
Germany 47.72 0.37 4.67 0.41 2.99 31.80 0.37 0.43 2.40 0.36 8.49
Greece 30.02 0.05 17.32 0.00 0.73 37.09 0.17 0.02 1.78 0.01 12.80
Hungary 51.37 0.04 4.79 0.00 1.72 28.62 0.16 0.19 4.42 0.23 8.45
Latvia 57.39 0.03 4.34 0.02 1.49 23.82 0.24 0.91 3.86 0.15 7.75
Lithuania 49.43 0.08 7.49 0.01 1.87 26.49 0.64 1.16 6.75 0.07 6.01
Netherlands 55.42 0.58 6.19 0.04 2.51 22.26 0.03 0.44 2.51 0.97 9.04
Norway 62.12 0.39 3.77 0.41 1.17 16.81 0.04 1.55 5.61 1.29 6.84
Poland 49.88 0.03 10.95 0.00 0.85 24.80 0.49 0.12 6.24 0.22 6.42
Portugal 46.53 0.14 6.42 0.21 3.83 28.94 0.62 0.58 3.56 0.26 8.92
Romania 41.72 0.00 15.14 0.00 0.01 33.84 0.67 0.00 3.45 0.01 5.15
Serbia 31.50 0.00 14.62 0.00 0.61 18.99 0.58 0.12 6.17 0.01 27.40
Slovakia 53.33 0.09 8.74 0.02 0.54 23.80 0.38 0.30 4.32 0.12 8.35
Slovenia 49.58 0.20 8.83 0.07 1.46 22.32 0.39 1.17 5.77 0.41 9.81
Spain 48.31 0.03 8.55 0.73 6.58 22.85 0.83 0.54 3.67 0.20 7.73
Sweden 55.94 0.43 0.19 1.34 1.61 24.75 0.05 1.62 1.29 2.68 10.10
UK 46.45 0.59 9.50 1.91 1.05 25.72 0.11 0.16 3.39 0.18 10.95
Total 49.25 0.23 7.92 0.3 2.29 25.97 0.33 0.55 4.20 0.48 8.49
Country
Female
Empl1. Comp. Car2 Profit/Loss3 Pens4. Unempl5. Old-age6 Survivor7 Sickness8 Disabled9 Ed. allowance10 HH inc11.
Austria 42.72 0.00 3.91 0.57 3.01 24.20 4.88 0.69 1.18 0.28 18.57
Belgium 42.92 0.11 2.92 0.03 5.54 23.16 1.01 0.70 4.47 0.19 18.94
Bulgaria 39.76 0.00 3.35 0.03 1.06 37.82 2.03 0.89 2.63 0.02 12.41
Croatia 36.03 0.02 5.33 0.03 0.93 24.06 13.02 0.36 5.76 0.14 14.32
Czechia 40.25 0.07 4.01 0.10 0.44 37.16 3.03 0.60 3.74 0.11 10.49
Denmark 52.17 0.07 2.00 0.00 7.25 24.20 0.24 0.99 4.97 2.97 5.14
Estonia 49.01 0.26 1.29 0.03 1.33 30.60 0.11 0.81 5.44 0.43 10.69
Finland 47.85 0.14 6.91 1.11 6.11 19.70 1.39 0.61 3.55 1.23 11.39
France 43.07 0.00 2.06 0.04 3.07 28.15 0.40 0.09 0.97 0.11 22.03
Germany 43.92 0.10 2.42 0.37 2.74 26.36 3.89 0.43 2.55 0.43 16.78
Greece 25.50 0.01 10.20 0.00 0.91 28.57 9.54 0.04 1.32 0.04 23.85
Hungary 38.03 0.01 2.48 0.00 1.27 40.19 0.45 0.23 3.78 0.20 13.35
Latvia 43.28 0.01 2.68 0.02 1.28 37.49 0.38 0.97 2.90 0.16 10.83
Lithuania 41.42 0.02 5.32 0.02 1.69 36.16 1.98 1.06 4.56 0.10 7.68
Netherlands 47.53 0.11 5.62 0.02 2.15 22.28 0.18 0.45 2.91 1.01 17.73
Norway 56.86 0.08 1.74 0.17 0.89 16.72 0.20 2.58 9.42 1.67 9.68
Poland 39.41 0.00 4.16 0.01 1.44 34.65 5.08 0.27 3.51 0.25 11.21
Portugal 43.76 0.04 3.26 0.16 2.60 26.46 6.12 0.70 2.72 0.19 13.99
Romania 31.96 0.00 8.23 0.00 0.01 40.00 4.49 0.02 3.13 0.02 12.13
Serbia 25.32 0.00 4.50 0.03 0.35 17.75 9.09 0.14 4.25 0.08 38.50
Slovakia 44.45 0.02 3.48 0.02 0.42 30.58 3.90 0.41 4.54 0.19 11.99
Slovenia 43.48 0.04 4.60 0.05 1.44 24.21 4.94 1.61 4.59 0.62 14.41
Spain 41.34 0.00 5.29 0.55 6.51 12.11 10.52 0.46 2.34 0.27 20.61
Sweden 53.48 0.11 1.34 1.42 1.41 24.18 0.13 2.52 2.23 2.97 10.22
UK 42.04 0.09 3.73 0.77 0.70 25.84 1.32 0.20 3.79 0.41 21.12
Total 42.22 0.05 4.03 0.22 2.18 27.70 3.53 0.71 3.65 0.56 15.12
1 Gross employee cash or near cash income.
2 Company car.
3 Gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment.







11 Household income at individual level.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE A.9: Income gap decomposition for the age group <25
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.266 (0.249) 0.090 (0.123) 0.129 (0.091) 0.000 (0.088) 0.034 (0.087) 0.144* (0.086) 0.146* (0.079) 0.178** (0.069) 0.097 (0.063)
Belgium -0.137 (0.270) -0.097 (0.333) -0.072 (0.218) -0.154 (0.193) -0.275 (0.210) -0.017 (0.208) 0.049 (0.172) -0.043 (0.148) 0.179 (0.115)
Bulgaria 0.000 (.) -0.153 (0.350) -0.206 (0.260) -0.096 (0.235) -0.031 (0.205) 0.037 (0.181) -0.046 (0.158) 0.027 (0.131) 0.051 (0.128)
Croatia 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) -0.297 (0.345) -0.074 (0.213) -0.094 (0.155) -0.013 (0.146) 0.013 (0.135) 0.063 (0.127) 0.058 (0.109)
Czechia -0.893 (1.166) -0.042 (0.259) 0.229 (0.185) 0.222** (0.100) 0.155* (0.079) 0.075 (0.069) 0.008 (0.062) -0.026 (0.061) -0.071 (0.055)
Denmark -0.170 (0.158) 0.037 (0.120) -0.032 (0.078) 0.038 (0.075) 0.113 (0.072) 0.095 (0.061) 0.054 (0.056) 0.095* (0.052) 0.114 (0.072)
Estonia -0.222 (0.491) 0.341 (0.307) 0.118 (0.266) 0.259 (0.198) 0.222 (0.138) 0.136 (0.126) 0.109 (0.127) 0.028 (0.108) 0.076 (0.102)
Finland -0.130* (0.068) -0.276*** (0.078) -0.247*** (0.065) -0.202*** (0.057) -0.146*** (0.053) -0.094* (0.053) -0.037 (0.052) -0.030 (0.054) -0.039 (0.061)
France -0.006 (0.157) -0.049 (0.140) -0.066 (0.112) -0.051 (0.101) -0.038 (0.097) 0.042 (0.084) 0.036 (0.063) 0.019 (0.055) -0.036 (0.059)
Germany -0.036 (0.145) 0.019 (0.082) 0.028 (0.064) -0.024 (0.062) 0.004 (0.060) -0.005 (0.058) -0.044 (0.057) -0.055 (0.064) -0.029 (0.097)
Greece 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.254 (0.365) 0.151 (0.259) -0.235 (0.233) -0.233 (0.199) 0.080 (0.143) 0.142 (0.123) 0.003 (0.107)
Hungary -0.196 (0.367) 0.160 (0.178) 0.180 (0.144) 0.147 (0.113) 0.213** (0.105) 0.092 (0.093) -0.025 (0.084) -0.085 (0.073) -0.060 (0.068)
Latvia -0.099 (0.521) 0.226 (0.308) 0.270 (0.247) 0.192 (0.198) 0.192 (0.157) 0.080 (0.133) -0.038 (0.128) -0.029 (0.128) 0.145* (0.086)
Lithuania 0.229 (2.373) -0.033 (0.777) 0.095 (0.282) 0.005 (0.235) 0.206 (0.222) 0.084 (0.222) 0.464** (0.199) 0.435** (0.195) 0.535** (0.208)
Netherlands 0.196* (0.119) 0.117 (0.084) 0.059 (0.068) 0.067 (0.066) 0.204*** (0.066) 0.244*** (0.072) 0.165** (0.068) 0.159** (0.066) 0.096 (0.066)
Norway 0.066 (0.118) 0.161 (0.099) 0.190** (0.083) 0.201** (0.078) 0.233*** (0.080) 0.278*** (0.079) 0.252*** (0.070) 0.244*** (0.059) 0.167*** (0.051)
Poland 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.536 (0.356) 0.386** (0.160) 0.249** (0.108) 0.319*** (0.104) 0.212** (0.102) 0.021 (0.091) -0.007 (0.087)
Portugal 0.000 (.) -0.721** (0.360) -0.481* (0.270) -0.298 (0.205) -0.262 (0.165) -0.176 (0.129) -0.171 (0.117) -0.284** (0.115) -0.234** (0.109)
Romania 0.000 (.) 0.005 (0.547) -0.045 (0.373) 0.207 (0.350) -0.135 (0.310) 0.187 (0.240) 0.129 (0.242) 0.288 (0.214) 0.113 (0.193)
Serbia -0.109** (0.054) -0.174*** (0.067) -0.206** (0.098) -0.174 (0.122) -0.268* (0.161) -0.002 (0.335) -0.287 (0.318) -0.115 (0.176) -0.003 (0.122)
Slovakia -0.058 (0.564) 0.375 (0.321) 0.253 (0.329) 0.166 (0.110) 0.058 (0.082) -0.023 (0.076) 0.041 (0.069) 0.045 (0.071) 0.059 (0.051)
Slovenia 0.746*** (0.253) 0.639*** (0.155) 0.482*** (0.133) 0.631*** (0.129) 0.512*** (0.122) 0.385*** (0.099) 0.357*** (0.080) 0.283*** (0.066) 0.249*** (0.077)
Spain -0.035 (0.042) -0.279 (1.114) -0.041 (0.347) 0.021 (0.182) 0.083 (0.147) 0.061 (0.128) 0.046 (0.119) 0.009 (0.120) 0.162 (0.108)
Sweden -0.050 (0.160) -0.112 (0.111) -0.108 (0.093) -0.072 (0.091) -0.014 (0.083) 0.031 (0.079) 0.092 (0.080) 0.143* (0.079) 0.165** (0.072)
UK -0.118 (0.410) 0.116 (0.151) 0.131 (0.105) 0.189*** (0.072) 0.133** (0.056) 0.144*** (0.049) 0.141*** (0.046) 0.114** (0.046) 0.072* (0.041)
Unexplained
Austria 0.897** (0.447) 0.480** (0.245) 0.268* (0.147) 0.193 (0.120) 0.183 (0.114) 0.042 (0.105) -0.066 (0.093) -0.002 (0.082) 0.015 (0.079)
Belgium 0.069 (0.584) 0.104 (0.476) 0.254 (0.305) 0.278 (0.241) 0.281 (0.246) 0.146 (0.240) 0.421** (0.195) 0.443** (0.190) 0.028 (0.169)
Bulgaria -0.088*** (0.000) 0.749 (0.501) 0.683** (0.344) 0.497 (0.306) 0.726*** (0.275) 0.462* (0.252) 0.495** (0.238) 0.248 (0.199) 0.153 (0.213)
Croatia -0.164 (.) 0.342 (0.749) 1.423** (0.556) 0.497 (0.315) 0.413* (0.221) 0.347* (0.194) 0.147 (0.181) 0.029 (0.173) 0.004 (0.158)
Czechia 1.765 (1.486) 0.905** (0.358) 0.466** (0.231) 0.542*** (0.140) 0.492*** (0.115) 0.430*** (0.096) 0.421*** (0.086) 0.426*** (0.083) 0.390*** (0.084)
Denmark 0.091 (0.208) -0.107 (0.148) 0.186* (0.107) 0.109 (0.113) 0.038 (0.118) 0.108 (0.103) 0.071 (0.092) 0.020 (0.062) 0.134 (0.084)
Estonia 0.048 (0.840) -0.808** (0.389) -0.474* (0.276) -0.269 (0.228) -0.111 (0.166) -0.005 (0.153) 0.019 (0.163) 0.197 (0.145) 0.200 (0.143)
Finland -0.402*** (0.124) -0.172* (0.101) -0.080 (0.079) 0.037 (0.069) 0.072 (0.069) 0.064 (0.073) 0.035 (0.069) 0.055 (0.076) 0.124 (0.089)
France 0.013 (0.274) 0.171 (0.204) 0.121 (0.157) 0.172 (0.133) 0.195 (0.120) 0.097 (0.111) 0.134 (0.092) 0.081 (0.086) 0.072 (0.102)
Germany -0.211 (0.187) 0.018 (0.113) -0.059 (0.097) -0.004 (0.089) -0.001 (0.084) 0.015 (0.080) 0.058 (0.077) 0.065 (0.083) 0.105 (0.127)
Greece -0.086 (.) -0.173 (.) -0.965* (0.585) -0.921** (0.375) -0.572* (0.301) -0.297 (0.232) -0.347* (0.177) -0.186 (0.162) 0.059 (0.151)
Hungary 0.324 (0.435) 0.148 (0.249) 0.146 (0.187) 0.267* (0.148) 0.152 (0.140) 0.269** (0.133) 0.375*** (0.127) 0.325*** (0.124) 0.216* (0.113)
Latvia 1.069 (0.951) -0.220 (0.411) -0.231 (0.284) 0.079 (0.205) 0.113 (0.168) 0.073 (0.153) 0.297* (0.158) 0.264 (0.169) -0.081 (0.128)
Lithuania -5.894* (3.243) -0.079 (0.878) 0.181 (0.340) 0.144 (0.257) 0.046 (0.249) 0.181 (0.252) -0.006 (0.212) -0.154 (0.200) -0.193 (0.198)
Netherlands -0.603*** (0.221) -0.181 (0.130) -0.044 (0.107) 0.025 (0.110) -0.076 (0.098) -0.088 (0.102) -0.051 (0.098) -0.006 (0.085) 0.135 (0.087)
Norway -0.151 (0.228) -0.180 (0.160) -0.186* (0.112) -0.045 (0.100) -0.044 (0.092) -0.027 (0.088) 0.143* (0.077) 0.183** (0.072) 0.210*** (0.066)
Poland -0.237 (.) -1.674** (0.710) 0.329 (0.453) 0.554** (0.249) 0.367** (0.162) 0.158 (0.148) 0.137 (0.143) 0.239* (0.131) 0.235* (0.122)
Portugal 0.145 (.) 0.867 (0.584) 0.447 (0.384) 0.259 (0.253) 0.222 (0.186) 0.248 (0.173) 0.198 (0.165) 0.406** (0.164) 0.427*** (0.154)
Romania 0.046*** (0.000) -0.033 (0.615) 0.296 (0.424) 0.222 (0.418) 0.562 (0.376) 0.099 (0.219) 0.696*** (0.237) 0.321 (0.258) 0.093 (0.248)
Serbia 0.075 (0.081) 0.241** (0.096) 0.316** (0.128) 0.241 (0.163) 0.420** (0.212) 0.224 (0.424) 0.500 (0.387) 0.220 (0.221) 0.084 (0.165)
Slovakia 0.146 (1.544) -0.199 (0.414) 0.348 (0.359) 0.633*** (0.183) 0.388*** (0.131) 0.312*** (0.110) 0.200* (0.104) 0.149 (0.102) 0.051 (0.081)
Slovenia -0.763* (0.400) -0.175 (0.249) -0.108 (0.197) -0.257 (0.167) 0.010 (0.156) 0.199 (0.132) 0.203* (0.112) 0.119 (0.106) 0.070 (0.107)
Spain -0.148*** (0.036) 0.879 (1.601) 0.498 (0.601) 0.109 (0.289) 0.085 (0.237) -0.024 (0.210) -0.146 (0.188) 0.093 (0.168) -0.050 (0.140)
Sweden -0.157 (0.249) 0.172 (0.180) -0.123 (0.127) -0.123 (0.116) -0.154 (0.100) -0.127 (0.093) -0.031 (0.088) -0.004 (0.087) -0.094 (0.084)
UK 0.341 (0.557) 0.183 (0.200) 0.044 (0.130) 0.034 (0.091) 0.047 (0.066) -0.023 (0.058) 0.029 (0.052) 0.140*** (0.052) 0.201*** (0.055)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.10: Income gap decomposition for the age group 25-44
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.684*** (0.161) 0.885*** (0.095) 0.535*** (0.047) 0.287*** (0.031) 0.201*** (0.027) 0.160*** (0.025) 0.125*** (0.024) 0.078*** (0.025) 0.071* (0.038)
Belgium 0.664*** (0.133) 0.501*** (0.074) 0.256*** (0.035) 0.143*** (0.023) 0.083*** (0.019) 0.046*** (0.018) 0.019 (0.019) -0.002 (0.021) -0.012 (0.023)
Bulgaria -0.022 (0.176) 0.117 (0.107) 0.116** (0.049) 0.014 (0.038) -0.039 (0.035) -0.078** (0.034) -0.069** (0.032) -0.077** (0.030) -0.080*** (0.030)
Croatia 0.755 (0.854) 0.280** (0.121) 0.175*** (0.056) 0.086*** (0.028) 0.022 (0.024) -0.018 (0.023) -0.017 (0.024) -0.052** (0.025) -0.041* (0.024)
Czechia 0.776*** (0.125) 0.299*** (0.042) 0.130*** (0.027) 0.054** (0.021) 0.013 (0.018) 0.005 (0.017) -0.017 (0.018) -0.034 (0.022) -0.033 (0.025)
Denmark 0.215*** (0.072) 0.149*** (0.052) 0.221*** (0.061) 0.081** (0.035) 0.009 (0.024) -0.027 (0.020) -0.058*** (0.018) -0.058*** (0.019) -0.045** (0.019)
Estonia 0.239* (0.127) 0.272*** (0.082) 0.176*** (0.065) 0.020 (0.046) 0.017 (0.037) -0.047 (0.033) -0.071** (0.031) -0.075** (0.030) -0.114*** (0.032)
Finland 0.093** (0.041) 0.251*** (0.053) 0.135*** (0.029) 0.057*** (0.020) 0.011 (0.017) -0.009 (0.015) -0.014 (0.015) -0.024 (0.015) -0.031* (0.018)
France 0.326*** (0.078) 0.246*** (0.044) 0.113*** (0.023) 0.072*** (0.021) 0.049** (0.020) 0.027 (0.018) 0.023 (0.019) 0.007 (0.018) 0.017 (0.022)
Germany 0.506*** (0.078) 0.737*** (0.082) 0.544*** (0.058) 0.233*** (0.032) 0.157*** (0.025) 0.115*** (0.023) 0.078*** (0.020) 0.050** (0.021) 0.040* (0.023)
Greece -0.000 (0.001) 1.218*** (0.156) 0.551*** (0.061) 0.346*** (0.035) 0.176*** (0.025) 0.076*** (0.020) 0.017 (0.017) -0.001 (0.018) -0.006 (0.021)
Hungary 0.727*** (0.153) 0.322*** (0.060) 0.134*** (0.030) 0.046* (0.027) 0.033 (0.027) -0.006 (0.025) -0.059** (0.025) -0.057** (0.025) -0.055** (0.022)
Latvia 0.645*** (0.196) 0.209*** (0.059) 0.006 (0.044) -0.054 (0.036) -0.095*** (0.034) -0.139*** (0.032) -0.126*** (0.030) -0.121*** (0.030) -0.141*** (0.038)
Lithuania 0.241 (0.200) 0.063 (0.078) -0.040 (0.056) -0.079 (0.050) -0.087* (0.047) -0.121*** (0.045) -0.151*** (0.049) -0.180*** (0.060) -0.100** (0.048)
Netherlands 0.678*** (0.110) 0.412*** (0.047) 0.334*** (0.032) 0.214*** (0.026) 0.141*** (0.022) 0.079*** (0.020) 0.052*** (0.020) 0.060*** (0.021) 0.046* (0.028)
Norway 0.317*** (0.054) 0.173*** (0.040) 0.102*** (0.025) 0.035** (0.017) 0.017 (0.015) 0.004 (0.014) -0.006 (0.015) -0.019 (0.016) -0.015 (0.018)
Poland 0.453** (0.221) 0.276*** (0.043) 0.141*** (0.027) 0.075*** (0.021) 0.009 (0.020) -0.005 (0.019) -0.015 (0.019) -0.026 (0.019) -0.017 (0.020)
Portugal 0.124 (0.269) 0.161** (0.074) 0.041* (0.021) 0.015 (0.017) -0.006 (0.017) -0.047** (0.018) -0.089*** (0.021) -0.138*** (0.023) -0.153*** (0.026)
Romania 2.610*** (0.303) 1.067*** (0.145) 0.549*** (0.063) 0.187*** (0.027) 0.110*** (0.023) 0.060*** (0.022) 0.019 (0.022) -0.011 (0.021) -0.015 (0.023)
Serbia 0.058 (0.037) 0.051 (0.059) 0.177 (0.141) 0.098 (0.111) 0.018 (0.048) -0.057 (0.036) -0.074** (0.032) -0.107*** (0.030) -0.067*** (0.025)
Slovakia 0.708*** (0.177) 0.301*** (0.046) 0.106*** (0.023) 0.050*** (0.017) 0.018 (0.015) 0.002 (0.014) -0.008 (0.015) -0.015 (0.015) -0.009 (0.022)
Slovenia 0.425*** (0.080) 0.281*** (0.071) 0.086*** (0.023) 0.041** (0.019) 0.014 (0.017) -0.027* (0.016) -0.068*** (0.016) -0.091*** (0.016) -0.116*** (0.019)
Spain 0.482*** (0.107) 0.335*** (0.057) 0.313*** (0.042) 0.219*** (0.031) 0.143*** (0.023) 0.092*** (0.021) 0.063*** (0.021) -0.004 (0.019) -0.036* (0.020)
Sweden 0.158* (0.090) 0.146** (0.066) 0.115*** (0.038) 0.106*** (0.025) 0.073*** (0.020) 0.055*** (0.018) 0.014 (0.017) -0.026 (0.017) -0.050*** (0.019)
UK 0.825*** (0.119) 0.478*** (0.058) 0.360*** (0.028) 0.265*** (0.023) 0.201*** (0.022) 0.151*** (0.021) 0.099*** (0.019) 0.074*** (0.021) 0.044** (0.021)
Unexplained
Austria 0.286 (0.198) 0.026 (0.114) 0.276*** (0.059) 0.442*** (0.042) 0.393*** (0.037) 0.371*** (0.033) 0.361*** (0.032) 0.342*** (0.033) 0.361*** (0.047)
Belgium 0.166 (0.180) -0.004 (0.082) 0.165*** (0.042) 0.163*** (0.029) 0.156*** (0.023) 0.158*** (0.022) 0.171*** (0.022) 0.210*** (0.026) 0.237*** (0.033)
Bulgaria 0.441* (0.238) 0.219 (0.153) 0.202*** (0.067) 0.165*** (0.048) 0.220*** (0.043) 0.310*** (0.043) 0.340*** (0.044) 0.360*** (0.047) 0.333*** (0.055)
Croatia 2.917*** (1.112) 0.662*** (0.181) 0.597*** (0.085) 0.462*** (0.050) 0.322*** (0.036) 0.261*** (0.035) 0.287*** (0.037) 0.254*** (0.041) 0.179*** (0.043)
Czechia 0.165 (0.139) 0.606*** (0.060) 0.532*** (0.039) 0.492*** (0.029) 0.465*** (0.025) 0.410*** (0.023) 0.429*** (0.024) 0.445*** (0.029) 0.503*** (0.037)
Denmark -0.385*** (0.124) -0.279*** (0.078) -0.302*** (0.064) -0.007 (0.035) 0.115*** (0.025) 0.158*** (0.023) 0.191*** (0.024) 0.239*** (0.026) 0.274*** (0.030)
Estonia 0.015 (0.162) -0.037 (0.086) 0.236*** (0.069) 0.439*** (0.052) 0.422*** (0.045) 0.454*** (0.041) 0.475*** (0.042) 0.457*** (0.043) 0.536*** (0.054)
Finland 0.043 (0.059) -0.071 (0.062) 0.142*** (0.033) 0.193*** (0.024) 0.229*** (0.020) 0.246*** (0.019) 0.262*** (0.019) 0.299*** (0.021) 0.298*** (0.028)
France 0.166* (0.100) 0.109** (0.052) 0.147*** (0.029) 0.127*** (0.022) 0.155*** (0.022) 0.184*** (0.022) 0.189*** (0.023) 0.224*** (0.024) 0.229*** (0.035)
Germany -0.000 (0.112) -0.242** (0.097) 0.057 (0.067) 0.337*** (0.040) 0.334*** (0.032) 0.341*** (0.029) 0.317*** (0.028) 0.317*** (0.028) 0.348*** (0.031)
Greece -0.230*** (0.002) 0.141 (0.184) 1.091*** (0.101) 0.795*** (0.068) 0.557*** (0.042) 0.395*** (0.030) 0.317*** (0.027) 0.256*** (0.028) 0.224*** (0.029)
Hungary -0.226 (0.180) 0.257*** (0.074) 0.298*** (0.047) 0.248*** (0.036) 0.253*** (0.034) 0.304*** (0.033) 0.371*** (0.034) 0.364*** (0.037) 0.411*** (0.041)
Latvia -0.320 (0.237) 0.330*** (0.072) 0.390*** (0.050) 0.453*** (0.043) 0.406*** (0.041) 0.465*** (0.042) 0.448*** (0.042) 0.406*** (0.044) 0.462*** (0.061)
Lithuania 0.347 (0.273) 0.498*** (0.112) 0.316*** (0.066) 0.422*** (0.059) 0.427*** (0.063) 0.441*** (0.066) 0.496*** (0.074) 0.547*** (0.099) 0.494*** (0.098)
Netherlands 0.282 (0.185) 0.138* (0.072) 0.094** (0.042) 0.190*** (0.032) 0.245*** (0.027) 0.284*** (0.025) 0.284*** (0.025) 0.282*** (0.026) 0.301*** (0.036)
Norway -0.148* (0.084) 0.086* (0.045) 0.182*** (0.028) 0.224*** (0.021) 0.214*** (0.018) 0.211*** (0.017) 0.255*** (0.018) 0.307*** (0.021) 0.343*** (0.027)
Poland 5.688*** (0.271) 1.440*** (0.131) 0.628*** (0.063) 0.304*** (0.029) 0.350*** (0.027) 0.363*** (0.026) 0.370*** (0.027) 0.409*** (0.030) 0.383*** (0.036)
Portugal 0.389 (0.364) 0.179 (0.109) 0.123*** (0.032) 0.117*** (0.024) 0.183*** (0.024) 0.197*** (0.027) 0.259*** (0.033) 0.273*** (0.040) 0.306*** (0.048)
Romania -0.698* (0.364) 0.906*** (0.172) 1.332*** (0.117) 0.983*** (0.132) 0.161*** (0.039) 0.158*** (0.038) 0.284*** (0.038) 0.187*** (0.039) 0.265*** (0.043)
Serbia 0.042 (0.062) 0.186** (0.083) 0.551*** (0.177) 0.783*** (0.156) 0.427*** (0.080) 0.204*** (0.048) 0.220*** (0.046) 0.258*** (0.046) 0.204*** (0.046)
Slovakia -0.096 (0.209) 0.590*** (0.085) 0.325*** (0.034) 0.295*** (0.025) 0.296*** (0.023) 0.251*** (0.022) 0.291*** (0.023) 0.274*** (0.025) 0.298*** (0.033)
Slovenia 0.228** (0.114) 0.252*** (0.086) 0.360*** (0.045) 0.183*** (0.025) 0.184*** (0.022) 0.221*** (0.022) 0.232*** (0.023) 0.234*** (0.025) 0.264*** (0.034)
Spain 2.262*** (0.416) 0.405*** (0.106) 0.175*** (0.061) 0.208*** (0.042) 0.250*** (0.032) 0.207*** (0.028) 0.228*** (0.028) 0.253*** (0.029) 0.187*** (0.034)
Sweden -0.107 (0.122) 0.061 (0.077) 0.142*** (0.045) 0.130*** (0.031) 0.132*** (0.024) 0.152*** (0.021) 0.185*** (0.021) 0.233*** (0.022) 0.263*** (0.030)
UK 0.633*** (0.211) 0.208** (0.084) 0.124*** (0.040) 0.143*** (0.029) 0.138*** (0.026) 0.176*** (0.024) 0.222*** (0.024) 0.235*** (0.028) 0.306*** (0.033)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.11: Income gap decomposition for the age group 45-65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.332*** (0.079) 0.351*** (0.059) 0.304*** (0.042) 0.283*** (0.034) 0.240*** (0.029) 0.204*** (0.028) 0.171*** (0.030) 0.187*** (0.031) 0.224*** (0.032)
Belgium 0.239*** (0.054) 0.262*** (0.039) 0.277*** (0.038) 0.237*** (0.031) 0.184*** (0.026) 0.143*** (0.022) 0.118*** (0.020) 0.091*** (0.020) 0.106*** (0.025)
Bulgaria 0.005 (0.087) 0.049 (0.035) 0.050* (0.026) 0.046** (0.023) 0.041* (0.022) 0.024 (0.021) -0.001 (0.022) -0.053** (0.024) -0.076** (0.034)
Croatia -0.007 (0.161) 0.106*** (0.039) 0.186*** (0.035) 0.158*** (0.027) 0.115*** (0.023) 0.108*** (0.023) 0.063*** (0.023) 0.027 (0.023) 0.007 (0.022)
Czechia 0.245*** (0.039) 0.289*** (0.028) 0.256*** (0.025) 0.197*** (0.024) 0.135*** (0.021) 0.091*** (0.019) 0.080*** (0.018) 0.075*** (0.017) 0.090*** (0.026)
Denmark 0.098* (0.059) 0.134*** (0.035) 0.114*** (0.021) 0.075*** (0.016) 0.046*** (0.016) 0.015 (0.016) -0.007 (0.015) -0.017 (0.016) -0.006 (0.022)
Estonia -0.102 (0.067) -0.029 (0.043) -0.081 (0.052) -0.071 (0.046) -0.050 (0.037) -0.025 (0.034) -0.052 (0.035) -0.084** (0.040) -0.106* (0.060)
Finland -0.055 (0.037) -0.093*** (0.035) -0.030 (0.029) -0.006 (0.022) 0.012 (0.017) 0.013 (0.016) 0.015 (0.014) 0.009 (0.013) 0.004 (0.015)
France 0.180*** (0.041) 0.202*** (0.027) 0.145*** (0.019) 0.134*** (0.017) 0.109*** (0.017) 0.101*** (0.019) 0.084*** (0.018) 0.104*** (0.019) 0.131*** (0.030)
Germany 0.443*** (0.054) 0.636*** (0.048) 0.488*** (0.031) 0.318*** (0.023) 0.235*** (0.019) 0.191*** (0.017) 0.193*** (0.015) 0.179*** (0.016) 0.229*** (0.020)
Greece 0.569 (0.553) 0.206** (0.086) 0.221*** (0.045) 0.155*** (0.026) 0.109*** (0.016) 0.101*** (0.012) 0.102*** (0.012) 0.127*** (0.012) 0.154*** (0.018)
Hungary -0.001 (0.049) 0.084*** (0.032) 0.111*** (0.026) 0.065*** (0.021) 0.039** (0.020) 0.016 (0.021) -0.002 (0.023) -0.023 (0.021) -0.020 (0.023)
Latvia -0.215** (0.104) -0.047 (0.073) 0.016 (0.050) -0.022 (0.042) -0.032 (0.037) -0.040 (0.032) -0.051* (0.031) -0.093*** (0.032) -0.095** (0.037)
Lithuania -0.102 (0.179) -0.003 (0.076) -0.055 (0.052) -0.016 (0.039) -0.017 (0.037) -0.043 (0.037) -0.046 (0.037) -0.053 (0.038) -0.067 (0.045)
Netherlands 0.340*** (0.044) 0.439*** (0.035) 0.379*** (0.024) 0.317*** (0.019) 0.268*** (0.017) 0.230*** (0.016) 0.223*** (0.016) 0.212*** (0.018) 0.212*** (0.022)
Norway 0.094*** (0.035) 0.100*** (0.023) 0.104*** (0.019) 0.105*** (0.016) 0.089*** (0.016) 0.091*** (0.017) 0.061*** (0.019) 0.053*** (0.017) 0.028 (0.028)
Poland 0.083 (0.093) 0.169*** (0.030) 0.200*** (0.026) 0.146*** (0.019) 0.095*** (0.018) 0.079*** (0.017) 0.062*** (0.017) 0.045** (0.019) -0.003 (0.023)
Portugal -0.047 (0.227) 0.212*** (0.044) 0.150*** (0.029) 0.129*** (0.023) 0.106*** (0.022) 0.080*** (0.024) 0.029 (0.024) 0.024 (0.025) 0.024 (0.029)
Romania 0.494** (0.219) 0.400*** (0.088) 0.321*** (0.036) 0.253*** (0.025) 0.176*** (0.019) 0.155*** (0.019) 0.121*** (0.019) 0.075*** (0.018) 0.073*** (0.022)
Serbia -0.183*** (0.056) -0.637*** (0.108) -0.640*** (0.105) -0.151*** (0.054) 0.005 (0.038) 0.056* (0.032) 0.095*** (0.029) 0.055* (0.029) 0.082*** (0.026)
Slovakia 0.071 (0.099) 0.113*** (0.030) 0.095*** (0.025) 0.104*** (0.021) 0.074*** (0.018) 0.059*** (0.015) 0.051*** (0.015) 0.053*** (0.018) 0.056*** (0.020)
Slovenia 0.036 (0.036) 0.033 (0.021) 0.059*** (0.022) 0.073*** (0.023) 0.072*** (0.022) 0.048** (0.019) 0.007 (0.017) -0.030* (0.018) -0.039* (0.020)
Spain 0.325*** (0.065) 0.322*** (0.045) 0.301*** (0.033) 0.260*** (0.026) 0.192*** (0.021) 0.123*** (0.018) 0.100*** (0.016) 0.078*** (0.016) 0.057*** (0.016)
Sweden 0.169** (0.067) 0.139*** (0.044) 0.121*** (0.023) 0.099*** (0.017) 0.072*** (0.016) 0.048*** (0.015) 0.030* (0.016) 0.026 (0.018) 0.023 (0.020)
UK 0.174** (0.073) 0.208*** (0.043) 0.274*** (0.037) 0.239*** (0.027) 0.182*** (0.023) 0.170*** (0.022) 0.130*** (0.022) 0.126*** (0.023) 0.165*** (0.034)
Unexplained
Austria 1.018*** (0.166) 0.346*** (0.079) 0.374*** (0.051) 0.310*** (0.041) 0.315*** (0.035) 0.305*** (0.033) 0.292*** (0.035) 0.248*** (0.036) 0.175*** (0.037)
Belgium 1.551*** (0.255) 0.275*** (0.055) 0.266*** (0.046) 0.266*** (0.036) 0.305*** (0.032) 0.254*** (0.030) 0.215*** (0.028) 0.181*** (0.027) 0.227*** (0.033)
Bulgaria 0.242 (0.172) 0.183*** (0.048) 0.197*** (0.036) 0.136*** (0.031) 0.178*** (0.030) 0.203*** (0.030) 0.231*** (0.031) 0.287*** (0.035) 0.383*** (0.052)
Croatia 5.352*** (0.177) 1.168*** (0.167) 0.398*** (0.047) 0.399*** (0.036) 0.270*** (0.032) 0.247*** (0.028) 0.300*** (0.029) 0.289*** (0.033) 0.149*** (0.036)
Czechia 0.077 (0.060) 0.018 (0.033) 0.124*** (0.025) 0.211*** (0.025) 0.277*** (0.024) 0.298*** (0.023) 0.269*** (0.023) 0.246*** (0.022) 0.269*** (0.033)
Denmark -0.103 (0.082) -0.020 (0.046) 0.017 (0.027) 0.069*** (0.021) 0.113*** (0.019) 0.191*** (0.020) 0.231*** (0.020) 0.286*** (0.023) 0.356*** (0.036)
Estonia -0.068 (0.099) -0.031 (0.054) 0.024 (0.061) 0.171*** (0.057) 0.254*** (0.049) 0.253*** (0.046) 0.263*** (0.050) 0.330*** (0.058) 0.393*** (0.088)
Finland -0.008 (0.047) 0.081* (0.045) 0.072** (0.034) 0.112*** (0.025) 0.145*** (0.020) 0.179*** (0.019) 0.205*** (0.018) 0.238*** (0.019) 0.247*** (0.026)
France 0.712*** (0.082) 0.331*** (0.042) 0.250*** (0.031) 0.169*** (0.024) 0.173*** (0.023) 0.187*** (0.024) 0.218*** (0.024) 0.224*** (0.026) 0.280*** (0.036)
Germany 0.692*** (0.122) 0.200*** (0.064) 0.294*** (0.040) 0.424*** (0.030) 0.409*** (0.025) 0.387*** (0.023) 0.313*** (0.021) 0.278*** (0.021) 0.246*** (0.023)
Greece 6.507*** (0.583) 7.938*** (0.091) 2.272*** (0.117) 1.135*** (0.066) 0.740*** (0.034) 0.457*** (0.025) 0.302*** (0.022) 0.207*** (0.021) 0.188*** (0.025)
Hungary 0.023 (0.082) 0.001 (0.048) -0.011 (0.035) 0.050* (0.027) 0.106*** (0.025) 0.132*** (0.026) 0.181*** (0.031) 0.149*** (0.031) 0.152*** (0.036)
Latvia 0.173 (0.144) 0.066 (0.089) 0.105* (0.058) 0.144*** (0.045) 0.200*** (0.041) 0.217*** (0.038) 0.182*** (0.039) 0.215*** (0.042) 0.274*** (0.053)
Lithuania -0.283 (0.272) 0.014 (0.103) 0.101* (0.060) 0.143*** (0.046) 0.129*** (0.047) 0.140*** (0.047) 0.146*** (0.050) 0.188*** (0.057) 0.215*** (0.071)
Netherlands 1.770*** (0.132) 0.523*** (0.061) 0.416*** (0.036) 0.405*** (0.026) 0.398*** (0.023) 0.404*** (0.021) 0.379*** (0.021) 0.366*** (0.023) 0.340*** (0.027)
Norway 0.196*** (0.047) 0.212*** (0.030) 0.172*** (0.024) 0.164*** (0.020) 0.186*** (0.020) 0.208*** (0.020) 0.279*** (0.023) 0.342*** (0.023) 0.424*** (0.039)
Poland 6.268*** (0.121) 0.494*** (0.116) 0.287*** (0.037) 0.308*** (0.029) 0.301*** (0.024) 0.325*** (0.022) 0.310*** (0.023) 0.262*** (0.027) 0.246*** (0.034)
Portugal 7.737*** (0.286) 1.277*** (0.246) 0.475*** (0.051) 0.257*** (0.033) 0.264*** (0.029) 0.392*** (0.029) 0.466*** (0.030) 0.365*** (0.036) 0.325*** (0.043)
Romania 4.498*** (0.248) 1.712*** (0.199) 0.692*** (0.097) 0.306*** (0.038) 0.270*** (0.028) 0.205*** (0.025) 0.221*** (0.026) 0.267*** (0.027) 0.201*** (0.034)
Serbia 0.421*** (0.066) 1.340*** (0.119) 1.543*** (0.152) 0.527*** (0.074) 0.338*** (0.051) 0.219*** (0.041) 0.177*** (0.035) 0.204*** (0.037) 0.138*** (0.041)
Slovakia 0.039 (0.135) 0.097** (0.040) 0.127*** (0.031) 0.172*** (0.026) 0.215*** (0.022) 0.218*** (0.021) 0.188*** (0.022) 0.210*** (0.025) 0.256*** (0.031)
Slovenia 0.176*** (0.067) 0.094*** (0.031) 0.110*** (0.031) 0.073** (0.030) 0.039 (0.025) 0.101*** (0.022) 0.111*** (0.022) 0.092*** (0.025) 0.132*** (0.032)
Spain 4.881*** (0.333) 1.382*** (0.121) 0.632*** (0.056) 0.517*** (0.039) 0.454*** (0.030) 0.452*** (0.028) 0.357*** (0.026) 0.274*** (0.025) 0.178*** (0.028)
Sweden -0.021 (0.098) 0.053 (0.058) 0.067** (0.029) 0.085*** (0.021) 0.116*** (0.019) 0.151*** (0.019) 0.189*** (0.020) 0.195*** (0.025) 0.249*** (0.031)
UK 0.688*** (0.176) 0.261*** (0.065) 0.185*** (0.049) 0.220*** (0.036) 0.265*** (0.030) 0.248*** (0.029) 0.320*** (0.030) 0.305*** (0.032) 0.342*** (0.045)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.12: Income gap decomposition for the age group >65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.105* (0.059) 0.168*** (0.044) 0.143*** (0.034) 0.116*** (0.030) 0.104*** (0.026) 0.092*** (0.024) 0.088*** (0.024) 0.133*** (0.026) 0.168*** (0.034)
Belgium 0.168*** (0.047) 0.119*** (0.032) 0.097*** (0.026) 0.076*** (0.025) 0.080*** (0.025) 0.119*** (0.019) 0.112*** (0.018) 0.119*** (0.020) 0.144*** (0.027)
Bulgaria 0.073*** (0.023) 0.059*** (0.016) 0.066*** (0.016) 0.057*** (0.016) 0.058*** (0.017) 0.069*** (0.018) 0.064*** (0.021) 0.046* (0.024) 0.047* (0.028)
Croatia 0.890*** (0.159) 0.320*** (0.053) 0.314*** (0.035) 0.302*** (0.028) 0.223*** (0.028) 0.149*** (0.022) 0.128*** (0.021) 0.103*** (0.031) 0.073 (0.056)
Czechia 0.015** (0.007) 0.016** (0.008) 0.014 (0.010) 0.010 (0.009) 0.003 (0.008) -0.006 (0.008) 0.004 (0.014) 0.006 (0.014) 0.103*** (0.029)
Denmark -0.049*** (0.011) -0.073*** (0.012) -0.080*** (0.014) -0.077*** (0.016) -0.070*** (0.018) -0.051** (0.021) -0.009 (0.026) 0.052** (0.025) 0.121*** (0.028)
Estonia 0.071** (0.034) 0.064*** (0.021) 0.027** (0.012) 0.024** (0.011) 0.017 (0.011) 0.018 (0.013) 0.040 (0.024) 0.108* (0.058) 0.153* (0.082)
Finland 0.026 (0.021) 0.021 (0.022) 0.063*** (0.023) 0.077*** (0.023) 0.068*** (0.023) 0.093*** (0.022) 0.121*** (0.023) 0.125*** (0.026) 0.153*** (0.034)
France 0.071** (0.028) 0.030 (0.018) 0.020 (0.017) 0.025 (0.017) 0.039** (0.019) 0.044** (0.022) 0.050** (0.024) 0.044 (0.031) 0.089*** (0.033)
Germany 0.199*** (0.047) 0.080*** (0.026) 0.039* (0.020) 0.026 (0.018) 0.039** (0.017) 0.048*** (0.018) 0.046** (0.021) 0.092*** (0.026) 0.104*** (0.040)
Greece 0.125*** (0.042) 0.184*** (0.043) 0.202*** (0.055) 0.267*** (0.041) 0.242*** (0.033) 0.211*** (0.030) 0.165*** (0.030) 0.174*** (0.012) 0.125*** (0.012)
Hungary 0.030 (0.046) 0.009 (0.027) 0.035 (0.022) 0.021 (0.023) 0.044** (0.021) 0.066*** (0.021) 0.078*** (0.023) 0.090*** (0.033) 0.158*** (0.032)
Latvia 0.063** (0.025) 0.039** (0.020) 0.037** (0.018) 0.024 (0.019) 0.046** (0.022) 0.077*** (0.027) 0.152*** (0.041) 0.276*** (0.074) 0.276*** (0.061)
Lithuania 0.024 (0.038) 0.024 (0.029) 0.050* (0.029) 0.052* (0.028) 0.049* (0.027) 0.046 (0.030) 0.100** (0.042) 0.126** (0.050) 0.142 (0.099)
Netherlands 0.093** (0.042) 0.113*** (0.028) 0.101*** (0.026) 0.150*** (0.026) 0.202*** (0.024) 0.193*** (0.023) 0.212*** (0.020) 0.212*** (0.024) 0.250*** (0.024)
Norway -0.026 (0.029) 0.000 (0.030) 0.019 (0.027) 0.035 (0.025) 0.071*** (0.024) 0.084*** (0.025) 0.112*** (0.032) 0.111*** (0.034) 0.175*** (0.046)
Poland 0.041 (0.031) 0.071*** (0.026) 0.077*** (0.022) 0.062*** (0.019) 0.042** (0.018) 0.044** (0.018) 0.045** (0.020) 0.058*** (0.022) 0.081*** (0.027)
Portugal 0.050** (0.021) 0.180*** (0.021) 0.175*** (0.022) 0.204*** (0.025) 0.249*** (0.027) 0.301*** (0.030) 0.288*** (0.034) 0.239*** (0.031) 0.188*** (0.034)
Romania 0.179*** (0.045) 0.335*** (0.040) 0.282*** (0.029) 0.194*** (0.022) 0.168*** (0.022) 0.195*** (0.017) 0.166*** (0.018) 0.126*** (0.016) 0.096*** (0.019)
Serbia 0.750*** (0.093) 0.667*** (0.068) 0.388*** (0.036) 0.290*** (0.030) 0.245*** (0.023) 0.195*** (0.020) 0.176*** (0.020) 0.129*** (0.022) 0.113*** (0.032)
Slovakia 0.037** (0.019) 0.030** (0.015) 0.009 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013) -0.020 (0.016) -0.024 (0.018) -0.025 (0.018) -0.004 (0.020) 0.014 (0.024)
Slovenia 0.142*** (0.030) 0.093*** (0.020) 0.098*** (0.017) 0.091*** (0.016) 0.096*** (0.016) 0.077*** (0.019) 0.091*** (0.025) 0.112*** (0.029) 0.096*** (0.028)
Spain 0.373*** (0.077) 0.347*** (0.034) 0.301*** (0.034) 0.312*** (0.033) 0.289*** (0.033) 0.225*** (0.038) 0.218*** (0.030) 0.170*** (0.030) 0.085*** (0.019)
Sweden 0.025 (0.029) 0.036 (0.024) 0.052** (0.021) 0.076*** (0.018) 0.085*** (0.019) 0.106*** (0.024) 0.077*** (0.027) 0.085*** (0.031) 0.027 (0.038)
UK -0.024 (0.024) -0.035* (0.019) -0.024 (0.018) -0.003 (0.019) 0.016 (0.021) 0.037 (0.024) 0.065** (0.026) 0.085*** (0.025) 0.149*** (0.034)
Unexplained
Austria 1.941*** (0.255) 0.822*** (0.078) 0.610*** (0.051) 0.556*** (0.041) 0.547*** (0.037) 0.474*** (0.035) 0.411*** (0.035) 0.337*** (0.034) 0.256*** (0.041)
Belgium 3.407*** (0.675) 1.139*** (0.181) 0.359*** (0.047) 0.281*** (0.034) 0.264*** (0.032) 0.221*** (0.025) 0.217*** (0.024) 0.198*** (0.026) 0.135*** (0.035)
Bulgaria 0.148*** (0.035) 0.190*** (0.025) 0.175*** (0.024) 0.207*** (0.024) 0.238*** (0.024) 0.268*** (0.025) 0.313*** (0.030) 0.328*** (0.036) 0.311*** (0.046)
Croatia 0.174 (0.208) 0.193*** (0.065) 0.041 (0.043) -0.009 (0.033) 0.166*** (0.032) 0.218*** (0.027) 0.127*** (0.026) 0.147*** (0.035) 0.249*** (0.061)
Czechia 0.158*** (0.010) 0.141*** (0.011) 0.094*** (0.012) 0.124*** (0.011) 0.142*** (0.009) 0.122*** (0.010) 0.115*** (0.016) 0.109*** (0.017) 0.067** (0.033)
Denmark 0.134*** (0.017) 0.136*** (0.017) 0.115*** (0.022) 0.099*** (0.024) 0.113*** (0.027) 0.119*** (0.031) 0.159*** (0.038) 0.106*** (0.039) 0.100** (0.042)
Estonia -0.192*** (0.046) -0.117*** (0.028) -0.020 (0.016) -0.008 (0.015) 0.007 (0.015) 0.024 (0.016) 0.061** (0.030) 0.122* (0.066) 0.214** (0.102)
Finland 0.093*** (0.030) 0.127*** (0.029) 0.124*** (0.030) 0.120*** (0.029) 0.153*** (0.029) 0.144*** (0.027) 0.149*** (0.028) 0.203*** (0.031) 0.247*** (0.041)
France 0.726*** (0.063) 0.460*** (0.030) 0.373*** (0.027) 0.298*** (0.026) 0.248*** (0.027) 0.229*** (0.029) 0.218*** (0.031) 0.217*** (0.040) 0.256*** (0.050)
Germany 0.907*** (0.070) 0.724*** (0.044) 0.575*** (0.032) 0.509*** (0.026) 0.445*** (0.025) 0.385*** (0.026) 0.348*** (0.028) 0.310*** (0.033) 0.390*** (0.046)
Greece 8.833*** (0.044) 0.286*** (0.048) 0.343*** (0.057) 0.262*** (0.044) 0.234*** (0.035) 0.276*** (0.032) 0.319*** (0.032) 0.257*** (0.016) 0.216*** (0.018)
Hungary 0.093 (0.065) 0.084** (0.035) 0.053* (0.029) 0.080*** (0.028) 0.072*** (0.026) 0.083*** (0.026) 0.106*** (0.028) 0.118*** (0.039) 0.068* (0.039)
Latvia -0.065* (0.034) -0.016 (0.025) 0.033 (0.023) 0.071*** (0.024) 0.086*** (0.027) 0.096*** (0.031) 0.098** (0.044) 0.111 (0.080) 0.139* (0.076)
Lithuania 0.116** (0.050) 0.150*** (0.040) 0.137*** (0.041) 0.138*** (0.038) 0.128*** (0.035) 0.160*** (0.039) 0.137*** (0.052) 0.181*** (0.064) 0.263** (0.109)
Netherlands 0.257*** (0.052) 0.395*** (0.036) 0.462*** (0.033) 0.362*** (0.037) 0.274*** (0.033) 0.327*** (0.029) 0.324*** (0.026) 0.343*** (0.029) 0.347*** (0.028)
Norway 0.357*** (0.038) 0.349*** (0.039) 0.336*** (0.035) 0.290*** (0.033) 0.223*** (0.031) 0.203*** (0.032) 0.181*** (0.039) 0.260*** (0.041) 0.195*** (0.056)
Poland 0.091** (0.040) 0.134*** (0.033) 0.160*** (0.028) 0.202*** (0.024) 0.229*** (0.022) 0.230*** (0.022) 0.257*** (0.024) 0.237*** (0.027) 0.252*** (0.033)
Portugal 0.277*** (0.036) 0.170*** (0.027) 0.175*** (0.029) 0.170*** (0.032) 0.176*** (0.033) 0.163*** (0.035) 0.307*** (0.038) 0.379*** (0.040) 0.268*** (0.043)
Romania 0.074 (0.054) 0.050 (0.045) 0.093*** (0.033) 0.234*** (0.026) 0.121*** (0.024) 0.117*** (0.019) 0.227*** (0.019) 0.317*** (0.020) 0.120*** (0.027)
Serbia 1.088*** (0.154) -0.183** (0.079) 0.128*** (0.043) 0.213*** (0.038) 0.210*** (0.032) 0.192*** (0.030) 0.148*** (0.029) 0.151*** (0.032) 0.204*** (0.047)
Slovakia 0.081*** (0.026) 0.082*** (0.021) 0.063*** (0.018) 0.063*** (0.018) 0.072*** (0.021) 0.077*** (0.023) 0.068*** (0.024) 0.058** (0.026) 0.063* (0.032)
Slovenia 0.074* (0.041) 0.128*** (0.027) 0.124*** (0.024) 0.111*** (0.022) 0.080*** (0.022) 0.096*** (0.023) 0.112*** (0.031) 0.173*** (0.037) 0.216*** (0.041)
Spain 3.991*** (0.230) 1.300*** (0.132) 0.367*** (0.049) 0.132*** (0.034) 0.277*** (0.034) 0.435*** (0.039) 0.421*** (0.033) 0.450*** (0.035) 0.430*** (0.031)
Sweden 0.230*** (0.041) 0.222*** (0.033) 0.189*** (0.027) 0.190*** (0.024) 0.178*** (0.024) 0.203*** (0.028) 0.288*** (0.032) 0.281*** (0.040) 0.363*** (0.052)
UK 0.679*** (0.038) 0.528*** (0.031) 0.452*** (0.029) 0.413*** (0.030) 0.340*** (0.030) 0.338*** (0.033) 0.328*** (0.035) 0.363*** (0.036) 0.382*** (0.051)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 1.392*** (0.226) 0.722*** (0.083) 0.396*** (0.042) 0.253*** (0.031) 0.187*** (0.026) 0.145*** (0.026) 0.100*** (0.026) 0.073*** (0.026) 0.063 (0.042)
Belgium 0.442*** (0.108) 0.218*** (0.036) 0.125*** (0.023) 0.073*** (0.019) 0.044** (0.018) 0.017 (0.018) -0.006 (0.019) -0.012 (0.021) 0.010 (0.020)
Bulgaria -0.062 (0.126) -0.050 (0.078) -0.089** (0.036) -0.112*** (0.034) -0.094*** (0.034) -0.120*** (0.035) -0.112*** (0.032) -0.109*** (0.030) -0.116*** (0.037)
Croatia -0.021 (0.087) 0.044 (0.040) 0.021 (0.021) -0.012 (0.019) -0.038* (0.020) -0.049** (0.021) -0.051** (0.022) -0.054** (0.022) -0.076*** (0.026)
Czechia 0.267*** (0.050) 0.100*** (0.026) 0.023 (0.019) -0.010 (0.017) -0.028* (0.016) -0.019 (0.015) -0.030* (0.016) -0.050** (0.022) -0.049* (0.025)
Denmark 0.439** (0.191) 0.272*** (0.104) 0.154** (0.063) 0.018 (0.027) -0.025 (0.021) -0.042** (0.019) -0.067*** (0.018) -0.048*** (0.017) -0.044** (0.018)
Estonia 0.192* (0.102) 0.086 (0.073) 0.041 (0.049) -0.048 (0.039) -0.030 (0.031) -0.049* (0.028) -0.080*** (0.029) -0.081*** (0.030) -0.087*** (0.030)
Finland 0.391*** (0.106) 0.463*** (0.064) 0.138*** (0.023) 0.084*** (0.018) 0.045*** (0.016) 0.010 (0.016) 0.001 (0.015) -0.009 (0.015) -0.023 (0.018)
France 0.324*** (0.097) 0.345*** (0.060) 0.116*** (0.023) 0.064*** (0.019) 0.041** (0.020) 0.035* (0.020) 0.021 (0.020) 0.013 (0.019) 0.027 (0.022)
Germany 1.125*** (0.164) 0.679*** (0.079) 0.317*** (0.038) 0.184*** (0.026) 0.128*** (0.024) 0.093*** (0.022) 0.059*** (0.020) 0.041* (0.022) 0.042* (0.025)
Greece 0.097** (0.048) 0.097*** (0.029) 0.053** (0.024) 0.019 (0.018) -0.004 (0.015) -0.018 (0.013) -0.034*** (0.013) -0.035** (0.014) -0.031 (0.021)
Hungary 0.381*** (0.092) 0.094** (0.042) 0.036 (0.024) -0.019 (0.024) -0.022 (0.025) -0.062*** (0.024) -0.064*** (0.022) -0.047** (0.023) -0.039* (0.024)
Latvia 0.211** (0.087) 0.027 (0.046) -0.066* (0.038) -0.115*** (0.033) -0.134*** (0.032) -0.145*** (0.030) -0.124*** (0.029) -0.111*** (0.030) -0.133*** (0.038)
Lithuania -0.025 (0.115) -0.142** (0.059) -0.188*** (0.050) -0.157*** (0.048) -0.178*** (0.048) -0.204*** (0.049) -0.202*** (0.054) -0.239*** (0.063) -0.116** (0.051)
Netherlands 1.013*** (0.168) 0.434*** (0.063) 0.286*** (0.036) 0.182*** (0.027) 0.125*** (0.023) 0.068*** (0.021) 0.058*** (0.020) 0.060*** (0.021) 0.070*** (0.027)
Norway 0.411*** (0.145) 0.239*** (0.056) 0.107*** (0.024) 0.042** (0.017) 0.030** (0.015) 0.014 (0.014) 0.007 (0.015) -0.010 (0.016) -0.006 (0.017)
Poland 0.090** (0.035) 0.006 (0.021) -0.010 (0.017) -0.037** (0.016) -0.051*** (0.016) -0.062*** (0.017) -0.079*** (0.019) -0.064*** (0.017) -0.061*** (0.020)
Portugal 0.150*** (0.051) 0.044*** (0.016) 0.017 (0.015) 0.002 (0.015) -0.017 (0.016) -0.060*** (0.021) -0.109*** (0.024) -0.131*** (0.023) -0.122*** (0.025)
Romania -0.056 (0.067) -0.177** (0.080) -0.063** (0.027) -0.045*** (0.016) -0.064*** (0.016) -0.119*** (0.025) -0.096*** (0.019) -0.094*** (0.020) -0.109*** (0.026)
Serbia -0.453*** (0.110) -0.446*** (0.086) -0.266*** (0.042) -0.189*** (0.027) -0.180*** (0.025) -0.173*** (0.026) -0.200*** (0.026) -0.157*** (0.026) -0.175*** (0.035)
Slovakia 0.064 (0.042) 0.006 (0.023) -0.006 (0.015) -0.010 (0.013) -0.010 (0.012) -0.020 (0.013) -0.019 (0.014) -0.033** (0.015) -0.011 (0.019)
Slovenia 0.155** (0.077) 0.130*** (0.044) 0.031 (0.019) 0.015 (0.018) -0.014 (0.016) -0.049*** (0.016) -0.084*** (0.016) -0.099*** (0.016) -0.142*** (0.021)
Spain 0.229** (0.099) 0.253*** (0.059) 0.177*** (0.038) 0.121*** (0.028) 0.079*** (0.023) 0.033 (0.021) 0.023 (0.020) -0.027 (0.019) -0.055*** (0.021)
Sweden 0.287** (0.146) 0.242*** (0.068) 0.150*** (0.037) 0.105*** (0.024) 0.065*** (0.019) 0.048*** (0.017) 0.019 (0.016) -0.020 (0.016) -0.053*** (0.020)
UK 0.435*** (0.089) 0.354*** (0.032) 0.246*** (0.027) 0.155*** (0.023) 0.111*** (0.021) 0.083*** (0.020) 0.048*** (0.019) 0.030 (0.021) 0.013 (0.021)
Unexplained
Austria -0.269 (0.265) 0.409*** (0.113) 0.448*** (0.064) 0.409*** (0.046) 0.368*** (0.037) 0.357*** (0.035) 0.333*** (0.035) 0.304*** (0.036) 0.313*** (0.053)
Belgium -0.067 (0.131) 0.134** (0.052) 0.141*** (0.030) 0.134*** (0.024) 0.139*** (0.022) 0.151*** (0.022) 0.164*** (0.024) 0.198*** (0.027) 0.202*** (0.032)
Bulgaria 0.173 (0.192) 0.148 (0.109) 0.186*** (0.050) 0.234*** (0.045) 0.259*** (0.046) 0.367*** (0.048) 0.377*** (0.047) 0.370*** (0.050) 0.348*** (0.068)
Croatia 0.381*** (0.125) 0.353*** (0.073) 0.272*** (0.036) 0.210*** (0.031) 0.196*** (0.031) 0.246*** (0.033) 0.199*** (0.037) 0.166*** (0.039) 0.165*** (0.046)
Czechia 0.407*** (0.084) 0.360*** (0.037) 0.394*** (0.027) 0.375*** (0.025) 0.340*** (0.022) 0.317*** (0.021) 0.351*** (0.023) 0.437*** (0.030) 0.453*** (0.040)
Denmark -0.208 (0.300) -0.321** (0.142) -0.024 (0.067) 0.141*** (0.031) 0.189*** (0.025) 0.193*** (0.024) 0.233*** (0.024) 0.248*** (0.026) 0.284*** (0.030)
Estonia 0.127 (0.133) 0.240*** (0.089) 0.426*** (0.062) 0.511*** (0.051) 0.456*** (0.044) 0.406*** (0.041) 0.426*** (0.043) 0.441*** (0.047) 0.463*** (0.054)
Finland 0.255* (0.143) 0.212*** (0.076) 0.370*** (0.043) 0.236*** (0.027) 0.213*** (0.022) 0.259*** (0.021) 0.269*** (0.021) 0.291*** (0.022) 0.309*** (0.028)
France 0.089 (0.131) 0.049 (0.074) 0.138*** (0.030) 0.130*** (0.023) 0.154*** (0.023) 0.176*** (0.023) 0.195*** (0.024) 0.234*** (0.028) 0.234*** (0.036)
Germany -0.712*** (0.200) 0.165 (0.102) 0.327*** (0.054) 0.367*** (0.038) 0.335*** (0.033) 0.313*** (0.031) 0.274*** (0.029) 0.285*** (0.030) 0.311*** (0.035)
Greece 0.268*** (0.080) 0.282*** (0.046) 0.232*** (0.036) 0.233*** (0.028) 0.180*** (0.023) 0.163*** (0.022) 0.169*** (0.021) 0.192*** (0.024) 0.231*** (0.034)
Hungary 0.190 (0.131) 0.307*** (0.064) 0.166*** (0.036) 0.184*** (0.031) 0.245*** (0.033) 0.314*** (0.034) 0.318*** (0.035) 0.289*** (0.039) 0.400*** (0.043)
Latvia 0.531*** (0.139) 0.378*** (0.060) 0.439*** (0.046) 0.464*** (0.041) 0.463*** (0.042) 0.481*** (0.042) 0.425*** (0.043) 0.393*** (0.046) 0.451*** (0.062)
Lithuania 0.649*** (0.218) 0.373*** (0.096) 0.426*** (0.067) 0.432*** (0.069) 0.427*** (0.071) 0.479*** (0.074) 0.483*** (0.086) 0.539*** (0.109) 0.445*** (0.097)
Netherlands -0.364 (0.232) 0.104 (0.085) 0.140*** (0.048) 0.215*** (0.036) 0.224*** (0.030) 0.249*** (0.027) 0.250*** (0.026) 0.244*** (0.027) 0.254*** (0.034)
Norway 0.316* (0.181) 0.466*** (0.075) 0.442*** (0.043) 0.330*** (0.028) 0.263*** (0.022) 0.270*** (0.020) 0.266*** (0.020) 0.317*** (0.022) 0.359*** (0.026)
Poland 0.449*** (0.078) 0.164*** (0.030) 0.251*** (0.024) 0.315*** (0.023) 0.312*** (0.024) 0.345*** (0.025) 0.356*** (0.030) 0.378*** (0.031) 0.359*** (0.041)
Portugal 0.164* (0.086) 0.099*** (0.027) 0.097*** (0.024) 0.187*** (0.023) 0.155*** (0.026) 0.238*** (0.030) 0.314*** (0.037) 0.257*** (0.041) 0.312*** (0.048)
Romania 0.542*** (0.132) 0.119* (0.067) 0.087*** (0.029) 0.164*** (0.023) 0.087*** (0.024) 0.267*** (0.034) 0.233*** (0.033) 0.168*** (0.036) 0.182*** (0.055)
Serbia 0.042 (0.158) 0.174* (0.095) 0.156*** (0.045) 0.194*** (0.033) 0.246*** (0.034) 0.189*** (0.038) 0.312*** (0.039) 0.295*** (0.040) 0.336*** (0.063)
Slovakia 0.221*** (0.060) 0.266*** (0.032) 0.254*** (0.023) 0.239*** (0.022) 0.252*** (0.021) 0.254*** (0.021) 0.250*** (0.023) 0.246*** (0.027) 0.256*** (0.034)
Slovenia 0.323*** (0.107) 0.411*** (0.065) 0.312*** (0.041) 0.186*** (0.027) 0.216*** (0.024) 0.239*** (0.024) 0.237*** (0.025) 0.221*** (0.027) 0.284*** (0.037)
Spain 0.058 (0.153) -0.003 (0.088) 0.050 (0.051) 0.169*** (0.038) 0.175*** (0.031) 0.198*** (0.029) 0.212*** (0.029) 0.246*** (0.031) 0.188*** (0.036)
Sweden 0.268 (0.189) 0.377*** (0.098) 0.305*** (0.057) 0.227*** (0.038) 0.184*** (0.027) 0.174*** (0.023) 0.204*** (0.022) 0.240*** (0.023) 0.286*** (0.033)
UK 0.183 (0.115) 0.146*** (0.043) 0.125*** (0.034) 0.180*** (0.030) 0.182*** (0.027) 0.192*** (0.026) 0.186*** (0.027) 0.197*** (0.031) 0.304*** (0.036)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.805*** (0.254) 0.561*** (0.110) 0.317*** (0.052) 0.289*** (0.038) 0.237*** (0.034) 0.185*** (0.035) 0.197*** (0.035) 0.185*** (0.037) 0.230*** (0.035)
Belgium 0.418*** (0.101) 0.147*** (0.042) 0.099*** (0.029) 0.086*** (0.025) 0.075*** (0.022) 0.054** (0.021) 0.037 (0.022) 0.043* (0.026) 0.095*** (0.031)
Bulgaria -0.098 (0.079) -0.090** (0.045) -0.029 (0.021) -0.009 (0.022) -0.008 (0.023) -0.041* (0.024) -0.061** (0.025) -0.114*** (0.030) -0.140*** (0.040)
Croatia 0.083 (0.083) 0.002 (0.039) -0.013 (0.025) -0.020 (0.024) -0.025 (0.024) -0.052** (0.025) -0.053** (0.023) -0.049** (0.022) -0.032 (0.025)
Czechia 0.420*** (0.086) 0.147*** (0.033) 0.078*** (0.024) 0.044** (0.020) 0.017 (0.019) 0.013 (0.019) 0.014 (0.018) 0.018 (0.017) 0.002 (0.032)
Denmark 1.664*** (0.496) 0.163*** (0.034) 0.096*** (0.019) 0.047*** (0.016) 0.019 (0.016) 0.014 (0.015) -0.010 (0.016) -0.016 (0.016) -0.004 (0.020)
Estonia 0.003 (0.127) 0.038 (0.056) -0.022 (0.043) -0.023 (0.039) -0.039 (0.038) -0.045 (0.039) -0.083* (0.043) -0.105** (0.052) -0.116 (0.081)
Finland 0.120 (0.147) 0.020 (0.070) 0.038 (0.033) 0.051*** (0.020) 0.035** (0.017) 0.027* (0.016) 0.022 (0.014) 0.013 (0.012) 0.008 (0.014)
France 0.550*** (0.172) 0.360*** (0.045) 0.186*** (0.024) 0.159*** (0.020) 0.125*** (0.020) 0.121*** (0.020) 0.096*** (0.019) 0.121*** (0.022) 0.167*** (0.035)
Germany 1.387*** (0.138) 0.507*** (0.043) 0.316*** (0.029) 0.229*** (0.022) 0.176*** (0.019) 0.172*** (0.017) 0.162*** (0.017) 0.173*** (0.018) 0.240*** (0.025)
Greece 0.105** (0.043) 0.136*** (0.028) 0.095*** (0.023) 0.053*** (0.017) 0.036** (0.015) 0.021 (0.014) 0.017 (0.015) 0.038** (0.015) 0.043* (0.026)
Hungary 0.816*** (0.159) 0.378*** (0.072) 0.138*** (0.033) 0.071*** (0.025) 0.015 (0.023) -0.017 (0.024) -0.035 (0.023) -0.049** (0.022) -0.044* (0.024)
Latvia -0.135 (0.103) -0.069 (0.049) -0.069* (0.040) -0.001 (0.040) -0.013 (0.035) -0.036 (0.033) -0.061* (0.032) -0.125*** (0.035) -0.149*** (0.044)
Lithuania 0.065 (0.114) -0.016 (0.041) -0.020 (0.036) 0.025 (0.038) -0.035 (0.038) -0.042 (0.036) -0.058 (0.039) -0.054 (0.043) -0.054 (0.049)
Netherlands 1.482*** (0.169) 0.613*** (0.050) 0.402*** (0.028) 0.285*** (0.022) 0.235*** (0.019) 0.221*** (0.017) 0.216*** (0.018) 0.197*** (0.020) 0.220*** (0.023)
Norway 0.580*** (0.163) 0.192*** (0.032) 0.124*** (0.021) 0.100*** (0.018) 0.101*** (0.016) 0.096*** (0.016) 0.080*** (0.016) 0.051*** (0.015) 0.036* (0.018)
Poland 0.019 (0.074) 0.017 (0.028) 0.005 (0.022) -0.023 (0.021) -0.033 (0.020) -0.027 (0.020) -0.038* (0.021) -0.076*** (0.024) -0.106*** (0.029)
Portugal 0.202*** (0.067) 0.075*** (0.028) 0.071*** (0.026) 0.064*** (0.025) 0.042 (0.026) 0.002 (0.028) -0.029 (0.030) -0.027 (0.032) -0.035 (0.036)
Romania 0.033 (0.078) -0.002 (0.096) 0.038 (0.030) 0.023 (0.019) 0.005 (0.019) -0.014 (0.022) -0.037* (0.019) -0.043** (0.021) -0.068** (0.031)
Serbia -0.126 (0.093) -0.329*** (0.108) -0.346*** (0.080) -0.198*** (0.043) -0.181*** (0.034) -0.167*** (0.031) -0.147*** (0.030) -0.103*** (0.030) -0.087** (0.034)
Slovakia 0.128*** (0.047) 0.085*** (0.027) 0.073*** (0.019) 0.056*** (0.017) 0.040*** (0.015) 0.039*** (0.015) 0.043*** (0.016) 0.039* (0.021) 0.043* (0.024)
Slovenia 0.060 (0.135) -0.062 (0.087) -0.053 (0.038) -0.030 (0.025) -0.033 (0.021) -0.060*** (0.018) -0.085*** (0.018) -0.098*** (0.020) -0.086*** (0.022)
Spain 0.634*** (0.133) 0.378*** (0.053) 0.293*** (0.039) 0.211*** (0.026) 0.121*** (0.022) 0.089*** (0.020) 0.077*** (0.019) 0.043*** (0.017) 0.038** (0.016)
Sweden 0.280* (0.165) 0.181*** (0.055) 0.099*** (0.021) 0.077*** (0.017) 0.050*** (0.016) 0.035** (0.015) 0.018 (0.016) 0.009 (0.019) 0.004 (0.021)
UK 0.413*** (0.088) 0.431*** (0.055) 0.276*** (0.034) 0.186*** (0.026) 0.159*** (0.024) 0.145*** (0.025) 0.094*** (0.024) 0.109*** (0.027) 0.182*** (0.043)
Unexplained
Austria 0.056 (0.295) 0.157 (0.123) 0.331*** (0.062) 0.279*** (0.046) 0.251*** (0.041) 0.284*** (0.041) 0.237*** (0.040) 0.230*** (0.041) 0.189*** (0.038)
Belgium -0.057 (0.129) 0.245*** (0.054) 0.277*** (0.038) 0.246*** (0.033) 0.213*** (0.030) 0.184*** (0.029) 0.188*** (0.030) 0.228*** (0.033) 0.221*** (0.041)
Bulgaria -0.121 (0.127) 0.045 (0.062) 0.022 (0.030) 0.065** (0.032) 0.100*** (0.033) 0.168*** (0.033) 0.223*** (0.036) 0.320*** (0.043) 0.391*** (0.066)
Croatia 0.096 (0.112) 0.123*** (0.047) 0.186*** (0.033) 0.195*** (0.030) 0.251*** (0.031) 0.267*** (0.033) 0.243*** (0.035) 0.160*** (0.036) 0.137*** (0.043)
Czechia 0.057 (0.113) 0.271*** (0.041) 0.293*** (0.031) 0.276*** (0.026) 0.260*** (0.024) 0.250*** (0.024) 0.259*** (0.023) 0.260*** (0.024) 0.386*** (0.044)
Denmark -1.357** (0.642) 0.046 (0.050) 0.068*** (0.026) 0.117*** (0.021) 0.154*** (0.020) 0.190*** (0.019) 0.248*** (0.021) 0.299*** (0.024) 0.351*** (0.036)
Estonia -0.184 (0.175) -0.010 (0.073) 0.211*** (0.055) 0.227*** (0.052) 0.255*** (0.051) 0.313*** (0.054) 0.313*** (0.060) 0.396*** (0.074) 0.464*** (0.116)
Finland -0.442** (0.176) -0.055 (0.081) 0.071* (0.037) 0.129*** (0.023) 0.164*** (0.020) 0.194*** (0.019) 0.238*** (0.018) 0.254*** (0.020) 0.264*** (0.025)
France 0.059 (0.225) 0.259*** (0.064) 0.224*** (0.038) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.183*** (0.026) 0.202*** (0.026) 0.225*** (0.027) 0.218*** (0.028) 0.280*** (0.040)
Germany -0.367** (0.166) 0.476*** (0.068) 0.452*** (0.040) 0.416*** (0.030) 0.406*** (0.026) 0.349*** (0.024) 0.288*** (0.023) 0.255*** (0.023) 0.224*** (0.027)
Greece 0.583*** (0.081) 0.373*** (0.050) 0.358*** (0.040) 0.252*** (0.033) 0.139*** (0.024) 0.151*** (0.023) 0.182*** (0.023) 0.170*** (0.025) 0.261*** (0.042)
Hungary 0.831*** (0.160) -0.007 (0.090) 0.104** (0.044) 0.071** (0.029) 0.163*** (0.028) 0.183*** (0.032) 0.196*** (0.034) 0.157*** (0.033) 0.176*** (0.040)
Latvia 0.058 (0.125) 0.113* (0.058) 0.131*** (0.045) 0.111** (0.044) 0.164*** (0.042) 0.178*** (0.040) 0.160*** (0.042) 0.235*** (0.048) 0.336*** (0.065)
Lithuania 0.011 (0.154) 0.058 (0.050) 0.143*** (0.046) 0.086* (0.050) 0.163*** (0.051) 0.159*** (0.051) 0.157*** (0.056) 0.207*** (0.063) 0.204** (0.080)
Netherlands -0.562*** (0.218) 0.300*** (0.067) 0.406*** (0.040) 0.429*** (0.030) 0.425*** (0.025) 0.413*** (0.023) 0.383*** (0.024) 0.374*** (0.026) 0.335*** (0.028)
Norway 0.039 (0.221) 0.318*** (0.044) 0.254*** (0.029) 0.233*** (0.023) 0.195*** (0.019) 0.206*** (0.019) 0.259*** (0.019) 0.352*** (0.020) 0.405*** (0.028)
Poland 0.093 (0.102) 0.038 (0.036) 0.124*** (0.029) 0.161*** (0.028) 0.187*** (0.027) 0.151*** (0.028) 0.179*** (0.029) 0.225*** (0.035) 0.232*** (0.046)
Portugal 0.086 (0.089) 0.093*** (0.033) 0.154*** (0.030) 0.238*** (0.029) 0.326*** (0.031) 0.419*** (0.034) 0.388*** (0.041) 0.278*** (0.043) 0.360*** (0.054)
Romania 0.496*** (0.105) -0.041 (0.076) 0.020 (0.032) 0.141*** (0.024) 0.078*** (0.024) 0.187*** (0.028) 0.195*** (0.031) 0.129*** (0.033) 0.125** (0.053)
Serbia 0.081 (0.133) 0.035 (0.161) -0.049 (0.072) 0.142*** (0.043) 0.146*** (0.039) 0.221*** (0.038) 0.195*** (0.043) 0.179*** (0.048) 0.329*** (0.053)
Slovakia 0.293** (0.136) 0.166*** (0.039) 0.185*** (0.027) 0.181*** (0.024) 0.184*** (0.023) 0.150*** (0.023) 0.148*** (0.024) 0.221*** (0.030) 0.282*** (0.036)
Slovenia 0.489*** (0.172) 0.024 (0.114) -0.012 (0.044) 0.050* (0.029) 0.091*** (0.025) 0.108*** (0.025) 0.073*** (0.026) 0.089*** (0.027) 0.168*** (0.034)
Spain 0.029 (0.183) 0.157** (0.077) 0.178*** (0.052) 0.208*** (0.036) 0.251*** (0.031) 0.215*** (0.030) 0.189*** (0.028) 0.178*** (0.027) 0.167*** (0.029)
Sweden -0.040 (0.218) 0.093 (0.073) 0.111*** (0.029) 0.118*** (0.021) 0.145*** (0.019) 0.171*** (0.019) 0.195*** (0.021) 0.213*** (0.025) 0.266*** (0.032)
UK -0.109 (0.140) -0.005 (0.079) 0.163*** (0.049) 0.243*** (0.038) 0.261*** (0.035) 0.288*** (0.036) 0.330*** (0.036) 0.294*** (0.040) 0.362*** (0.057)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.15: Private transfers and capital income gap decomposition for
the age group <25
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.562 (0.475) 0.369 (0.254) 0.234 (0.251) 0.167 (0.239) 0.060 (0.260) 0.193 (0.276) 0.152 (0.321) 0.158 (0.290) 0.254 (0.241)
Belgium -0.503* (0.263) 0.182 (0.376) 0.132 (0.375) -0.134 (0.436) -0.290 (0.521) -0.603 (0.695) -1.219* (0.737) -0.956* (0.542) -0.554 (0.470)
Bulgaria -0.222 (0.537) -0.340 (0.851) -0.185 (0.477) -0.280 (0.318) -0.483 (0.322) -0.499 (0.315) -0.195 (0.377) 0.430 (0.488) 0.358 (0.682)
Croatia -0.401 (0.254) -0.615 (0.391) -0.765 (0.484) -0.828 (0.724) -0.493 (0.695) 0.049 (0.567) -0.142 (0.502) -0.535 (0.470) -0.680 (0.510)
Czechia 0.040 (0.175) 0.104 (0.225) -0.096 (0.262) -0.217 (0.267) -0.250 (0.316) -0.124 (0.369) -0.678 (0.462) -0.308 (0.403) -0.668* (0.386)
Denmark -0.507** (0.249) -1.063*** (0.327) -1.234** (0.530) -1.691* (0.892) -1.005* (0.581) -0.478 (0.499) 0.254 (0.462) 0.729 (0.503) 0.675* (0.385)
Estonia 3.589 (3.193) 3.225 (2.077) 0.280 (2.654) 0.139 (1.777) 0.298 (1.297) -0.431 (1.118) -0.618 (1.005) -0.983 (0.855) 0.222 (0.691)
Finland -0.065 (0.113) -0.220 (0.243) -0.303 (0.276) -0.107 (0.221) 0.039 (0.184) 0.089 (0.162) 0.023 (0.149) 0.241* (0.142) 0.264 (0.170)
France -0.655** (0.261) -0.639** (0.284) -0.941*** (0.307) -0.260 (0.268) -0.148 (0.192) -0.230 (0.170) -0.141 (0.168) -0.090 (0.178) -0.267 (0.182)
Germany 0.057 (0.171) -0.105 (0.163) -0.099 (0.116) -0.149 (0.117) -0.193 (0.125) -0.367** (0.186) -0.693*** (0.257) -0.524** (0.216) -0.446** (0.203)
Greece -0.510 (0.861) -0.162 (0.229) -0.122 (0.190) -0.119 (0.176) -0.036 (0.171) 0.028 (0.145) 0.083 (0.098) 0.080 (0.087) 0.103 (0.070)
Hungary 0.154 (0.160) 0.246 (0.175) -0.103 (0.180) -0.329* (0.183) -0.234 (0.218) -0.446 (0.276) -0.577 (0.436) -0.420 (0.434) 0.129 (0.315)
Latvia -0.163 (0.553) -0.729 (0.737) -1.600* (0.889) -0.964 (1.929) -0.777 (1.161) -0.954 (0.990) -1.039 (0.863) -0.010 (0.728) -0.051 (0.574)
Lithuania -0.237 (1.024) -0.079 (1.009) 0.769 (2.192) 0.769 (2.192) -2.237 (3.456) -0.599 (3.100) 0.140 (2.200) -0.133 (1.936) -0.277 (1.150)
Netherlands -0.481 (1.230) -0.497 (0.552) -0.526** (0.263) -0.664*** (0.222) -0.484** (0.200) -0.407* (0.213) -0.427* (0.223) -0.057 (0.198) -0.255 (0.179)
Norway -0.003 (0.138) -0.118 (0.208) 0.032 (0.183) 0.158 (0.156) 0.232* (0.128) 0.164 (0.117) 0.242** (0.113) 0.219* (0.129) 0.131 (0.210)
Poland -0.310 (0.449) -0.220 (0.435) -0.468 (0.364) -0.497* (0.290) -0.478* (0.279) -0.672** (0.261) -0.713** (0.292) -1.115** (0.435) -0.988 (0.772)
Portugal 0.828 (1.262) 0.269 (0.248) 0.133 (0.218) 0.108 (0.218) 0.270 (0.246) 0.161 (0.225) 0.214 (0.194) 0.192 (0.199) 0.229 (0.300)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia 0.000 (0.000) 0.173 (0.390) 0.407 (0.417) 0.862* (0.478) 1.069* (0.609) 0.988 (0.658) 0.128 (0.689) -0.861 (0.645) -0.918* (0.535)
Slovakia -0.053 (0.070) -0.219 (0.197) 0.163 (0.266) 0.163 (0.266) -0.190 (0.359) -0.427 (0.592) 0.049 (0.912) 0.009 (0.592) 0.446 (0.502)
Slovenia -0.064 (0.300) 0.178 (0.364) -0.348 (0.399) -0.476 (0.439) -0.494 (0.482) -0.452 (0.526) -0.345 (0.436) -0.144 (0.375) -0.266 (0.292)
Spain -0.011 (0.314) -0.145 (0.350) -0.001 (0.343) -0.301 (0.332) -0.521 (0.324) -0.447 (0.337) -0.445 (0.339) -0.295 (0.307) -0.334 (0.269)
Sweden -0.113 (0.173) -0.142 (0.182) -0.113 (0.201) -0.027 (0.217) -0.173 (0.219) -0.230 (0.241) -0.107 (0.220) 0.101 (0.200) 0.362* (0.212)
UK -0.335** (0.132) -0.530*** (0.184) -0.545** (0.238) -0.489** (0.235) -0.588** (0.234) -0.656*** (0.242) -0.688*** (0.260) -0.497** (0.206) -0.296 (0.187)
Unexplained
Austria 0.150 (0.660) -0.252 (0.320) -0.280 (0.314) -0.055 (0.306) 0.201 (0.333) 0.201 (0.356) 0.071 (0.486) -0.030 (0.426) 0.131 (0.320)
Belgium 0.308 (0.273) -0.355 (0.482) -0.133 (0.500) 0.009 (0.563) 0.080 (0.677) 0.808 (0.821) 1.442 (1.102) 1.380* (0.799) 1.155 (0.717)
Bulgaria 0.629 (0.597) 0.958 (0.979) 0.778 (0.569) 0.860** (0.416) 0.994** (0.399) 0.924** (0.372) 0.461 (0.438) 0.043 (0.510) 0.565 (0.894)
Croatia -0.095 (0.478) -0.061 (0.603) -0.293 (0.688) 0.606 (0.917) 0.581 (0.907) -0.127 (0.824) -0.345 (0.663) 0.047 (0.481) 0.309 (0.745)
Czechia -0.091 (0.241) -0.086 (0.302) -0.102 (0.324) -0.006 (0.335) 0.055 (0.386) -0.151 (0.454) 0.596 (0.551) 0.053 (0.478) 0.052 (0.477)
Denmark -0.007 (0.407) 0.233 (0.492) 0.109 (0.808) 1.187 (1.154) 1.907** (0.857) 1.763** (0.807) 0.455 (0.747) 0.581 (0.702) 1.141** (0.529)
Estonia -6.194* (3.179) -4.516** (2.085) -1.522 (2.552) -0.043 (1.814) -0.099 (1.405) 0.419 (1.292) 0.292 (1.193) 0.636 (0.963) -0.816 (0.785)
Finland 0.519** (0.246) 0.576 (0.405) 0.404 (0.552) -0.203 (0.372) -0.042 (0.319) -0.100 (0.290) 0.271 (0.272) 0.029 (0.265) 0.154 (0.306)
France 0.953*** (0.340) 1.345*** (0.393) 1.596*** (0.438) 1.263*** (0.422) 0.986*** (0.352) 0.988*** (0.323) 0.574* (0.304) 0.407 (0.289) 0.307 (0.311)
Germany -0.110 (0.295) -0.161 (0.253) 0.005 (0.192) 0.121 (0.198) 0.051 (0.211) 0.215 (0.308) 0.334 (0.414) 0.404 (0.327) 0.004 (0.292)
Greece -0.837 (0.976) -0.125 (0.294) -0.034 (0.239) -0.053 (0.223) -0.169 (0.199) -0.099 (0.177) -0.067 (0.148) -0.030 (0.149) -0.059 (0.133)
Hungary -0.267 (0.185) -0.324 (0.223) -0.044 (0.214) 0.058 (0.278) -0.882*** (0.276) -0.557** (0.271) 0.028 (0.467) 0.419 (0.488) 0.472 (0.407)
Latvia 0.178 (0.714) 0.814 (0.911) 1.160 (1.009) 0.390 (2.293) 0.310 (1.368) 0.294 (1.192) 0.219 (1.051) -0.582 (0.834) -0.436 (0.649)
Lithuania -0.847 (0.988) 0.235 (1.225) -0.443 (2.476) -3.626 (2.729) -1.221 (3.489) -2.871 (3.197) -3.326 (2.144) -1.704 (1.955) -2.014 (1.353)
Netherlands 0.653 (1.824) 0.543 (0.784) 0.751** (0.375) 0.872** (0.339) 0.655** (0.317) 0.513 (0.356) 0.282 (0.371) 0.073 (0.347) 0.356 (0.344)
Norway -0.153 (0.228) 0.215 (0.373) -0.151 (0.301) -0.146 (0.250) -0.099 (0.213) -0.010 (0.199) -0.204 (0.191) -0.203 (0.205) -0.009 (0.333)
Poland 0.240 (0.516) 0.355 (0.535) 0.409 (0.452) 0.345 (0.408) 0.054 (0.339) -0.001 (0.332) -0.108 (0.360) 0.164 (0.487) 0.051 (0.940)
Portugal -0.778 (1.537) -0.249 (0.408) -0.329 (0.320) 0.056 (0.334) -0.518 (0.356) -0.434 (0.371) -0.557 (0.349) -0.655* (0.362) -0.378 (0.431)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia 0.151 (0.208) -0.439 (0.469) -0.500 (0.419) -0.827 (0.544) -1.264** (0.614) -0.917 (0.570) -0.118 (0.639) 0.736 (0.584) 0.894 (0.671)
Slovakia -0.054 (0.084) -0.034 (0.290) -0.185 (0.380) -0.212 (0.380) -0.209 (0.542) -1.291* (0.751) -0.608 (0.963) 0.106 (0.640) -0.053 (0.523)
Slovenia -0.129 (0.327) -0.041 (0.677) 0.148 (0.726) -0.587 (0.683) -0.425 (0.680) -0.238 (0.643) 0.368 (0.567) -0.118 (0.439) 0.073 (0.486)
Spain -0.350 (0.441) 0.092 (0.481) -0.048 (0.479) 0.221 (0.485) 0.440 (0.504) 0.013 (0.528) -0.458 (0.471) -0.120 (0.439) 0.197 (0.386)
Sweden 0.190 (0.227) 0.534** (0.254) 0.425 (0.289) 0.583* (0.323) 0.805** (0.333) 0.989*** (0.378) 0.805** (0.368) 0.257 (0.334) -0.247 (0.327)
UK 0.053 (0.172) -0.133 (0.284) -0.152 (0.419) -0.289 (0.410) -0.347 (0.374) -0.641* (0.335) 0.057 (0.305) -0.043 (0.312) 0.031 (0.312)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: Romania is excluded due to data limitations.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.16: Private transfers and capital income gap decomposition for
the age group 25-44
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.030 (0.236) 0.101 (0.148) 0.040 (0.112) -0.074 (0.110) -0.180 (0.123) -0.180 (0.169) -0.375* (0.224) -0.779*** (0.273) -0.926*** (0.273)
Belgium -0.411** (0.170) -0.250*** (0.096) -0.250*** (0.096) -0.176 (0.118) -0.286* (0.162) -0.271 (0.171) -0.286 (0.243) -0.123 (0.227) 0.033 (0.171)
Bulgaria -0.163 (0.138) -0.028 (0.132) -0.086 (0.115) -0.038 (0.115) -0.010 (0.120) 0.136 (0.126) 0.158 (0.132) 0.230 (0.149) 0.286* (0.149)
Croatia 0.063 (0.115) 0.023 (0.101) -0.087 (0.095) -0.117 (0.095) -0.109 (0.110) -0.238* (0.136) -0.331** (0.164) -0.216 (0.156) -0.215 (0.176)
Czechia -0.175** (0.081) -0.187** (0.080) -0.221*** (0.077) -0.232*** (0.068) -0.209*** (0.071) -0.282*** (0.089) -0.374*** (0.101) -0.358*** (0.116) -0.417*** (0.152)
Denmark -0.180*** (0.066) -0.153** (0.077) -0.151* (0.091) -0.306*** (0.111) -0.247 (0.165) -0.572* (0.337) -0.291 (0.349) -0.267 (0.329) 0.051 (0.224)
Estonia -0.428 (0.304) -0.432 (0.589) -0.478 (0.403) -0.272 (0.348) -0.059 (0.327) -0.186 (0.299) 0.002 (0.289) 0.099 (0.287) 0.212 (0.264)
Finland 0.074 (0.069) 0.048 (0.078) 0.085 (0.101) -0.216 (0.166) -0.295* (0.163) -0.372*** (0.128) -0.260** (0.122) -0.180 (0.110) -0.138 (0.084)
France 0.057 (0.147) 0.079 (0.140) -0.031 (0.132) -0.009 (0.110) 0.019 (0.101) -0.066 (0.107) -0.067 (0.106) -0.111 (0.104) 0.025 (0.117)
Germany 0.020 (0.133) 0.177* (0.102) 0.077 (0.072) 0.056 (0.061) 0.023 (0.062) 0.055 (0.081) -0.037 (0.100) -0.227* (0.131) -0.301* (0.160)
Greece -0.113* (0.060) -0.454** (0.181) -0.189** (0.079) -0.163*** (0.057) -0.199*** (0.050) -0.185*** (0.047) -0.160*** (0.049) -0.192*** (0.054) -0.169** (0.066)
Hungary 0.004 (0.047) 0.001 (0.057) 0.008 (0.053) -0.000 (0.063) -0.036 (0.076) -0.125 (0.117) -0.228 (0.177) -0.115 (0.130) -0.256* (0.155)
Latvia -0.059 (0.096) -0.114 (0.120) -0.190 (0.128) -0.222* (0.134) -0.204 (0.219) -0.054 (0.756) -0.332 (0.581) -0.251 (0.354) -0.592* (0.326)
Lithuania -0.033 (0.201) -0.088 (0.265) -0.026 (0.351) -0.203 (0.496) -0.174 (0.692) -0.543 (0.579) -0.428 (0.544) -0.784* (0.475) -1.184** (0.590)
Netherlands -0.801*** (0.272) -0.827 (0.997) -0.302 (0.226) -0.171 (0.137) -0.235** (0.114) -0.234** (0.106) -0.290*** (0.111) -0.292** (0.129) -0.185* (0.110)
Norway -0.128 (0.098) -0.401** (0.159) -0.267** (0.117) -0.146 (0.090) -0.152** (0.069) -0.138** (0.059) -0.088 (0.056) -0.024 (0.058) 0.037 (0.079)
Poland -0.304 (0.278) -0.143 (0.231) -0.162 (0.180) -0.241 (0.152) -0.199 (0.138) -0.114 (0.148) -0.018 (0.149) -0.335*** (0.129) -0.340** (0.168)
Portugal -0.134 (0.157) -0.197 (0.187) -0.105 (0.071) -0.126** (0.056) -0.110* (0.057) -0.164*** (0.060) -0.197** (0.098) -0.198** (0.089) -0.224** (0.088)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia 0.129 (0.118) 0.170 (0.116) 0.151 (0.124) 0.060 (0.121) 0.064 (0.132) -0.028 (0.121) -0.006 (0.124) -0.099 (0.130) -0.352 (0.259)
Slovakia 0.044 (0.061) -0.020 (0.064) -0.131* (0.067) -0.131* (0.067) -0.110 (0.088) -0.103 (0.123) -0.319* (0.193) -0.743** (0.312) -0.171 (0.201)
Slovenia -0.068 (0.047) -0.038 (0.062) -0.096 (0.088) -0.178** (0.087) -0.171* (0.095) -0.207** (0.096) -0.144 (0.092) -0.213** (0.101) -0.170* (0.103)
Spain -0.178** (0.078) -0.116 (0.091) -0.113 (0.086) -0.142* (0.086) -0.319*** (0.093) -0.312*** (0.094) -0.247*** (0.089) -0.183** (0.074) -0.109 (0.075)
Sweden 0.002 (0.079) -0.149* (0.089) -0.265** (0.123) -0.268** (0.126) -0.173 (0.131) -0.231 (0.147) -0.295** (0.139) -0.276** (0.128) -0.241** (0.123)
UK 0.005 (0.064) 0.005 (0.064) -0.133 (0.098) -0.059 (0.128) -0.132 (0.142) -0.134 (0.162) -0.213 (0.183) -0.299 (0.183) -0.402* (0.217)
Unexplained
Austria -0.267 (0.278) -0.166 (0.179) -0.033 (0.138) 0.018 (0.137) 0.029 (0.154) 0.054 (0.209) 0.005 (0.281) 0.423 (0.336) 0.584* (0.332)
Belgium 0.035 (0.188) 0.090 (0.114) 0.494*** (0.119) -0.115 (0.159) -0.028 (0.225) 0.054 (0.238) -0.595 (0.406) -0.030 (0.305) -0.215 (0.234)
Bulgaria 0.069 (0.230) -0.243 (0.197) -0.147 (0.174) -0.335* (0.174) -0.142 (0.183) -0.392** (0.188) -0.180 (0.195) -0.311 (0.217) -0.355 (0.223)
Croatia -0.029 (0.200) 0.003 (0.165) 0.208 (0.156) 0.136 (0.155) 0.110 (0.176) 0.239 (0.219) 0.291 (0.268) 0.030 (0.251) 0.042 (0.281)
Czechia -0.156* (0.094) -0.246** (0.096) -0.191** (0.092) 0.116 (0.085) -0.282*** (0.095) 0.132 (0.116) -0.093 (0.136) -0.250 (0.155) -0.000 (0.193)
Denmark 0.247** (0.110) 0.282** (0.137) 0.275* (0.156) 0.557*** (0.193) 0.340 (0.287) 0.942 (0.582) 0.095 (0.733) -0.889 (0.611) -0.813** (0.362)
Estonia -1.403*** (0.525) -0.782 (0.732) -0.511 (0.497) -0.634 (0.439) -0.626 (0.405) -0.438 (0.369) -0.381 (0.357) -0.646* (0.354) -0.458 (0.305)
Finland -0.325*** (0.102) -0.105 (0.118) -0.221 (0.158) -0.037 (0.262) 0.141 (0.254) 0.018 (0.208) -0.202 (0.198) -0.239 (0.179) -0.110 (0.143)
France 0.037 (0.183) 0.027 (0.180) 0.159 (0.171) 0.115 (0.147) 0.061 (0.138) 0.035 (0.147) -0.055 (0.146) -0.020 (0.137) -0.001 (0.142)
Germany 0.045 (0.177) -0.176 (0.144) -0.128 (0.101) -0.124 (0.084) -0.109 (0.086) -0.107 (0.113) -0.036 (0.141) 0.065 (0.185) 0.163 (0.213)
Greece 0.197 (0.180) -0.029 (0.273) -0.013 (0.138) -0.023 (0.103) 0.137 (0.088) 0.106 (0.085) 0.081 (0.089) 0.051 (0.093) 0.116 (0.106)
Hungary -0.015 (0.057) -0.051 (0.070) -0.087 (0.071) -0.053 (0.085) -0.109 (0.104) -0.043 (0.154) 0.087 (0.232) 0.083 (0.173) 0.270 (0.203)
Latvia 0.047 (0.136) 0.064 (0.174) 0.086 (0.192) -0.595** (0.238) -2.603*** (0.816) -3.426*** (0.906) -1.201* (0.676) -0.468 (0.431) 0.009 (0.412)
Lithuania 0.044 (0.324) 0.159 (0.380) 0.219 (0.454) 0.196 (0.688) 0.410 (0.988) 0.669 (0.811) 0.403 (0.744) 0.079 (0.724) 0.759 (0.847)
Netherlands 0.401 (0.334) -1.527 (1.254) -0.026 (0.292) -0.011 (0.186) 0.034 (0.155) 0.053 (0.147) 0.065 (0.156) 0.112 (0.182) -0.028 (0.159)
Norway -0.474*** (0.162) -0.262 (0.198) -0.178 (0.153) -0.113 (0.122) -0.008 (0.103) -0.084 (0.095) -0.201** (0.094) -0.268*** (0.103) -0.347** (0.140)
Poland 0.026 (0.341) -0.280 (0.301) -0.167 (0.227) 0.060 (0.197) 0.058 (0.177) 0.054 (0.192) -0.038 (0.188) 0.288 (0.188) 0.543** (0.261)
Portugal -0.200 (0.261) -0.136 (0.266) -0.035 (0.116) -0.028 (0.094) -0.037 (0.096) -0.281** (0.126) -0.020 (0.177) 0.044 (0.167) -0.123 (0.184)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia -0.192 (0.169) -0.216 (0.180) -0.185 (0.194) -0.040 (0.194) -0.188 (0.221) -0.088 (0.196) -0.101 (0.190) 0.067 (0.202) 0.293 (0.358)
Slovakia -0.180** (0.082) -0.122 (0.087) -0.113 (0.090) -0.152* (0.090) -0.305* (0.158) -0.360 (0.251) -1.262*** (0.320) -0.354 (0.423) -0.424 (0.282)
Slovenia -0.085 (0.071) -0.146 (0.122) -0.107 (0.165) -0.162 (0.170) -0.332* (0.188) -0.294 (0.181) -0.513*** (0.172) -0.314* (0.179) -0.338* (0.178)
Spain 0.174 (0.125) 0.110 (0.144) 0.071 (0.145) -0.014 (0.143) 0.186 (0.156) 0.197 (0.163) 0.122 (0.155) 0.050 (0.129) -0.071 (0.129)
Sweden -0.025 (0.114) -0.021 (0.131) -0.007 (0.182) -0.032 (0.186) -0.233 (0.193) -0.201 (0.212) -0.054 (0.206) -0.076 (0.193) -0.088 (0.190)
UK -0.113 (0.083) 0.015 (0.101) -0.049 (0.132) -0.250 (0.175) -0.119 (0.197) -0.249 (0.228) -0.384 (0.251) -0.159 (0.242) 0.140 (0.281)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: Romania is excluded due to data limitations.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.17: Private transfers and capital income gap decomposition for
the age group 45-65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.234 (0.183) 0.181 (0.116) 0.168 (0.103) 0.164 (0.108) 0.122 (0.124) 0.017 (0.154) -0.264 (0.191) -0.171 (0.169) -0.188 (0.201)
Belgium -0.045 (0.066) 0.074 (0.081) 0.017 (0.093) 0.065 (0.125) 0.204 (0.136) 0.276 (0.174) 0.300 (0.206) 0.128 (0.136) 0.072 (0.120)
Bulgaria -0.025 (0.096) -0.145* (0.081) -0.144* (0.081) -0.133 (0.089) -0.094 (0.090) -0.054 (0.092) -0.029 (0.093) 0.048 (0.093) 0.150 (0.116)
Croatia 0.018 (0.136) -0.192 (0.124) -0.203* (0.122) -0.234 (0.146) -0.219 (0.177) -0.206 (0.162) -0.096 (0.139) -0.091 (0.137) 0.042 (0.144)
Czechia 0.026 (0.043) -0.026 (0.047) -0.043 (0.045) -0.066 (0.054) -0.067 (0.055) -0.073 (0.061) -0.129 (0.085) -0.195* (0.110) -0.069 (0.132)
Denmark -0.012 (0.066) -0.070 (0.077) -0.217** (0.094) -0.232 (0.142) -0.459 (0.401) -0.169 (0.433) -0.086 (0.219) -0.071 (0.145) -0.180 (0.127)
Estonia 0.669 (1.259) -0.504* (0.294) -0.306 (0.237) -0.048 (0.255) -0.119 (0.206) -0.102 (0.203) -0.274 (0.214) -0.343 (0.271) -0.277 (0.279)
Finland -0.031 (0.044) 0.070 (0.078) -0.012 (0.122) -0.146 (0.135) -0.175 (0.126) -0.210 (0.138) -0.105 (0.130) -0.104 (0.117) -0.087 (0.102)
France 0.380** (0.153) 0.422*** (0.122) 0.276*** (0.097) 0.113 (0.081) 0.121 (0.078) 0.169** (0.074) 0.152** (0.063) 0.204*** (0.057) 0.169*** (0.064)
Germany 0.091 (0.087) -0.043 (0.063) -0.055 (0.048) -0.019 (0.045) -0.054 (0.048) -0.066 (0.071) -0.198** (0.101) -0.131 (0.112) -0.199* (0.120)
Greece -0.214** (0.101) -0.310** (0.140) -0.195* (0.109) -0.148** (0.072) -0.105 (0.067) -0.165*** (0.060) -0.161** (0.078) -0.261*** (0.093) -0.323 (0.198)
Hungary 0.004 (0.019) -0.038 (0.026) -0.046 (0.028) -0.050 (0.032) -0.071* (0.041) -0.096 (0.061) -0.125 (0.088) -0.071 (0.126) -0.043 (0.189)
Latvia 0.043 (0.106) -0.081 (0.129) -0.178 (0.135) -0.416** (0.202) -0.651 (0.411) -0.236 (0.416) -0.133 (0.248) -0.213 (0.207) -0.184 (0.245)
Lithuania -0.301* (0.165) -0.648*** (0.209) -1.076*** (0.281) -0.569* (0.344) -0.434 (0.343) -0.304 (0.321) -0.322 (0.287) -0.377 (0.282) -0.453 (0.323)
Netherlands -0.322 (0.253) -0.086 (1.058) 0.198 (0.176) 0.134 (0.099) 0.051 (0.081) 0.035 (0.077) -0.002 (0.080) 0.008 (0.082) 0.040 (0.086)
Norway 0.263 (0.192) 0.225* (0.129) 0.118 (0.090) 0.159** (0.076) 0.114 (0.075) 0.105 (0.080) 0.057 (0.082) 0.035 (0.091) 0.162 (0.102)
Poland -0.104 (0.193) -0.143 (0.149) -0.133 (0.136) -0.133 (0.126) -0.090 (0.126) -0.097 (0.131) -0.102 (0.149) 0.035 (0.167) -0.053 (0.161)
Portugal 0.334 (0.223) 0.138 (0.092) 0.152*** (0.058) 0.155** (0.061) 0.155** (0.061) 0.280*** (0.084) 0.252*** (0.083) 0.157** (0.079) 0.129* (0.066)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia -0.055 (0.073) -0.050 (0.086) -0.136 (0.101) 0.055 (0.126) 0.116 (0.133) 0.051 (0.130) 0.035 (0.120) 0.003 (0.124) 0.000 (0.176)
Slovakia 0.009 (0.036) 0.003 (0.054) -0.026 (0.059) -0.026 (0.059) -0.048 (0.070) -0.103 (0.100) -0.023 (0.127) 0.131 (0.237) 0.118 (0.115)
Slovenia -0.012 (0.036) -0.079 (0.063) -0.073 (0.069) -0.097 (0.071) -0.131* (0.077) -0.070 (0.073) -0.037 (0.069) -0.034 (0.074) -0.020 (0.094)
Spain -0.012 (0.094) -0.163* (0.084) -0.188** (0.081) -0.220*** (0.080) -0.209*** (0.075) -0.120* (0.072) -0.053 (0.061) -0.089 (0.059) -0.075 (0.058)
Sweden -0.044 (0.088) -0.082 (0.137) -0.128 (0.142) -0.251** (0.127) -0.263** (0.117) -0.238** (0.107) -0.155 (0.095) -0.175* (0.096) -0.185 (0.127)
UK 0.058 (0.057) -0.143* (0.075) -0.190* (0.104) -0.098 (0.105) -0.119 (0.105) -0.219** (0.111) -0.271** (0.123) -0.268** (0.114) -0.198* (0.119)
Unexplained
Austria -0.230 (0.228) -0.248* (0.144) -0.209 (0.129) -0.235* (0.135) -0.229 (0.156) -0.056 (0.195) 0.077 (0.247) -0.050 (0.215) -0.077 (0.242)
Belgium -0.095 (0.104) -0.207* (0.118) -0.180 (0.134) -0.497*** (0.184) -0.469** (0.198) -0.666** (0.298) -0.680** (0.293) -0.382* (0.206) -0.223 (0.181)
Bulgaria -0.025 (0.150) 0.110 (0.130) 0.076 (0.127) 0.138 (0.141) 0.102 (0.142) 0.054 (0.151) 0.082 (0.152) -0.149 (0.162) -0.141 (0.187)
Croatia -0.203 (0.214) -0.077 (0.181) -0.223 (0.188) -0.134 (0.225) -0.449* (0.258) -0.278 (0.223) -0.293 (0.194) -0.179 (0.190) -0.251 (0.194)
Czechia -0.054 (0.064) -0.163** (0.068) 0.117* (0.066) -0.034 (0.074) 0.056 (0.077) 0.083 (0.086) 0.044 (0.120) 0.020 (0.158) -0.234 (0.194)
Denmark -0.070 (0.130) -0.049 (0.144) 0.127 (0.171) 0.018 (0.254) -0.316 (0.690) 0.015 (0.698) -0.149 (0.373) -0.310 (0.247) 0.020 (0.215)
Estonia 0.328 (1.410) 1.404*** (0.538) 0.791** (0.389) 0.320 (0.381) 0.346 (0.305) 0.133 (0.288) 0.139 (0.303) 0.262 (0.370) 0.801* (0.422)
Finland 0.000 (0.067) 0.007 (0.114) 0.131 (0.177) 0.300 (0.214) 0.220 (0.195) 0.295 (0.207) 0.157 (0.199) 0.076 (0.168) 0.250 (0.153)
France -0.465** (0.218) -0.466*** (0.180) -0.356** (0.143) -0.170 (0.123) -0.253** (0.124) -0.318*** (0.115) -0.339*** (0.103) -0.258*** (0.090) -0.171* (0.099)
Germany -0.154 (0.122) 0.006 (0.087) 0.013 (0.064) -0.027 (0.059) -0.021 (0.064) -0.053 (0.093) 0.131 (0.131) -0.133 (0.155) -0.001 (0.155)
Greece -0.264 (0.178) 0.008 (0.222) -0.003 (0.153) 0.065 (0.101) 0.050 (0.089) 0.066 (0.082) 0.067 (0.099) 0.096 (0.114) 0.229 (0.225)
Hungary 0.011 (0.032) 0.028 (0.040) 0.025 (0.045) -0.040 (0.054) -0.042 (0.072) -0.035 (0.103) -0.016 (0.150) -0.085 (0.212) -0.134 (0.298)
Latvia -0.056 (0.150) 0.078 (0.178) 0.139 (0.189) 0.284 (0.295) 0.158 (0.661) -0.138 (0.611) -0.324 (0.375) -0.303 (0.319) -0.145 (0.360)
Lithuania 0.329 (0.222) 0.802*** (0.291) 1.126*** (0.390) 0.584 (0.474) 0.573 (0.477) 0.305 (0.456) 0.128 (0.417) 0.373 (0.402) 0.072 (0.480)
Netherlands -0.100 (0.343) -1.190 (1.329) -0.493** (0.232) -0.275** (0.133) -0.175 (0.110) -0.152 (0.107) -0.188* (0.113) -0.191 (0.117) -0.302** (0.123)
Norway -0.553** (0.266) -0.407** (0.179) -0.205 (0.126) -0.219** (0.109) -0.124 (0.108) -0.030 (0.114) 0.026 (0.121) 0.078 (0.136) -0.092 (0.162)
Poland 0.007 (0.322) -0.008 (0.236) -0.133 (0.194) -0.154 (0.179) -0.259 (0.178) -0.130 (0.178) -0.107 (0.200) -0.335 (0.224) -0.114 (0.256)
Portugal -0.329 (0.324) -0.183 (0.139) -0.219** (0.092) -0.237*** (0.088) -0.240*** (0.088) -0.423*** (0.136) -0.373*** (0.132) -0.174 (0.128) -0.314** (0.143)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia 0.102 (0.120) 0.036 (0.141) 0.013 (0.166) -0.375** (0.191) -0.303 (0.203) -0.343* (0.203) -0.267 (0.184) -0.250 (0.198) -0.153 (0.270)
Slovakia -0.002 (0.061) -0.061 (0.088) -0.010 (0.097) -0.049 (0.097) -0.256** (0.122) 0.114 (0.161) -0.384 (0.245) -0.541 (0.359) -0.481** (0.203)
Slovenia -0.019 (0.068) 0.069 (0.123) 0.070 (0.136) -0.004 (0.140) 0.061 (0.148) 0.042 (0.143) -0.143 (0.136) -0.054 (0.139) -0.079 (0.176)
Spain -0.082 (0.142) -0.009 (0.127) 0.034 (0.126) 0.075 (0.124) 0.043 (0.120) -0.088 (0.115) -0.150 (0.101) -0.123 (0.097) -0.087 (0.095)
Sweden -0.010 (0.135) -0.040 (0.204) 0.039 (0.214) 0.247 (0.193) 0.224 (0.181) 0.189 (0.164) 0.154 (0.147) 0.155 (0.150) 0.233 (0.197)
UK -0.099 (0.085) 0.066 (0.105) 0.061 (0.157) -0.010 (0.156) -0.048 (0.155) 0.030 (0.163) -0.016 (0.177) 0.138 (0.166) 0.143 (0.174)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: Romania is excluded due to data limitations.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.18: Private transfers and capital income gap decomposition for
the age group >65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria -0.041 (0.168) -0.166 (0.110) -0.199* (0.104) -0.142 (0.126) -0.055 (0.148) 0.070 (0.201) 0.356 (0.251) 0.656*** (0.221) 0.154 (0.227)
Belgium -0.003 (0.108) -0.003 (0.108) -0.194 (0.164) -0.282 (0.198) 0.447 (0.317) 0.066 (0.422) 0.619* (0.367) 0.352 (0.270) 0.197 (0.151)
Bulgaria -0.132 (0.115) -0.214*** (0.080) -0.138** (0.066) -0.139* (0.078) -0.119 (0.084) -0.148 (0.095) -0.154 (0.102) -0.211* (0.121) -0.208 (0.145)
Croatia -0.544*** (0.177) -0.515*** (0.178) -0.645*** (0.179) -0.666*** (0.183) -0.019 (0.339) 0.064 (0.198) -0.065 (0.205) -0.237 (0.203) -0.006 (0.181)
Czechia 0.005 (0.079) 0.041 (0.069) 0.006 (0.066) 0.028 (0.078) -0.069 (0.080) 0.006 (0.085) -0.170 (0.111) -0.200* (0.120) -0.237 (0.185)
Denmark 0.454** (0.179) 0.646*** (0.234) 2.085*** (0.644) 0.902*** (0.344) 0.367* (0.202) -0.007 (0.149) -0.029 (0.123) -0.041 (0.110) -0.135 (0.111)
Estonia 0.021 (0.608) 0.977 (1.209) 0.803 (0.645) 0.563 (0.518) 0.619* (0.376) 0.524 (0.365) 0.082 (0.363) 0.312 (0.347) -0.030 (0.317)
Finland 0.140 (0.165) 0.444* (0.252) 0.541** (0.221) 0.388** (0.192) 0.351* (0.180) 0.167 (0.186) 0.160 (0.165) 0.135 (0.126) 0.071 (0.132)
France 0.022 (0.145) 0.232 (0.159) 0.062 (0.125) 0.227* (0.125) 0.070 (0.115) -0.015 (0.105) 0.015 (0.095) -0.082 (0.107) 0.050 (0.092)
Germany 0.142 (0.153) 0.036 (0.058) -0.048 (0.046) -0.114** (0.048) -0.126* (0.072) 0.014 (0.112) -0.077 (0.115) -0.076 (0.136) -0.037 (0.149)
Greece -0.798*** (0.171) -1.026*** (0.229) -0.163 (0.304) 0.090 (0.280) 0.188 (0.243) 0.031 (0.225) -0.096 (0.234) -0.201 (0.282) -0.345 (0.428)
Hungary 0.042 (0.092) 0.062 (0.068) 0.030 (0.070) 0.017 (0.081) 0.121 (0.098) 0.155 (0.114) 0.130 (0.179) 0.115 (0.245) 0.372 (0.342)
Latvia -0.091 (0.143) -0.065 (0.187) -0.214 (0.284) -0.538 (0.433) -0.674 (0.499) -0.989** (0.491) -0.976** (0.456) -0.710** (0.301) -0.721*** (0.264)
Lithuania -0.301 (0.831) -0.126 (0.477) 0.002 (0.569) 0.051 (0.576) -0.181 (0.521) 0.146 (0.446) 0.165 (0.432) -0.096 (0.415) -0.860** (0.430)
Netherlands 0.589 (0.813) 0.334* (0.199) 0.211* (0.126) 0.305*** (0.099) 0.199** (0.089) 0.169* (0.093) 0.170 (0.111) 0.359*** (0.086) 0.103 (0.106)
Norway 0.601* (0.355) 0.278 (0.187) 0.283* (0.161) 0.150 (0.144) 0.173 (0.125) 0.186* (0.111) 0.161 (0.111) 0.220** (0.112) 0.317*** (0.095)
Poland -1.148** (0.484) -1.084** (0.440) -0.292 (0.248) -0.381 (0.235) -0.234 (0.226) 0.187 (0.365) -0.080 (0.419) 0.207 (0.363) 0.835* (0.493)
Portugal -0.096 (0.160) -0.140 (0.140) -0.087 (0.066) -0.052 (0.045) -0.052 (0.045) 0.026 (0.066) -0.013 (0.110) 0.236** (0.119) 0.253** (0.112)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia -0.183 (0.183) -0.138 (0.133) -0.150 (0.135) -0.159 (0.133) 0.614*** (0.151) 0.742*** (0.185) 0.620*** (0.189) 0.580*** (0.212) 0.433** (0.212)
Slovakia 0.122 (0.102) 0.193** (0.098) 0.214** (0.101) 0.214** (0.101) -0.035 (0.159) -0.253 (0.210) 0.444 (0.278) 1.096*** (0.339) 0.537 (0.383)
Slovenia -0.116 (0.117) 0.189 (0.169) 0.222 (0.177) 0.178 (0.166) 0.145 (0.153) 0.163 (0.146) 0.122 (0.140) 0.073 (0.164) 0.050 (0.195)
Spain 0.419 (0.688) 0.063 (0.478) -0.201 (0.311) 0.198 (0.450) 0.731*** (0.123) 0.503*** (0.176) 0.412*** (0.153) 0.301** (0.144) 0.264** (0.103)
Sweden -0.014 (0.269) 0.116 (0.200) -0.004 (0.161) -0.010 (0.157) 0.008 (0.142) 0.113 (0.121) 0.105 (0.106) 0.097 (0.092) 0.007 (0.087)
UK -0.049 (0.079) 0.115 (0.114) 0.171 (0.118) 0.121 (0.105) 0.166* (0.099) 0.117 (0.091) 0.021 (0.084) 0.019 (0.083) 0.038 (0.095)
Unexplained
Austria 0.249 (0.216) 0.379*** (0.143) 0.343** (0.134) 0.401** (0.157) 0.414** (0.187) 0.543** (0.253) 0.357 (0.335) -0.170 (0.292) 0.313 (0.286)
Belgium 0.304** (0.132) 0.116 (0.129) 0.036 (0.189) 0.246 (0.226) 0.393 (0.362) 0.581 (0.490) 0.148 (0.467) -0.192 (0.327) -0.046 (0.210)
Bulgaria -0.006 (0.154) 0.008 (0.115) -0.065 (0.100) -0.134 (0.118) -0.277** (0.127) -0.191 (0.141) -0.175 (0.150) -0.097 (0.179) 0.186 (0.216)
Croatia 0.524*** (0.203) 0.441* (0.233) 0.350 (0.229) 0.282 (0.245) -0.348 (0.392) -0.526** (0.248) -0.276 (0.257) -0.047 (0.255) 0.013 (0.214)
Czechia -0.161* (0.091) -0.237*** (0.082) 0.013 (0.081) -0.263*** (0.094) -0.105 (0.097) -0.187* (0.104) -0.203 (0.135) -0.086 (0.151) 0.014 (0.235)
Denmark -1.038*** (0.330) -1.586*** (0.460) -3.677*** (1.019) -0.877 (0.595) -0.317 (0.362) 0.223 (0.269) 0.311 (0.225) 0.287 (0.203) 0.384* (0.204)
Estonia -1.043 (1.038) -1.985 (1.559) -0.969 (0.902) -0.720 (0.742) -0.835 (0.515) -0.820 (0.505) -0.146 (0.523) -0.510 (0.452) -0.315 (0.487)
Finland -0.119 (0.209) -0.428 (0.326) -0.400 (0.303) -0.139 (0.264) -0.181 (0.250) 0.306 (0.254) 0.423* (0.230) 0.365* (0.188) 0.311 (0.195)
France -0.002 (0.225) -0.370 (0.238) -0.098 (0.183) -0.210 (0.168) -0.044 (0.153) 0.043 (0.139) -0.021 (0.128) 0.003 (0.144) -0.112 (0.147)
Germany 0.028 (0.210) 0.012 (0.079) 0.047 (0.062) 0.095 (0.065) 0.045 (0.095) 0.149 (0.142) 0.226 (0.155) 0.263 (0.185) 0.150 (0.186)
Greece 0.674*** (0.226) 0.569** (0.262) -0.095 (0.323) -0.364 (0.292) -0.336 (0.255) -0.197 (0.236) -0.041 (0.244) 0.018 (0.293) 0.249 (0.441)
Hungary -0.074 (0.095) -0.105 (0.071) -0.097 (0.076) -0.166* (0.093) -0.179 (0.111) -0.326** (0.140) -0.175 (0.208) -0.286 (0.280) -0.430 (0.398)
Latvia 0.104 (0.204) 0.191 (0.262) 0.185 (0.381) 0.419 (0.557) 0.506 (0.629) 0.530 (0.626) 0.546 (0.573) 0.232 (0.403) 0.251 (0.396)
Lithuania 0.656 (0.950) 0.296 (0.625) -0.340 (0.774) -0.563 (0.754) -0.217 (0.658) -0.411 (0.529) -0.546 (0.496) -0.169 (0.475) 0.762 (0.626)
Netherlands -2.739** (1.229) -0.397 (0.270) -0.202 (0.173) -0.269** (0.133) -0.122 (0.120) -0.117 (0.125) -0.136 (0.149) -0.366*** (0.121) -0.098 (0.145)
Norway -0.478 (0.465) -0.031 (0.253) -0.001 (0.210) 0.243 (0.188) 0.252 (0.167) 0.224 (0.150) 0.334** (0.151) 0.370** (0.152) 0.357** (0.140)
Poland 1.092*** (0.328) 1.755*** (0.422) 0.674** (0.278) 0.545** (0.252) 0.462* (0.236) -0.107 (0.426) 0.252 (0.479) -0.192 (0.423) -0.728 (0.468)
Portugal -0.149 (0.253) -0.100 (0.188) 0.066 (0.100) -0.002 (0.076) -0.047 (0.076) -0.489*** (0.111) -0.024 (0.158) -0.403** (0.181) -0.432** (0.172)
Romania NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Serbia 0.235 (0.189) 0.304* (0.178) 0.162 (0.176) 0.064 (0.180) -0.956*** (0.179) -0.935*** (0.196) -0.885*** (0.185) -0.827*** (0.190) -0.454*** (0.173)
Slovakia -0.230 (0.157) -0.442*** (0.138) -0.201 (0.149) -0.530*** (0.149) -0.519** (0.210) 0.240 (0.270) -0.722** (0.360) -1.489*** (0.420) -0.768 (0.470)
Slovenia -0.063 (0.145) -0.191 (0.235) -0.377 (0.240) -0.177 (0.226) -0.050 (0.213) -0.081 (0.201) 0.113 (0.196) 0.147 (0.232) 0.109 (0.283)
Spain -0.347 (0.695) 0.037 (0.487) 0.353 (0.321) -0.098 (0.458) -0.685*** (0.140) -0.415** (0.192) -0.267 (0.169) -0.112 (0.159) 0.059 (0.122)
Sweden 0.262 (0.356) 0.447 (0.289) 0.377 (0.239) 0.386* (0.225) 0.286 (0.201) 0.199 (0.171) 0.216 (0.152) 0.269** (0.134) 0.380*** (0.132)
UK 0.252** (0.114) 0.070 (0.162) 0.388** (0.172) 0.549*** (0.158) 0.607*** (0.152) 0.659*** (0.142) 0.816*** (0.135) 0.717*** (0.136) 0.554*** (0.150)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Note: Romania is excluded due to data limitations.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.19: Public transfers gap decomposition for the age group <25
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.080 (0.178) 0.015 (0.127) -0.117 (0.106) -0.120 (0.096) -0.125 (0.100) -0.140 (0.118) -0.233 (0.146) -0.097 (0.201) -0.239 (0.220)
Belgium 0.212 (0.210) 0.095 (0.210) 0.164 (0.209) 0.097 (0.229) 0.107 (0.227) 0.205 (0.260) 0.435 (0.278) 0.291 (0.203) 0.084 (0.178)
Bulgaria -0.306 (0.240) -0.540* (0.284) -0.513** (0.248) -0.407 (0.263) -0.447* (0.271) -0.354 (0.286) -0.428 (0.292) -0.619* (0.325) -0.524* (0.304)
Croatia 0.045 (0.118) 0.004 (0.259) 0.266 (0.271) 0.156 (0.407) 0.177 (0.389) -0.105 (0.365) 0.277 (0.273) 0.204 (0.258) 0.065 (0.220)
Czechia -0.321 (0.339) -0.318 (0.439) -0.893 (0.681) -0.784 (0.659) -0.579 (0.633) -0.125 (0.395) -0.203 (0.334) -0.469 (0.306) -0.666** (0.295)
Denmark -0.072 (0.094) -0.520** (0.246) -0.826*** (0.239) -0.826*** (0.243) -0.676*** (0.204) -0.414** (0.164) -0.304** (0.127) -0.340*** (0.122) -0.138* (0.073)
Estonia -0.146 (0.098) -0.159 (0.115) -0.053 (0.157) -0.267 (0.168) -0.459** (0.212) -0.576** (0.276) -0.464 (0.322) -0.706** (0.307) -0.565*** (0.197)
Finland -0.107 (0.116) -0.210* (0.123) -0.118 (0.093) -0.093 (0.061) -0.081 (0.052) 0.007 (0.048) 0.012 (0.047) 0.037 (0.053) 0.034 (0.073)
France -0.037 (0.249) -0.080 (0.165) -0.244* (0.147) -0.208 (0.138) -0.134 (0.132) -0.169 (0.135) -0.050 (0.131) -0.087 (0.138) -0.126 (0.114)
Germany 0.017 (0.035) 0.017 (0.035) 0.017 (0.035) 0.002 (0.050) 0.002 (0.050) -0.019 (0.059) -0.043 (0.064) 0.029 (0.090) -0.077 (0.110)
Greece -0.214** (0.107) -0.090 (0.112) -0.078 (0.099) -0.119 (0.102) -0.119 (0.102) -0.319** (0.127) -0.372*** (0.119) -0.634*** (0.238) -0.491** (0.226)
Hungary -0.098* (0.057) -0.181** (0.073) -0.229*** (0.082) -0.310*** (0.101) -0.522*** (0.130) -0.741*** (0.177) -0.715*** (0.162) -0.588*** (0.149) -0.437*** (0.148)
Latvia -0.197 (0.357) 0.062 (0.339) -0.171 (0.350) -0.355 (0.318) -0.434 (0.291) -0.386 (0.262) -0.362 (0.261) -0.277 (0.240) -0.422 (0.257)
Lithuania -0.018 (0.415) -0.536 (0.404) -0.301 (0.448) -1.018** (0.514) -1.262** (0.596) -1.395** (0.580) -2.030*** (0.613) -1.482** (0.714) -0.780 (0.532)
Netherlands 0.053 (0.149) -0.189 (0.120) -0.157 (0.115) -0.190 (0.121) -0.160 (0.130) -0.073 (0.101) -0.036 (0.088) -0.062 (0.088) -0.133 (0.081)
Norway -0.070 (0.120) -0.364** (0.145) -0.264** (0.114) -0.137* (0.078) -0.011 (0.081) -0.036 (0.081) -0.040 (0.090) 0.088 (0.092) 0.093 (0.264)
Poland -0.378** (0.189) -0.549** (0.226) -0.796*** (0.291) -0.911*** (0.280) -0.718*** (0.233) -0.674*** (0.220) -0.637*** (0.201) -0.817*** (0.226) -0.729*** (0.278)
Portugal 0.257 (0.316) 0.127 (0.248) -0.027 (0.191) -0.068 (0.178) 0.087 (0.189) -0.005 (0.212) 0.021 (0.264) -0.246 (0.254) 0.131 (0.285)
Romania -0.327* (0.191) -0.057 (0.186) -0.047 (0.173) -0.167 (0.184) -0.296 (0.199) -0.163 (0.256) -0.209 (0.335) -0.635* (0.350) -0.817*** (0.312)
Serbia -0.015 (0.032) 0.026 (0.046) 0.007 (0.044) -0.036 (0.041) -0.063 (0.043) -0.053 (0.046) -0.014 (0.054) -0.069 (0.060) -0.116 (0.160)
Slovakia -0.190** (0.097) -0.166** (0.070) -0.166** (0.070) -0.209* (0.110) -0.232* (0.124) -0.471*** (0.153) -1.226*** (0.368) -0.934*** (0.321) -0.930** (0.445)
Slovenia -0.117 (0.253) -0.219 (0.185) -0.392** (0.184) -0.453*** (0.160) -0.218 (0.152) -0.257* (0.133) -0.225 (0.140) -0.360** (0.147) -0.685*** (0.209)
Spain -0.144 (0.317) -0.333 (0.309) -0.209 (0.263) 0.059 (0.173) 0.105 (0.152) -0.045 (0.143) -0.186 (0.128) -0.251* (0.130) -0.306 (0.188)
Sweden -0.102 (0.104) -0.139 (0.094) -0.133 (0.140) -0.205 (0.162) -0.461** (0.203) -0.573*** (0.213) -0.370** (0.187) -0.195 (0.144) -0.068 (0.119)
UK 0.026 (0.030) -0.091 (0.096) -0.272** (0.125) -0.263 (0.164) -0.383 (0.297) -0.325 (0.286) -0.184 (0.206) -0.226 (0.183) -0.085 (0.168)
Unexplained
Austria 0.089 (0.216) 0.274 (0.188) 0.368** (0.166) 0.232 (0.160) 0.217 (0.163) 0.090 (0.191) 0.021 (0.223) -0.169 (0.281) -0.071 (0.308)
Belgium -0.225 (0.294) -0.083 (0.301) -0.345 (0.311) -0.137 (0.314) -0.157 (0.296) -0.184 (0.321) -0.258 (0.348) -0.036 (0.342) -0.465 (0.387)
Bulgaria 0.393 (0.259) 0.675** (0.293) 0.655** (0.262) 0.480 (0.320) 0.554* (0.329) 0.342 (0.346) 0.430 (0.364) 0.835** (0.400) 0.574 (0.418)
Croatia -0.025 (0.172) -0.144 (0.303) -0.466 (0.330) -0.315 (0.488) 0.017 (0.456) 0.123 (0.423) -0.110 (0.335) -0.038 (0.302) -0.102 (0.332)
Czechia 0.511 (0.370) 0.326 (0.455) 0.632 (0.640) 0.643 (0.612) 0.380 (0.622) 0.259 (0.392) 0.278 (0.328) 0.579* (0.324) 0.837** (0.361)
Denmark -0.443 (0.854) -0.964*** (0.364) -0.806*** (0.267) -0.299 (0.278) -0.144 (0.226) -0.322 (0.207) -0.120 (0.161) 0.419*** (0.162) 0.112 (0.108)
Estonia 0.458* (0.246) 0.142 (0.268) -0.596** (0.241) -0.260 (0.249) -0.076 (0.284) 0.112 (0.339) -0.092 (0.388) 0.352 (0.358) 0.467* (0.253)
Finland -0.155 (0.166) -0.216 (0.182) -0.072 (0.114) 0.008 (0.088) 0.007 (0.075) -0.026 (0.072) 0.013 (0.071) -0.013 (0.080) -0.076 (0.108)
France -0.405 (0.374) -0.225 (0.251) 0.034 (0.219) -0.078 (0.203) -0.067 (0.198) 0.034 (0.197) -0.117 (0.189) 0.140 (0.196) 0.141 (0.174)
Germany 0.052 (0.065) -0.061 (0.063) -0.040 (0.075) -0.087 (0.082) -0.086 (0.085) -0.015 (0.096) -0.403*** (0.110) -0.473*** (0.163) -0.191 (0.181)
Greece 0.156 (0.173) -0.146 (0.167) 0.120 (0.168) 0.075 (0.167) 0.127 (0.170) 0.221 (0.221) -0.075 (0.251) 0.283 (0.340) 0.522 (0.341)
Hungary 0.019 (0.078) 0.087 (0.106) -0.137 (0.129) -0.153 (0.140) -0.032 (0.153) 0.349* (0.196) 0.447** (0.191) 0.334* (0.192) 0.238 (0.202)
Latvia 0.659 (0.520) -0.179 (0.457) 0.147 (0.461) 0.331 (0.408) 0.477 (0.369) 0.173 (0.341) 0.123 (0.337) 0.088 (0.327) 0.321 (0.346)
Lithuania -0.168 (0.591) -0.288 (0.398) -0.527 (0.458) 0.192 (0.530) 0.759 (0.598) 0.896 (0.645) 1.437** (0.666) 1.228 (0.824) 0.799 (0.600)
Netherlands -0.650*** (0.223) -0.428** (0.175) -0.622*** (0.168) -0.715*** (0.165) -0.672*** (0.163) -0.498*** (0.130) -0.354** (0.143) -0.073 (0.147) -0.142 (0.163)
Norway -0.212 (0.230) -0.079 (0.213) -0.170 (0.151) 0.079 (0.117) -0.369*** (0.127) -0.408*** (0.117) -0.071 (0.124) -0.409*** (0.135) -0.183 (0.327)
Poland 0.487** (0.240) 0.471* (0.257) 0.751** (0.296) 1.109*** (0.309) 0.925*** (0.284) 0.741*** (0.282) 0.719** (0.288) 0.636** (0.323) 0.793** (0.387)
Portugal -0.695* (0.418) -0.535 (0.342) -0.294 (0.273) -0.242 (0.271) -0.430 (0.281) -0.585** (0.276) -0.251 (0.323) 0.050 (0.331) -0.159 (0.373)
Romania -0.122 (0.201) -0.267 (0.208) -0.145 (0.186) -0.191 (0.203) 0.089 (0.229) -0.189 (0.314) -0.161 (0.421) 0.499 (0.440) 0.916** (0.425)
Serbia -0.002 (0.047) 0.002 (0.064) 0.017 (0.063) 0.043 (0.062) 0.067 (0.066) 0.031 (0.069) 0.030 (0.084) -0.041 (0.112) -0.247 (0.269)
Slovakia 0.047 (0.127) 0.113 (0.124) 0.416*** (0.159) -0.256 (0.212) -0.341 (0.272) -0.711*** (0.205) 0.284 (0.389) 0.318 (0.354) 0.637 (0.500)
Slovenia -0.867** (0.358) -0.655*** (0.250) -0.381* (0.221) -0.068 (0.197) -0.225 (0.198) -0.113 (0.188) -0.169 (0.197) -0.039 (0.210) 0.432 (0.289)
Spain 0.346 (0.477) -0.197 (0.413) -0.164 (0.310) -0.168 (0.229) -0.255 (0.207) -0.204 (0.196) -0.014 (0.189) 0.064 (0.199) 0.221 (0.270)
Sweden -0.283* (0.148) -0.070 (0.151) -0.106 (0.189) -0.268 (0.213) 0.092 (0.232) 0.102 (0.249) 0.311 (0.230) 0.439** (0.187) 0.174 (0.167)
UK -0.133 (0.107) -0.208 (0.156) -0.152 (0.193) -0.381 (0.246) -0.278 (0.354) -0.019 (0.340) 0.018 (0.260) 0.098 (0.229) -0.165 (0.217)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.20: Public transfers gap decomposition for the age group 25-44
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria -0.213* (0.110) -0.258** (0.107) -0.323*** (0.096) -0.294*** (0.091) -0.275*** (0.099) -0.272*** (0.099) -0.335*** (0.101) -0.453*** (0.111) -0.587*** (0.136)
Belgium -0.108** (0.047) -0.329*** (0.090) -0.191*** (0.068) -0.133** (0.062) -0.143** (0.066) -0.125 (0.085) -0.186** (0.093) -0.096 (0.104) -0.129 (0.091)
Bulgaria -0.151* (0.080) -0.265*** (0.083) -0.204*** (0.079) -0.228*** (0.079) -0.254*** (0.071) -0.352*** (0.080) -0.500*** (0.098) -0.467*** (0.080) -0.259*** (0.072)
Croatia 0.015 (0.111) 0.039 (0.109) -0.007 (0.092) -0.089 (0.097) -0.181** (0.087) -0.114 (0.086) -0.141 (0.088) -0.240** (0.098) -0.279** (0.112)
Czechia -0.545*** (0.129) -0.885*** (0.173) -0.827*** (0.201) -0.622*** (0.134) -0.371*** (0.091) -0.389*** (0.084) -0.456*** (0.080) -0.609*** (0.102) -0.750*** (0.136)
Denmark -0.015 (0.014) -1.407*** (0.208) -0.412*** (0.065) -0.312*** (0.050) -0.205*** (0.054) -0.171** (0.067) -0.343*** (0.126) -0.076 (0.080) 0.053 (0.056)
Estonia -0.106 (0.109) -0.068 (0.090) -0.093 (0.068) -0.068 (0.071) -0.033 (0.092) -0.142 (0.105) -0.184* (0.095) -0.216*** (0.084) -0.022 (0.067)
Finland -0.386*** (0.084) -0.349*** (0.052) -0.230*** (0.059) -0.278*** (0.076) -0.166** (0.066) -0.023 (0.051) -0.026 (0.046) -0.065 (0.044) -0.044 (0.044)
France -0.091 (0.063) -0.021 (0.049) -0.031 (0.058) -0.065 (0.068) -0.074 (0.060) -0.168*** (0.060) -0.195*** (0.062) -0.239*** (0.069) -0.131 (0.081)
Germany -0.016 (0.042) -0.016 (0.042) -0.103* (0.058) -0.111** (0.046) -0.092* (0.051) -0.205*** (0.075) -0.220*** (0.085) -0.214*** (0.078) -0.108 (0.067)
Greece -0.138* (0.073) -0.119** (0.052) -0.051 (0.049) -0.051 (0.034) -0.051 (0.034) -0.090* (0.055) -0.207** (0.093) -0.449*** (0.101) -0.981*** (0.138)
Hungary -0.088** (0.039) -0.131*** (0.035) -0.203*** (0.048) -0.267*** (0.051) -0.282*** (0.054) -0.371*** (0.079) -0.315*** (0.076) -0.252*** (0.071) -0.180** (0.083)
Latvia -0.174*** (0.065) -0.170* (0.091) -0.150** (0.074) -0.137* (0.082) -0.188 (0.120) -0.312** (0.127) -0.195* (0.100) -0.193** (0.084) -0.290*** (0.082)
Lithuania 0.040 (0.177) -0.048 (0.122) 0.071 (0.130) 0.127 (0.143) -0.033 (0.135) -0.156 (0.115) -0.172 (0.106) -0.218** (0.100) -0.158 (0.105)
Netherlands -0.124** (0.055) -0.119* (0.072) -0.082* (0.049) -0.029 (0.049) -0.098 (0.061) -0.134 (0.083) -0.140 (0.136) -0.337** (0.154) -0.450*** (0.141)
Norway -0.117** (0.056) -0.114*** (0.033) -0.007 (0.041) 0.019 (0.052) -0.002 (0.082) 0.057 (0.114) 0.040 (0.088) 0.001 (0.067) -0.010 (0.053)
Poland -0.284*** (0.087) -0.311*** (0.083) -0.269*** (0.095) -0.252*** (0.096) -0.273*** (0.103) -0.289*** (0.109) -0.477*** (0.119) -0.440*** (0.090) -0.296*** (0.087)
Portugal -0.001 (0.155) 0.027 (0.107) 0.034 (0.081) -0.016 (0.065) -0.089 (0.065) -0.112 (0.078) -0.213* (0.109) -0.162* (0.095) -0.168** (0.073)
Romania -0.095 (0.067) -0.169** (0.071) -0.063* (0.037) -0.063* (0.038) -0.104* (0.060) -0.180*** (0.053) -0.164*** (0.051) -0.317** (0.129) -0.706*** (0.250)
Serbia -0.020** (0.010) -0.014 (0.013) -0.028** (0.013) -0.025* (0.014) -0.034** (0.016) -0.055*** (0.021) -0.056** (0.024) -0.041 (0.025) -0.047 (0.043)
Slovakia -0.070 (0.052) -0.082** (0.039) -0.082** (0.039) -0.109** (0.047) -0.115** (0.047) -0.144** (0.065) -0.402*** (0.115) -0.460*** (0.078) -0.410*** (0.065)
Slovenia -0.075 (0.061) -0.088* (0.046) -0.045 (0.043) -0.089** (0.043) -0.114** (0.046) -0.116** (0.050) -0.109** (0.047) -0.139*** (0.038) -0.147*** (0.048)
Spain 0.332** (0.161) 0.124 (0.078) 0.081 (0.085) 0.138** (0.070) 0.110* (0.060) 0.065 (0.056) 0.054 (0.058) 0.012 (0.065) -0.128** (0.065)
Sweden -0.026 (0.109) -0.020 (0.081) -0.007 (0.070) -0.014 (0.069) -0.001 (0.067) -0.052 (0.064) -0.110* (0.058) -0.068 (0.049) -0.091** (0.043)
UK -0.049 (0.038) -0.049 (0.038) -0.135*** (0.050) -0.135*** (0.050) -0.206*** (0.064) -0.818*** (0.171) -0.592*** (0.137) -0.646*** (0.121) -0.537*** (0.113)
Unexplained
Austria 0.122 (0.120) 0.189 (0.121) 0.277*** (0.107) 0.297*** (0.102) 0.342*** (0.111) 0.365*** (0.112) 0.421*** (0.115) 0.514*** (0.131) 0.596*** (0.162)
Belgium 0.214*** (0.059) 0.125 (0.112) 0.180** (0.084) 0.066 (0.079) 0.102 (0.084) 0.091 (0.105) 0.074 (0.110) 0.008 (0.123) -0.008 (0.116)
Bulgaria 0.332** (0.147) 0.189 (0.123) 0.110 (0.117) 0.139 (0.114) 0.232** (0.103) 0.342*** (0.113) 0.498*** (0.137) 0.385*** (0.115) 0.095 (0.111)
Croatia 0.015 (0.154) -0.007 (0.157) 0.085 (0.127) 0.174 (0.134) 0.288** (0.127) 0.137 (0.121) 0.141 (0.120) 0.180 (0.134) 0.346** (0.159)
Czechia 0.759*** (0.130) 0.970*** (0.181) 0.969*** (0.211) 0.667*** (0.144) 0.408*** (0.098) 0.360*** (0.091) 0.397*** (0.089) 0.569*** (0.112) 0.647*** (0.149)
Denmark -0.156*** (0.029) 0.824*** (0.195) 0.041 (0.079) 0.137** (0.070) -0.024 (0.077) -0.366*** (0.113) -0.121 (0.131) 0.124 (0.101) -0.398*** (0.093)
Estonia -0.210* (0.125) -0.247** (0.112) -0.041 (0.086) -0.106 (0.089) -0.073 (0.111) 0.168 (0.123) 0.300*** (0.116) 0.308*** (0.107) 0.049 (0.091)
Finland 0.524*** (0.104) 0.174*** (0.059) 0.022 (0.070) 0.150* (0.082) 0.168** (0.075) 0.041 (0.062) 0.049 (0.058) 0.106* (0.058) -0.038 (0.062)
France -0.037 (0.081) 0.082 (0.066) 0.089 (0.078) 0.048 (0.089) 0.088 (0.077) 0.149** (0.074) 0.193*** (0.075) 0.207** (0.082) 0.154* (0.090)
Germany -0.063 (0.047) -0.054 (0.047) -0.089 (0.066) 0.061 (0.053) 0.089 (0.060) 0.163* (0.092) 0.192* (0.102) 0.142 (0.098) -0.028 (0.086)
Greece -0.097 (0.085) 0.100 (0.066) -0.250*** (0.063) 0.003 (0.046) 0.360*** (0.047) 0.086 (0.072) 0.217* (0.120) 0.410*** (0.127) 1.191*** (0.171)
Hungary 0.026 (0.046) 0.102** (0.045) 0.101 (0.063) 0.198*** (0.062) 0.255*** (0.063) 0.293*** (0.090) 0.244*** (0.090) 0.187** (0.089) 0.079 (0.106)
Latvia 0.015 (0.073) 0.008 (0.116) 0.080 (0.097) -0.146 (0.105) 0.018 (0.137) 0.199 (0.144) 0.195* (0.118) 0.191* (0.105) 0.263** (0.117)
Lithuania 0.047 (0.250) 0.157 (0.192) -0.044 (0.197) -0.196 (0.199) 0.063 (0.188) 0.128 (0.163) 0.125 (0.147) 0.234 (0.151) 0.118 (0.160)
Netherlands -0.002 (0.061) -0.179** (0.084) 0.099* (0.059) -0.034 (0.059) -0.013 (0.070) -0.015 (0.096) -0.073 (0.165) 0.032 (0.186) 0.343* (0.182)
Norway -0.247*** (0.077) -0.028 (0.046) -0.425*** (0.059) -0.293*** (0.070) -0.393*** (0.102) -0.459*** (0.135) -0.310*** (0.107) -0.195** (0.083) -0.139* (0.072)
Poland 0.139 (0.109) 0.296*** (0.112) 0.207 (0.128) 0.138 (0.124) 0.206 (0.127) 0.289** (0.134) 0.561*** (0.148) 0.583*** (0.115) 0.346*** (0.115)
Portugal -0.362 (0.266) -0.340** (0.156) -0.154 (0.127) -0.011 (0.102) -0.017 (0.098) 0.137 (0.116) 0.227 (0.167) 0.217 (0.153) 0.250** (0.125)
Romania -0.161* (0.085) -0.095 (0.086) 0.109** (0.050) 0.138** (0.054) 0.037 (0.084) 0.112 (0.073) 0.113 (0.069) 0.264 (0.161) 0.612** (0.301)
Serbia -0.002 (0.047) 0.002 (0.064) 0.017 (0.063) 0.043 (0.062) 0.067 (0.066) 0.031 (0.069) 0.030 (0.084) -0.041 (0.112) -0.247 (0.269)
Slovakia -0.083 (0.066) -0.028 (0.048) 0.307*** (0.056) -0.008 (0.062) 0.043 (0.062) -0.003 (0.085) 0.335** (0.134) 0.422*** (0.094) 0.324*** (0.084)
Slovenia -0.126 (0.095) -0.129* (0.072) -0.097 (0.067) -0.062 (0.064) -0.021 (0.064) -0.027 (0.069) -0.029 (0.065) 0.015 (0.062) 0.016 (0.076)
Spain -0.340 (0.248) -0.060 (0.127) 0.019 (0.132) -0.070 (0.107) -0.027 (0.089) -0.021 (0.080) 0.040 (0.079) 0.027 (0.087) 0.194* (0.102)
Sweden -0.124 (0.162) 0.007 (0.109) -0.083 (0.094) -0.175* (0.090) -0.238*** (0.088) -0.193** (0.084) -0.119 (0.078) -0.051 (0.068) -0.043 (0.067)
UK -0.010 (0.044) -0.057 (0.044) 0.018 (0.062) -0.008 (0.062) -0.114 (0.094) 0.219 (0.201) 0.144 (0.166) 0.030 (0.145) 0.103 (0.140)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.21: Public transfers gap decomposition for the age group 45-65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria -0.022 (0.111) -0.078 (0.086) -0.188** (0.092) -0.308*** (0.092) -0.445*** (0.113) -0.828*** (0.160) -0.629*** (0.114) -0.248*** (0.073) -0.133** (0.059)
Belgium -0.246*** (0.069) -0.272*** (0.091) -0.227*** (0.082) -0.264** (0.105) -0.484*** (0.131) -0.131 (0.085) -0.014 (0.056) 0.006 (0.043) -0.049 (0.037)
Bulgaria -0.131** (0.061) -0.087 (0.077) -0.145 (0.090) -0.190** (0.092) -0.056 (0.052) -0.034 (0.043) 0.015 (0.039) -0.015 (0.037) 0.004 (0.035)
Croatia -0.444*** (0.118) -0.677*** (0.124) -0.468*** (0.099) -0.158*** (0.057) -0.046 (0.039) 0.018 (0.034) 0.063** (0.031) 0.075** (0.031) 0.056* (0.030)
Czechia -0.515*** (0.098) -1.000*** (0.174) -0.802*** (0.109) -0.373*** (0.060) -0.201*** (0.045) -0.083** (0.035) -0.049* (0.029) -0.024 (0.026) 0.005 (0.025)
Denmark -0.027* (0.016) -0.027* (0.016) -0.136 (0.160) -0.125 (0.084) -0.200*** (0.076) -0.259*** (0.083) -0.993*** (0.231) -0.447*** (0.097) -0.206*** (0.065)
Estonia -0.222*** (0.040) -0.175*** (0.049) -0.363*** (0.076) -0.521*** (0.115) -0.232*** (0.076) -0.157*** (0.051) -0.059 (0.039) -0.046 (0.036) -0.031 (0.031)
Finland 0.130** (0.051) 0.118* (0.063) 0.089 (0.077) 0.065 (0.126) -0.040 (0.054) -0.063 (0.043) -0.056 (0.039) -0.010 (0.033) -0.018 (0.030)
France -0.194*** (0.055) -0.250*** (0.061) -0.500*** (0.084) -0.620*** (0.100) -0.465*** (0.087) -0.204*** (0.057) -0.083* (0.043) -0.017 (0.036) -0.016 (0.034)
Germany -0.084** (0.038) -0.060** (0.027) -0.227*** (0.056) -0.249*** (0.048) -0.373*** (0.049) -0.775*** (0.099) -0.340*** (0.055) -0.128*** (0.039) -0.104** (0.044)
Greece -0.147*** (0.042) -0.263*** (0.049) -0.423*** (0.052) -0.894*** (0.091) -1.908*** (0.174) -0.670*** (0.088) -0.243*** (0.038) -0.148*** (0.025) -0.066*** (0.019)
Hungary -0.034 (0.033) -0.124*** (0.036) -0.321*** (0.055) -0.629*** (0.084) -0.466*** (0.061) -0.424*** (0.056) -0.324*** (0.050) -0.234*** (0.040) -0.223*** (0.040)
Latvia -0.072 (0.093) -0.323*** (0.097) -0.515*** (0.122) -0.404*** (0.105) -0.307*** (0.079) -0.229*** (0.073) -0.203*** (0.065) -0.101* (0.059) -0.070 (0.067)
Lithuania -0.208** (0.097) -0.187* (0.102) -0.310*** (0.101) -0.209*** (0.081) -0.190*** (0.073) -0.144** (0.070) -0.124** (0.062) -0.130** (0.053) -0.132** (0.054)
Netherlands -0.243*** (0.040) -0.367*** (0.049) -0.407*** (0.047) -0.505*** (0.054) -0.876*** (0.090) -1.441*** (0.152) -0.632*** (0.071) -0.256*** (0.051) -0.119*** (0.040)
Norway -0.006 (0.049) -0.109** (0.051) -0.172*** (0.053) -0.285*** (0.063) -0.696*** (0.146) -0.868*** (0.165) -0.310*** (0.077) -0.194*** (0.057) -0.147*** (0.051)
Poland -0.726*** (0.113) -0.863*** (0.124) -0.572*** (0.085) -0.220*** (0.040) -0.164*** (0.035) -0.106*** (0.037) -0.071* (0.041) -0.029 (0.040) 0.047 (0.038)
Portugal -0.168 (0.180) -0.171 (0.109) -0.235* (0.126) -0.416*** (0.150) 0.004 (0.073) 0.053 (0.058) 0.010 (0.051) -0.038 (0.050) -0.041 (0.055)
Romania -0.167*** (0.049) -0.240*** (0.049) -0.406*** (0.057) -0.854*** (0.094) -1.436*** (0.125) -2.049*** (0.224) -0.561*** (0.081) -0.339*** (0.061) -0.217*** (0.055)
Serbia -0.069*** (0.014) -0.100*** (0.016) -0.131*** (0.019) -0.188*** (0.022) -0.245*** (0.026) -0.369*** (0.033) -0.693*** (0.049) -3.313*** (0.236) -0.529*** (0.055)
Slovakia -0.129*** (0.039) -0.194*** (0.048) -0.278*** (0.070) -0.375*** (0.081) -1.217*** (0.175) -0.814*** (0.116) -0.278*** (0.055) -0.147*** (0.041) -0.154*** (0.036)
Slovenia -0.089** (0.043) -0.206*** (0.052) -0.297*** (0.057) -0.270*** (0.054) -0.222*** (0.045) -0.147*** (0.034) -0.108*** (0.025) -0.098*** (0.021) -0.100*** (0.022)
Spain -0.088 (0.072) -0.037 (0.057) -0.040 (0.046) 0.020 (0.038) 0.020 (0.035) 0.021 (0.044) 0.052 (0.041) 0.044 (0.041) -0.027 (0.042)
Sweden -0.155* (0.080) -0.212*** (0.074) -0.249*** (0.073) -0.337*** (0.084) -0.461*** (0.108) -0.427*** (0.140) -0.231** (0.100) -0.076 (0.068) 0.030 (0.058)
UK -0.198*** (0.053) -0.230*** (0.052) -0.397*** (0.066) -0.763*** (0.117) -0.773*** (0.105) -0.439*** (0.066) -0.292*** (0.053) -0.222*** (0.046) -0.143*** (0.046)
Unexplained
Austria 0.090 (0.137) 0.115 (0.104) 0.215** (0.107) 0.310*** (0.102) 0.414*** (0.119) 0.758*** (0.153) 0.740*** (0.115) 0.425*** (0.081) 0.366*** (0.076)
Belgium 0.140 (0.091) 0.247** (0.118) 0.190* (0.101) 0.188 (0.116) 0.343*** (0.127) 0.185** (0.089) 0.182*** (0.066) 0.182*** (0.054) 0.224*** (0.054)
Bulgaria 0.438*** (0.115) 0.411*** (0.123) 0.323** (0.133) 0.440*** (0.120) 0.253*** (0.068) 0.306*** (0.058) 0.316*** (0.058) 0.416*** (0.059) 0.509*** (0.060)
Croatia 0.685*** (0.145) 0.831*** (0.145) 0.555*** (0.105) 0.374*** (0.061) 0.260*** (0.048) 0.236*** (0.046) 0.284*** (0.043) 0.353*** (0.046) 0.218*** (0.051)
Czechia 0.502*** (0.133) 0.673*** (0.183) 0.506*** (0.111) 0.215*** (0.064) 0.063 (0.049) 0.071* (0.041) 0.059* (0.036) 0.168*** (0.034) 0.143*** (0.034)
Denmark 0.056*** (0.017) 0.113*** (0.017) 1.072*** (0.196) 0.194 (0.124) 0.114 (0.109) -0.270** (0.138) 0.318 (0.265) 0.226* (0.120) 0.185** (0.092)
Estonia 0.280*** (0.071) 0.197*** (0.075) 0.389*** (0.111) 0.438*** (0.153) 0.228** (0.098) 0.161** (0.069) 0.013 (0.054) 0.049 (0.052) 0.054 (0.047)
Finland -0.086 (0.078) -0.158* (0.088) -0.182* (0.096) 0.005 (0.129) 0.284*** (0.062) 0.211*** (0.052) 0.170*** (0.050) 0.161*** (0.045) 0.200*** (0.045)
France 0.230*** (0.079) 0.291*** (0.084) 0.461*** (0.115) 0.697*** (0.118) 0.718*** (0.100) 0.495*** (0.068) 0.375*** (0.057) 0.252*** (0.051) 0.203*** (0.050)
Germany -0.058 (0.048) 0.071** (0.035) 0.179*** (0.069) 0.224*** (0.058) 0.074 (0.069) 0.718*** (0.106) 0.328*** (0.061) 0.189*** (0.048) 0.352*** (0.061)
Greece 0.295*** (0.063) 0.506*** (0.069) 0.164** (0.077) 0.250* (0.140) 1.102*** (0.152) 0.728*** (0.083) 0.426*** (0.043) 0.387*** (0.037) 0.229*** (0.033)
Hungary -0.007 (0.051) -0.030 (0.059) -0.078 (0.078) 0.154* (0.087) 0.116* (0.066) 0.101 (0.062) 0.121** (0.060) 0.058 (0.055) 0.172*** (0.063)
Latvia -0.094 (0.134) 0.134 (0.138) 0.305* (0.163) 0.258** (0.127) 0.258*** (0.096) 0.223** (0.091) 0.276*** (0.083) 0.173** (0.080) 0.299*** (0.092)
Lithuania 0.483*** (0.139) 0.252* (0.137) 0.451*** (0.139) 0.324*** (0.115) 0.208** (0.100) 0.097 (0.095) 0.170* (0.087) 0.202*** (0.078) 0.257*** (0.084)
Netherlands 0.278*** (0.052) 0.436*** (0.064) 0.322*** (0.062) 0.338*** (0.073) 0.502*** (0.116) 1.392*** (0.165) 0.797*** (0.093) 0.345*** (0.072) 0.386*** (0.060)
Norway -0.115 (0.076) -0.311*** (0.079) -0.193** (0.088) -0.650*** (0.105) -0.432*** (0.157) 0.415** (0.170) 0.245*** (0.084) 0.266*** (0.070) 0.274*** (0.072)
Poland 0.450*** (0.129) 0.530*** (0.139) 0.344*** (0.091) 0.123** (0.048) 0.146*** (0.045) 0.140*** (0.047) 0.212*** (0.053) 0.288*** (0.051) 0.340*** (0.047)
Portugal 0.132 (0.277) 0.233 (0.153) 0.298* (0.159) 0.807*** (0.177) 0.411*** (0.091) 0.252*** (0.072) 0.301*** (0.066) 0.475*** (0.067) 0.634*** (0.090)
Romania 0.228*** (0.075) 0.194*** (0.072) 0.284*** (0.090) 0.518*** (0.154) -0.128 (0.129) 1.624*** (0.235) 0.554*** (0.096) 0.427*** (0.083) 0.500*** (0.079)
Serbia 0.054** (0.022) 0.069*** (0.025) 0.075*** (0.028) 0.135*** (0.031) 0.173*** (0.036) 0.173*** (0.049) -0.548*** (0.104) 2.776*** (0.238) 0.529*** (0.078)
Slovakia 0.047 (0.063) 0.038 (0.079) -0.321*** (0.113) -0.180 (0.139) 0.222 (0.161) 0.366*** (0.101) 0.265*** (0.059) 0.215*** (0.055) 0.264*** (0.053)
Slovenia 0.239*** (0.078) 0.289*** (0.081) 0.263*** (0.081) 0.111 (0.070) -0.031 (0.052) 0.018 (0.038) 0.119*** (0.034) 0.114*** (0.033) 0.106*** (0.039)
Spain 0.353*** (0.116) 0.245*** (0.088) 0.231*** (0.069) 0.191*** (0.061) 0.074 (0.050) 0.212*** (0.056) 0.204*** (0.052) 0.253*** (0.055) 0.419*** (0.065)
Sweden 0.062 (0.111) 0.050 (0.109) 0.211* (0.108) -0.047 (0.125) -0.056 (0.137) -0.051 (0.161) 0.014 (0.119) 0.008 (0.089) -0.022 (0.080)
UK 0.047 (0.076) 0.272*** (0.082) 0.374*** (0.097) 0.303** (0.137) 0.653*** (0.123) 0.412*** (0.083) 0.390*** (0.072) 0.347*** (0.068) 0.316*** (0.071)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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TABLE A.22: Public transfers gap decomposition for the age group >65
Country
Quantile:
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Explained
Austria 0.113** (0.057) 0.172*** (0.042) 0.128*** (0.032) 0.111*** (0.029) 0.116*** (0.025) 0.092*** (0.022) 0.074*** (0.021) 0.084*** (0.022) 0.137*** (0.033)
Belgium 0.062 (0.041) 0.081*** (0.029) 0.076*** (0.024) 0.057*** (0.022) 0.057*** (0.021) 0.063*** (0.023) 0.101*** (0.018) 0.103*** (0.020) 0.119*** (0.030)
Bulgaria 0.086*** (0.022) 0.066*** (0.018) 0.049*** (0.014) 0.048*** (0.014) 0.049*** (0.015) 0.046*** (0.016) 0.057*** (0.017) 0.060*** (0.022) 0.026 (0.028)
Croatia 0.784*** (0.150) 0.291*** (0.050) 0.285*** (0.033) 0.260*** (0.026) 0.237*** (0.027) 0.145*** (0.023) 0.127*** (0.022) 0.078*** (0.028) 0.068 (0.053)
Czechia 0.016** (0.008) 0.014** (0.006) 0.013* (0.008) 0.015 (0.012) 0.007 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) -0.004 (0.007) -0.002 (0.010) -0.007 (0.009)
Denmark -0.118*** (0.017) -0.098*** (0.012) -0.102*** (0.011) -0.099*** (0.012) -0.090*** (0.015) -0.091*** (0.017) -0.098*** (0.023) -0.052** (0.026) 0.013 (0.020)
Estonia 0.080*** (0.029) 0.044** (0.020) 0.018* (0.011) 0.012 (0.009) 0.002 (0.008) -0.001 (0.009) -0.006 (0.009) -0.015 (0.015) -0.016 (0.021)
Finland 0.005 (0.021) 0.020 (0.022) 0.012 (0.021) 0.048** (0.021) 0.055*** (0.021) 0.072*** (0.021) 0.084*** (0.019) 0.122*** (0.019) 0.117*** (0.020)
France 0.044 (0.027) 0.019 (0.021) 0.017 (0.018) -0.003 (0.016) 0.012 (0.017) 0.042** (0.018) 0.036* (0.020) 0.043* (0.024) 0.096*** (0.026)
Germany 0.158*** (0.048) 0.101*** (0.027) 0.055** (0.022) 0.030 (0.019) 0.038** (0.016) 0.040*** (0.015) 0.053*** (0.016) 0.080*** (0.022) 0.127*** (0.028)
Greece 0.118*** (0.022) 0.199*** (0.024) 0.206*** (0.043) 0.262*** (0.036) 0.243*** (0.028) 0.222*** (0.029) 0.157*** (0.028) 0.144*** (0.015) 0.099*** (0.011)
Hungary 0.019 (0.042) 0.004 (0.027) 0.035 (0.022) 0.018 (0.022) 0.036* (0.022) 0.054*** (0.021) 0.065*** (0.022) 0.072*** (0.027) 0.091*** (0.027)
Latvia 0.079** (0.034) 0.027 (0.018) 0.032* (0.017) 0.032** (0.016) 0.022 (0.017) 0.039** (0.019) 0.061** (0.024) 0.112*** (0.035) 0.101** (0.041)
Lithuania 0.048 (0.042) 0.054* (0.030) 0.055** (0.026) 0.062*** (0.024) 0.031 (0.023) 0.029 (0.022) 0.029 (0.025) 0.035 (0.034) 0.052 (0.037)
Netherlands 0.083** (0.042) 0.091*** (0.027) 0.110*** (0.025) 0.135*** (0.025) 0.185*** (0.026) 0.195*** (0.021) 0.185*** (0.018) 0.205*** (0.018) 0.212*** (0.023)
Norway -0.039 (0.028) -0.020 (0.022) 0.002 (0.023) -0.002 (0.023) 0.029 (0.020) 0.030 (0.019) 0.042** (0.017) 0.058*** (0.017) 0.050** (0.022)
Poland 0.038 (0.028) 0.046* (0.026) 0.069*** (0.023) 0.080*** (0.021) 0.048*** (0.019) 0.036** (0.018) 0.047*** (0.018) 0.041** (0.020) 0.022 (0.027)
Portugal 0.025 (0.020) 0.122*** (0.022) 0.129*** (0.023) 0.152*** (0.025) 0.197*** (0.028) 0.235*** (0.032) 0.284*** (0.037) 0.221*** (0.034) 0.142*** (0.036)
Romania 0.159*** (0.035) 0.300*** (0.033) 0.269*** (0.025) 0.191*** (0.020) 0.164*** (0.019) 0.180*** (0.017) 0.162*** (0.019) 0.119*** (0.016) 0.085*** (0.019)
Serbia 0.597*** (0.085) 0.796*** (0.077) 0.414*** (0.036) 0.282*** (0.030) 0.262*** (0.023) 0.203*** (0.021) 0.165*** (0.020) 0.121*** (0.022) 0.115*** (0.028)
Slovakia 0.023 (0.018) 0.028* (0.015) 0.007 (0.013) -0.011 (0.013) -0.021 (0.016) -0.021 (0.017) -0.031* (0.017) -0.030 (0.019) -0.009 (0.020)
Slovenia 0.125*** (0.027) 0.135*** (0.021) 0.098*** (0.018) 0.090*** (0.015) 0.079*** (0.016) 0.072*** (0.017) 0.064*** (0.021) 0.083*** (0.030) 0.087*** (0.026)
Spain 0.237*** (0.050) 0.273*** (0.018) 0.267*** (0.022) 0.232*** (0.028) 0.264*** (0.032) 0.254*** (0.025) 0.206*** (0.023) 0.187*** (0.022) 0.085*** (0.015)
Sweden -0.061** (0.029) 0.019 (0.026) 0.031 (0.020) 0.037** (0.017) 0.057*** (0.014) 0.054*** (0.013) 0.066*** (0.014) 0.062*** (0.020) 0.089*** (0.029)
UK -0.056*** (0.021) -0.053*** (0.019) -0.042** (0.020) -0.057*** (0.019) -0.044** (0.020) -0.030 (0.022) -0.021 (0.025) 0.008 (0.026) 0.067*** (0.024)
Unexplained
Austria 0.701*** (0.082) 0.540*** (0.062) 0.500*** (0.044) 0.476*** (0.038) 0.457*** (0.035) 0.419*** (0.032) 0.367*** (0.031) 0.299*** (0.032) 0.202*** (0.041)
Belgium 0.882*** (0.138) 0.243*** (0.051) 0.178*** (0.032) 0.197*** (0.028) 0.210*** (0.027) 0.213*** (0.029) 0.164*** (0.024) 0.166*** (0.026) 0.135*** (0.039)
Bulgaria 0.051 (0.032) 0.158*** (0.027) 0.199*** (0.021) 0.192*** (0.021) 0.212*** (0.022) 0.246*** (0.023) 0.281*** (0.025) 0.331*** (0.031) 0.426*** (0.041)
Croatia -0.460*** (0.166) 0.027 (0.057) -0.082** (0.038) 0.016 (0.030) 0.082*** (0.031) 0.178*** (0.028) 0.161*** (0.027) 0.130*** (0.032) 0.230*** (0.056)
Czechia 0.155*** (0.011) 0.150*** (0.008) 0.103*** (0.011) 0.082*** (0.014) 0.137*** (0.008) 0.142*** (0.008) 0.091*** (0.010) 0.121*** (0.012) 0.035** (0.014)
Denmark 0.123*** (0.020) 0.130*** (0.017) 0.097*** (0.017) 0.078*** (0.019) 0.046** (0.023) 0.064** (0.027) 0.135*** (0.035) 0.175*** (0.040) 0.123*** (0.037)
Estonia -0.180*** (0.039) -0.092*** (0.026) -0.018 (0.014) -0.001 (0.011) 0.021* (0.011) 0.025** (0.012) 0.038*** (0.013) 0.086*** (0.020) 0.123*** (0.028)
Finland 0.126*** (0.029) 0.100*** (0.028) 0.152*** (0.027) 0.132*** (0.026) 0.128*** (0.027) 0.114*** (0.026) 0.134*** (0.024) 0.127*** (0.024) 0.213*** (0.026)
France 0.843*** (0.066) 0.493*** (0.035) 0.428*** (0.028) 0.363*** (0.025) 0.292*** (0.024) 0.247*** (0.025) 0.216*** (0.027) 0.239*** (0.032) 0.230*** (0.034)
Germany 0.947*** (0.068) 0.737*** (0.047) 0.580*** (0.034) 0.526*** (0.028) 0.463*** (0.024) 0.392*** (0.024) 0.325*** (0.024) 0.284*** (0.030) 0.299*** (0.035)
Greece 0.025 (0.028) 0.124*** (0.028) 0.216*** (0.045) 0.128*** (0.038) 0.156*** (0.030) 0.146*** (0.030) 0.267*** (0.029) 0.226*** (0.018) 0.196*** (0.018)
Hungary 0.117* (0.060) 0.092*** (0.035) 0.074** (0.029) 0.093*** (0.028) 0.078*** (0.026) 0.101*** (0.025) 0.108*** (0.026) 0.125*** (0.033) 0.128*** (0.032)
Latvia -0.098** (0.047) -0.004 (0.024) 0.027 (0.022) 0.049** (0.020) 0.080*** (0.021) 0.077*** (0.024) 0.094*** (0.030) 0.094** (0.042) 0.155*** (0.051)
Lithuania 0.090* (0.055) 0.117*** (0.040) 0.120*** (0.036) 0.113*** (0.033) 0.137*** (0.031) 0.119*** (0.029) 0.133*** (0.033) 0.147*** (0.043) 0.125** (0.050)
Netherlands 0.193*** (0.052) 0.294*** (0.035) 0.459*** (0.032) 0.438*** (0.034) 0.325*** (0.036) 0.315*** (0.027) 0.343*** (0.023) 0.336*** (0.023) 0.366*** (0.029)
Norway 0.440*** (0.037) 0.362*** (0.031) 0.302*** (0.030) 0.306*** (0.030) 0.251*** (0.028) 0.217*** (0.026) 0.184*** (0.024) 0.156*** (0.024) 0.153*** (0.032)
Poland 0.048 (0.035) 0.106*** (0.033) 0.125*** (0.029) 0.140*** (0.026) 0.195*** (0.023) 0.216*** (0.022) 0.203*** (0.022) 0.223*** (0.024) 0.259*** (0.035)
Portugal 0.157*** (0.026) 0.142*** (0.027) 0.155*** (0.029) 0.157*** (0.033) 0.157*** (0.034) 0.183*** (0.037) 0.272*** (0.042) 0.387*** (0.043) 0.314*** (0.047)
Romania 0.011 (0.044) 0.067* (0.038) 0.135*** (0.029) 0.205*** (0.025) 0.089*** (0.022) 0.101*** (0.018) 0.213*** (0.020) 0.313*** (0.020) 0.107*** (0.027)
Serbia 1.022*** (0.154) -0.412*** (0.088) 0.078* (0.043) 0.166*** (0.037) 0.132*** (0.032) 0.168*** (0.030) 0.143*** (0.029) 0.124*** (0.031) 0.147*** (0.041)
Slovakia 0.099*** (0.024) 0.078*** (0.021) 0.064*** (0.018) 0.062*** (0.017) 0.073*** (0.021) 0.070*** (0.022) 0.072*** (0.023) 0.086*** (0.026) 0.084*** (0.029)
Slovenia 0.083** (0.039) 0.042 (0.028) 0.102*** (0.024) 0.105*** (0.020) 0.085*** (0.021) 0.083*** (0.022) 0.109*** (0.027) 0.155*** (0.038) 0.188*** (0.039)
Spain 0.212*** (0.052) -0.153*** (0.023) -0.027 (0.025) 0.044 (0.030) 0.199*** (0.034) 0.264*** (0.028) 0.315*** (0.030) 0.314*** (0.029) 0.361*** (0.032)
Sweden 0.317*** (0.038) 0.226*** (0.035) 0.205*** (0.026) 0.202*** (0.022) 0.209*** (0.018) 0.200*** (0.017) 0.186*** (0.018) 0.234*** (0.025) 0.286*** (0.038)
UK 0.565*** (0.030) 0.508*** (0.037) 0.425*** (0.032) 0.395*** (0.030) 0.368*** (0.032) 0.311*** (0.034) 0.340*** (0.037) 0.354*** (0.038) 0.302*** (0.042)
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: author’s calculations from EU-SILC 2016 data.
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